Lab 03 Map AI Threats Using OWASP and MITRE ATLAS
Mission Information
Section titled “Mission Information”| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Mission | Map AI Threats Using OWASP and MITRE ATLAS |
| Role | Junior AI Security Engineer |
| Difficulty | Beginner → Intermediate |
| Estimated Time | 60–90 minutes |
| Primary Skills | AI Threat Identification, OWASP Mapping, MITRE ATLAS Mapping, Risk Analysis |
| Environment | Documentation / Threat Modeling Lab |
| Output | AI Threat Register + Threat Mapping + Security Recommendations |
Mission Scenario
Section titled “Mission Scenario”You have recently joined the AI Security Engineering team of a fictional enterprise.
The organization is preparing to deploy an internal AI assistant called:
Enterprise Knowledge Assistant
Employees will use the assistant to search internal documentation, summarize information and answer business questions.
The application uses:
- A web interface
- Enterprise authentication
- Application APIs
- A Large Language Model
- Retrieval-Augmented Generation
- A vector database
- Internal documents
- Cloud storage
- Logging and monitoring
The architecture team has asked the AI Security team to perform an initial threat assessment before production deployment.
Your task is to:
- Understand the architecture.
- Identify important assets.
- Identify possible AI attack scenarios.
- Map relevant risks to OWASP guidance.
- Map adversary behaviors to MITRE ATLAS.
- Identify existing and missing controls.
- Prioritize the threats.
- Produce an AI Threat Register.
You are not attacking a real system.
This is a threat modeling and security analysis exercise.
Mission Objective
Section titled “Mission Objective”By completing this lab, you should understand the difference between:
A vulnerability category
and
An adversary technique or behavior.
OWASP guidance helps us understand important application security risk categories and defensive considerations.
MITRE ATLAS helps us understand how adversaries may target AI-enabled systems through tactics and techniques.
Together they provide different perspectives on the same environment.
Learning Objectives
Section titled “Learning Objectives”By the end of this lab, you should be able to:
- Analyze an enterprise AI architecture.
- Identify important AI assets.
- Identify trust boundaries.
- Develop realistic AI attack scenarios.
- Use OWASP AI/LLM security guidance during an assessment.
- Use MITRE ATLAS to analyze adversary behavior.
- Understand the difference between OWASP and MITRE ATLAS.
- Map threats across multiple frameworks.
- Identify preventive and detective controls.
- Prioritize AI security risks.
- Create an enterprise-style AI Threat Register.
- Communicate AI security findings clearly.
Prerequisites
Section titled “Prerequisites”Before beginning, you should have completed:
- 01 Introduction to AI Security
- 02 How AI and Machine Learning Systems Work
- 03 Generative AI and LLM Architecture
- 04 Enterprise AI Architecture
- 05 AI Security Attack Surface
- 06 AI Security Threat Landscape
- 07 OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
- 08 MITRE ATLAS
You should also have completed:
- Lab 01 — Explore an Enterprise AI Architecture
- Lab 02 — Identify AI Attack Surfaces
This lab combines those skills.
Framework Note
Section titled “Framework Note”AI security frameworks evolve quickly.
For this lab, use the current official OWASP guidance relevant to LLM/Generative AI applications and the current MITRE ATLAS knowledge base when performing your mapping.
Do not treat framework identifiers as permanent.
The important skill is learning how to:
Identify the threat → locate the relevant framework entry → justify the mapping → recommend controls.
Understanding the Two Frameworks
Section titled “Understanding the Two Frameworks”Before starting, understand what each framework contributes.
OWASP guidance helps security teams understand common security risks affecting AI and LLM-enabled applications.
It is useful for questions such as:
What application security weakness exists?
What design problem makes the attack possible?
What controls should developers consider?
Examples of areas you may encounter include:
- Prompt injection
- Sensitive information disclosure
- Supply-chain risk
- Data or model poisoning
- Improper output handling
- Excessive agency
- System prompt leakage
- Vector and embedding weaknesses
- Misinformation
- Resource or consumption risks
Use the terminology from the current OWASP guidance available when you perform the lab.
MITRE ATLAS
Section titled “MITRE ATLAS”MITRE ATLAS focuses more heavily on adversarial behavior against AI-enabled systems.
It helps answer:
What is the attacker trying to achieve?
What technique could they use?
Where does this behavior fit in an attack lifecycle?
ATLAS can therefore help security teams understand potential adversary activity and connect AI security with:
- Threat intelligence
- Detection engineering
- Red teaming
- Threat hunting
- Incident response
OWASP vs MITRE ATLAS
Section titled “OWASP vs MITRE ATLAS”A simple way to remember the distinction is:
OWASP ↓"What security risks should we design and test for?"
MITRE ATLAS ↓"How might an adversary operate against this AI system?"Neither replaces the other.
Together they can provide a stronger view.
Enterprise Architecture
Section titled “Enterprise Architecture”The system being assessed looks like this:
Employees │ ▼ ┌───────────────┐ │ Web Interface │ └───────┬───────┘ │ ▼ ┌───────────────┐ │ Application │ │ API │ └───────┬───────┘ │ ▼ ┌───────────────┐ │ AI / LLM │ │ Application │ └───────┬───────┘ │ ┌──────────────┼──────────────┐ │ │ │ ▼ ▼ ▼ ┌─────────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌───────────┐ │ LLM │ │ RAG │ │ Logging & │ │ Service │ │ Pipeline │ │ Monitoring│ └─────────┘ └─────┬─────┘ └───────────┘ │ ▼ ┌───────────────┐ │ Vector │ │ Database │ └───────┬───────┘ │ ▼ ┌───────────────┐ │ Enterprise │ │ Documents │ └───────────────┘The application processes internal company information.
Some documents may contain:
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HR information
-
Security procedures
-
Engineering documentation
-
Internal policies
-
Customer information
-
Operational documentation
This means both the AI system and the underlying enterprise data require protection.
Step 1 — Identify the Assets
Section titled “Step 1 — Identify the Assets”Begin by identifying what the organization needs to protect.
Create an asset inventory.
Example:
| Asset | Why It Matters |
|---|---|
| LLM Application | Provides the AI capability |
| Enterprise Documents | May contain sensitive information |
| Vector Database | Contains embeddings and indexed knowledge |
| Application API | Provides access to backend functionality |
| User Identity | Determines who can access the application |
| Service Credentials | Allow components to communicate |
| System Instructions | Influence application behavior |
| Logs | Provide security and investigation evidence |
| Cloud Infrastructure | Hosts supporting components |
Add additional assets you identify.
Step 2 — Classify the Assets
Section titled “Step 2 — Classify the Assets”Not every asset has the same sensitivity.
Create a simple classification.
Example:
| Asset | Classification |
|---|---|
| Public documentation | Public |
| Internal procedures | Internal |
| Architecture documentation | Confidential |
| Customer records | Confidential |
| Credentials | Restricted |
| API keys | Restricted |
Ask:
What would happen if this asset were disclosed?
What would happen if it were modified?
What would happen if it became unavailable?
This introduces the traditional security principles of:
Confidentiality + Integrity + Availability
into AI threat analysis.
Step 3 — Identify Trust Boundaries
Section titled “Step 3 — Identify Trust Boundaries”Look at the architecture again.
Identify locations where data moves between different security contexts.
Potential trust boundaries include:
Employee │ ▼Web ApplicationApplication │ ▼LLM ServiceRAG Pipeline │ ▼Enterprise DocumentsApplication │ ▼External AI ProviderEach trust boundary deserves security attention.
Ask:
-
Is the caller authenticated?
-
Is authorization enforced?
-
Is input trusted?
-
Is output trusted?
-
Is communication protected?
-
Is activity logged?
Step 4 — Identify Threat Actors
Section titled “Step 4 — Identify Threat Actors”Now consider who or what could create risk.
Possible threat actors include:
External Attacker
Section titled “External Attacker”Attempts to gain unauthorized access.
Malicious Insider
Section titled “Malicious Insider”Already has legitimate access but intentionally abuses it.
Compromised Employee Account
Section titled “Compromised Employee Account”A legitimate identity is controlled by an attacker.
Compromised Application
Section titled “Compromised Application”A connected system has been breached.
Malicious Content
Section titled “Malicious Content”Documents or external content contain instructions intended to influence AI behavior.
Supply-Chain Adversary
Section titled “Supply-Chain Adversary”Compromises models, packages, dependencies or supporting components.
Record the threat actors relevant to your scenario.
Step 5 — Identify Entry Points
Section titled “Step 5 — Identify Entry Points”Determine how information enters the AI environment.
Potential entry points include:
-
User prompts
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Uploaded documents
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RAG documents
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APIs
-
Model inputs
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External websites
-
Plugins
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Agent tools
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Third-party data
-
Software dependencies
Represent them as:
User Prompt │ ▼AI Applicationand:
External Document │ ▼RAG Pipeline │ ▼LLM ContextThe second path is especially important.
The user may not directly control everything that enters the model context.
Step 6 — Create Initial Threat Scenarios
Section titled “Step 6 — Create Initial Threat Scenarios”Now create realistic scenarios.
Do not start with framework identifiers.
Start with the business and technical threat.
Threat Scenario 1 — Direct Prompt Manipulation
Section titled “Threat Scenario 1 — Direct Prompt Manipulation”An employee submits specially crafted instructions attempting to make the AI ignore intended restrictions.
Potential impact:
-
Unauthorized behavior
-
Security control bypass
-
Information disclosure
-
Unexpected application actions
Threat Scenario 2 — Malicious RAG Document
Section titled “Threat Scenario 2 — Malicious RAG Document”An attacker places malicious instructions inside a document that later enters the RAG knowledge base.
Flow:
Malicious Document ↓Document Repository ↓RAG Ingestion ↓Vector Database ↓Retrieved Context ↓LLM ↓Manipulated ResponseThis represents an important indirect trust problem.
Threat Scenario 3 — Sensitive Information Disclosure
Section titled “Threat Scenario 3 — Sensitive Information Disclosure”A user attempts to retrieve information they should not be permitted to access.
Potential targets:
-
HR records
-
Customer information
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Credentials
-
Internal architecture
-
Security procedures
Threat Scenario 4 — Unsafe Model Output
Section titled “Threat Scenario 4 — Unsafe Model Output”The model produces output that another component treats as trusted instructions or executable content.
Flow:
LLM Output ↓Application ↓Trusted Processing ↓Security ImpactThreat Scenario 5 — Poisoned Knowledge Source
Section titled “Threat Scenario 5 — Poisoned Knowledge Source”An attacker modifies enterprise content used by the AI system.
The system begins producing manipulated or incorrect responses.
Potential impact:
-
Integrity loss
-
Misinformation
-
Incorrect decisions
-
Security control manipulation
Threat Scenario 6 — AI Supply-Chain Compromise
Section titled “Threat Scenario 6 — AI Supply-Chain Compromise”A compromised dependency, model, library or package is introduced into the environment.
Potential impact:
-
Code execution
-
Data theft
-
Backdoors
-
Model manipulation
-
Infrastructure compromise
Threat Scenario 7 — Excessive AI Permissions
Section titled “Threat Scenario 7 — Excessive AI Permissions”An AI component or future AI agent has more permissions than required.
If manipulated or compromised, the AI may access unrelated systems or data.
Threat Scenario 8 — Resource Abuse
Section titled “Threat Scenario 8 — Resource Abuse”An attacker repeatedly sends expensive requests.
Potential consequences:
-
Increased cost
-
Resource exhaustion
-
Service degradation
-
Availability problems
Step 7 — Map Threats to OWASP
Section titled “Step 7 — Map Threats to OWASP”Now use the official OWASP guidance.
For every threat scenario:
-
Search the relevant OWASP AI/LLM security guidance.
-
Identify the closest applicable risk category.
-
Read the description.
-
Compare it with your scenario.
-
Record the mapping.
-
Explain why the mapping applies.
Your worksheet might look like:
| Threat Scenario | OWASP Mapping | Why It Applies |
|---|---|---|
| Direct prompt manipulation | Current prompt-injection category | Untrusted instructions attempt to influence model behavior |
| Sensitive data exposure | Current sensitive-information category | AI output may expose protected information |
| Unsafe downstream processing | Current output-handling category | Application trusts model-generated output |
| Poisoned knowledge source | Current poisoning category | Manipulated information influences AI behavior |
| Excessive AI permissions | Current agency/permission-related category | AI capabilities exceed required authorization |
Do not copy this table blindly.
Validate every mapping using the current official OWASP documentation.
Step 8 — Add Security Controls
Section titled “Step 8 — Add Security Controls”For each OWASP-mapped threat, identify controls.
Example:
Prompt Manipulation
Section titled “Prompt Manipulation”Possible controls may include:
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Input handling
-
Context separation
-
Authorization enforcement
-
Output validation
-
Least privilege
-
Human approval for sensitive actions
-
Monitoring
Sensitive Information Disclosure
Section titled “Sensitive Information Disclosure”Possible controls may include:
-
Data classification
-
Access control
-
RAG authorization
-
Data minimization
-
Output filtering where appropriate
-
Logging and monitoring
Excessive Agency
Section titled “Excessive Agency”Possible controls may include:
-
Least privilege
-
Restricted tool access
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Scoped credentials
-
Action allowlists
-
Human approval
-
Transaction validation
-
Monitoring
The key principle is:
Do not rely on the LLM alone to enforce critical security boundaries.
Step 9 — Open MITRE ATLAS
Section titled “Step 9 — Open MITRE ATLAS”Now switch perspective.
Instead of asking:
What application weakness exists?
ask:
How could an adversary operate against this AI environment?
Review the current MITRE ATLAS knowledge base.
Look for relevant:
-
Tactics
-
Techniques
-
Sub-techniques where applicable
-
Case studies
-
Mitigations
Do not attempt to memorize the entire framework.
Learn how to navigate it.
Step 10 — Understand Tactics and Techniques
Section titled “Step 10 — Understand Tactics and Techniques”A tactic describes an adversary objective.
A technique describes how an adversary may achieve that objective.
Conceptually:
Adversary Goal │ ▼ Tactic │ ▼ Technique │ ▼Observed BehaviorThis is useful when analyzing an attack as a sequence of behaviors rather than a single vulnerability.
Step 11 — Map Your Threat Scenarios to ATLAS
Section titled “Step 11 — Map Your Threat Scenarios to ATLAS”Return to your scenarios.
For each scenario:
-
Identify the adversary objective.
-
Search ATLAS for related behavior.
-
Identify applicable techniques.
-
Record the technique.
-
Explain the relationship.
-
Record relevant mitigations or detection opportunities.
Create:
| Threat Scenario | ATLAS Tactic | ATLAS Technique | Reason |
|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious AI input | Validate from current ATLAS | Validate | Attacker attempts to influence model behavior |
| Poisoned knowledge | Validate from current ATLAS | Validate | Adversary manipulates AI data or knowledge |
| Sensitive information theft | Validate from current ATLAS | Validate | Adversary seeks protected information |
| Model manipulation | Validate from current ATLAS | Validate | Adversary attempts to alter system behavior |
Again:
Use the current ATLAS knowledge base to complete the exact mappings.
The objective is learning the mapping process, not copying static identifiers.
Step 12 — Build a Combined Threat Map
Section titled “Step 12 — Build a Combined Threat Map”Now combine both perspectives.
Your threat register can contain:
| ID | Threat | Asset | OWASP | MITRE ATLAS | Impact | Control |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T01 | Direct prompt manipulation | LLM App | Validate | Validate | High | Input/output controls + authorization |
| T02 | Malicious RAG content | RAG | Validate | Validate | High | Content governance + isolation |
| T03 | Sensitive data disclosure | Enterprise Data | Validate | Validate | Critical | Authorization + data controls |
| T04 | Poisoned knowledge | RAG Data | Validate | Validate | High | Source validation + integrity controls |
| T05 | Excessive AI permissions | AI Agent | Validate | Validate | Critical | Least privilege + approval |
| T06 | Supply-chain compromise | AI Platform | Validate | Validate | Critical | Provenance + dependency controls |
Complete the exact framework mappings yourself.
Step 13 — Build an Attack Path
Section titled “Step 13 — Build an Attack Path”Choose one scenario.
For example:
Indirect manipulation through RAG content
Map the possible attack path:
Threat Actor │ ▼Creates Malicious Document │ ▼Document Enters Trusted Repository │ ▼RAG Pipeline Ingests Document │ ▼Vector Database Stores Representation │ ▼User Performs Related Search │ ▼Malicious Content Is Retrieved │ ▼Content Enters LLM Context │ ▼Model Behavior Is Manipulated │ ▼Potential Data / Action ImpactNow identify where security controls could interrupt the path.
Malicious Document │ ▼[Content Governance] │ ▼RAG Ingestion │ ▼[Source Validation] │ ▼Retrieval │ ▼[Context Controls] │ ▼LLM │ ▼[Output Validation] │ ▼Application │ ▼[Authorization + Least Privilege]This is defense in depth.
Step 14 — Identify Preventive Controls
Section titled “Step 14 — Identify Preventive Controls”Preventive controls attempt to stop the threat.
Examples may include:
-
Authentication
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Authorization
-
Least privilege
-
Data classification
-
Input validation
-
Output validation
-
Secure RAG design
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Trusted data sources
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Dependency verification
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Network restrictions
-
Secret management
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Agent permission boundaries
-
Human approval
Record which threats each control addresses.
Step 15 — Identify Detective Controls
Section titled “Step 15 — Identify Detective Controls”Prevention will not always succeed.
Ask:
How would we know this attack was happening?
Potential telemetry includes:
Authentication LogsApplication LogsAPI LogsPrompt ActivityModel ResponsesRAG Retrieval ActivityDocument Ingestion LogsAgent ActionsCloud Audit LogsSecurity AlertsFor each major threat, identify at least one detection opportunity.
Example:
| Threat | Possible Detection |
|---|---|
| Prompt manipulation | Suspicious prompt patterns or anomalous interactions |
| Data access abuse | Unusual retrieval activity |
| Resource abuse | Request-rate and cost anomalies |
| Agent misuse | Unexpected tool invocation |
| Knowledge poisoning | Unauthorized document changes |
Step 16 — Identify Response Actions
Section titled “Step 16 — Identify Response Actions”Now ask:
If this threat becomes an incident, what would we do?
Possible actions include:
Detect ↓Validate ↓Identify User / Workload ↓Collect Evidence ↓Determine Affected Data ↓Disable Access if Required ↓Contain AI Capability ↓Remove Malicious Content ↓Rotate Credentials ↓Remediate Control ↓RetestThis connects threat modeling with AI Security Operations.
Step 17 — Score the Threats
Section titled “Step 17 — Score the Threats”Use a simple qualitative model.
Likelihood
Section titled “Likelihood”-
Low
-
Medium
-
High
Impact
Section titled “Impact”-
Low
-
Medium
-
High
-
Critical
Example:
| Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prompt manipulation | High | High | High |
| Sensitive data disclosure | Medium | Critical | Critical |
| Knowledge poisoning | Medium | High | High |
| Resource abuse | High | Medium | Medium/High |
| Supply-chain compromise | Low/Medium | Critical | High |
Your rating should be justified by the scenario.
Do not assign severity simply because a framework lists a threat.
Step 18 — Consider Business Impact
Section titled “Step 18 — Consider Business Impact”Translate technical threats into business language.
Instead of only:
Prompt injection exists.
Explain:
Manipulated model behavior could allow unauthorized disclosure of internal information or trigger actions outside the intended business workflow.
Instead of:
RAG poisoning exists.
Explain:
Manipulated knowledge sources could cause employees to receive incorrect or malicious information from a system they believe is authoritative.
This is how security findings become useful to decision-makers.
Step 19 — Create Your AI Threat Register
Section titled “Step 19 — Create Your AI Threat Register”Create:
AI-Threat-Register.mdUse:
# Enterprise Knowledge Assistant — AI Threat Register
## System
Enterprise Knowledge Assistant
## Assessment Scope
- Web Application- Application API- LLM- RAG- Vector Database- Enterprise Documents- Identity- Supporting Infrastructure
## Threat Register
| ID | Threat | Asset | Threat Actor | Attack Path | OWASP Mapping | MITRE ATLAS Mapping | Likelihood | Impact | Existing Controls | Recommended Controls ||---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
## Critical Findings
## High-Risk Findings
## Detection Opportunities
## Recommended Security Controls
## Residual Risk
## Assessment ConclusionComplete the register using your analysis.
Step 20 — Create a Threat Mapping Matrix
Section titled “Step 20 — Create a Threat Mapping Matrix”Create:
AI-Threat-Mapping-Matrix.mdStructure:
# AI Threat Mapping Matrix
| Threat | OWASP | MITRE ATLAS | Prevent | Detect | Respond ||---|---|---|---|---|---|
## Observations
## Framework Gaps
## Security RecommendationsThe Prevent → Detect → Respond columns are important.
A mature security program needs all three.
Step 21 — Create an Executive Summary
Section titled “Step 21 — Create an Executive Summary”Your security manager does not need every technical detail first.
Create a short executive summary.
Example structure:
## Executive Summary
The assessment identified several security risks associated with theEnterprise Knowledge Assistant.
The most significant areas include:
- Manipulation of LLM behavior through untrusted input- Unauthorized disclosure of enterprise information- Manipulation of RAG knowledge sources- Excessive permissions assigned to AI components- AI software supply-chain risks
The assessment recommends implementing defense-in-depth controls acrossidentity, data access, RAG ingestion, application processing, AI permissions,logging and security monitoring before production deployment.Do not exaggerate findings.
Security reporting should be evidence-based.
Step 22 — Review Your Architecture Again
Section titled “Step 22 — Review Your Architecture Again”Return to the architecture.
Your view should now be different.
At the beginning you saw:
UserApplicationAPILLMRAGVector DatabaseDocumentsNow you should begin seeing:
Assets +Entry Points +Trust Boundaries +Threat Actors +Attack Paths +OWASP Risks +ATLAS Techniques +Preventive Controls +Detection Opportunities +Response ActionsThat shift is the real objective of this lab.
Expected Deliverables
Section titled “Expected Deliverables”By the end of the mission, you should have:
Lab-03/│├── AI-Threat-Register.md├── AI-Threat-Mapping-Matrix.md├── Architecture.md├── Attack-Paths.md├── Executive-Summary.md└── Evidence/ ├── OWASP-Mapping/ └── MITRE-ATLAS-Mapping/Your evidence may include screenshots or notes showing how you validated framework mappings.
Evidence Checklist
Section titled “Evidence Checklist”Capture evidence showing:
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Enterprise architecture reviewed
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Assets identified
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Trust boundaries identified
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Threat actors identified
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Entry points identified
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Threat scenarios documented
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OWASP mappings validated
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MITRE ATLAS mappings validated
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Preventive controls identified
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Detective controls identified
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Response actions considered
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Threats prioritized
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Threat register completed
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Executive summary completed
Validation Questions
Section titled “Validation Questions”Before completing the lab, answer these questions without referring to your notes.
Question 1
Section titled “Question 1”What is the primary difference between OWASP AI/LLM security guidance and MITRE ATLAS?
Question 2
Section titled “Question 2”Why should framework mappings be validated against the current official documentation?
Question 3
Section titled “Question 3”Why is prompt injection not purely an input-validation problem?
Question 4
Section titled “Question 4”How can malicious content enter an LLM without being directly submitted by the user?
Question 5
Section titled “Question 5”Why does RAG introduce additional trust boundaries?
Question 6
Section titled “Question 6”Why should AI agents follow least privilege?
Question 7
Section titled “Question 7”What is the difference between a preventive and detective control?
Question 8
Section titled “Question 8”Why should AI security threats be translated into business impact?
Question 9
Section titled “Question 9”Why should security teams understand attack paths rather than individual vulnerabilities only?
Question 10
Section titled “Question 10”How could OWASP and MITRE ATLAS complement each other during an enterprise AI security assessment?
If you can explain these clearly, you have understood the purpose of the lab.
Real-World Security Engineer Perspective
Section titled “Real-World Security Engineer Perspective”In a real organization, you may receive an architecture diagram and be asked:
“Can Security review this AI solution before production?”
You will rarely receive a perfect checklist telling you exactly what to investigate.
You may need to:
Understand the Business Use Case ↓Understand the Architecture ↓Identify Sensitive Assets ↓Identify Trust Boundaries ↓Identify Threats ↓Consult Security Frameworks ↓Map Attack Scenarios ↓Review Existing Controls ↓Identify Gaps ↓Prioritize Risk ↓Recommend Controls ↓Document FindingsThat is why this lab focuses on the methodology, not memorizing framework numbers.
Frameworks change.
The engineering thought process remains valuable.
Common Mistakes
Section titled “Common Mistakes”Mistake 1 — Starting With Framework Numbers
Section titled “Mistake 1 — Starting With Framework Numbers”Do not begin by searching for something to map.
First understand the system and identify the threat.
Then use frameworks to support the analysis.
Mistake 2 — Treating OWASP and ATLAS as Identical
Section titled “Mistake 2 — Treating OWASP and ATLAS as Identical”They provide different perspectives.
Use them together where appropriate.
Mistake 3 — Mapping Everything to Everything
Section titled “Mistake 3 — Mapping Everything to Everything”Not every OWASP category or ATLAS technique applies to every system.
Only map what you can justify.
Mistake 4 — Ignoring Traditional Security
Section titled “Mistake 4 — Ignoring Traditional Security”AI applications still require:
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IAM
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API security
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Cloud security
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Data security
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Network security
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Application security
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Logging
AI-specific frameworks do not replace these controls.
Mistake 5 — Ignoring Detection
Section titled “Mistake 5 — Ignoring Detection”Security architecture should not consist only of preventive controls.
Ask:
How would we detect failure or abuse?
Mistake 6 — Ignoring Business Impact
Section titled “Mistake 6 — Ignoring Business Impact”A technical weakness becomes meaningful when you understand what it could do to:
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Data
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Customers
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Operations
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Revenue
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Reputation
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Compliance
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Business decisions
Security Engineer Checklist
Section titled “Security Engineer Checklist”Before approving your assessment:
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I understand the business use case.
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I understand the architecture.
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I identified important assets.
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I identified trust boundaries.
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I identified realistic threat actors.
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I documented realistic attack scenarios.
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I validated OWASP mappings.
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I validated MITRE ATLAS mappings.
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I identified preventive controls.
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I identified detective controls.
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I considered incident response.
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I prioritized threats.
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I documented business impact.
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I recommended actionable controls.
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I retained evidence supporting my assessment.
Key Takeaways
Section titled “Key Takeaways”You have now moved beyond simply learning individual AI threats.
You have practiced how to analyze them systematically.
Remember:
OWASP helps you understand important application security risks and defensive considerations.
MITRE ATLAS helps you understand adversarial behaviors targeting AI-enabled systems.
But frameworks alone do not perform threat analysis.
The AI Security Engineer must understand:
Architecture +Assets +Data +Identity +Trust Boundaries +Attack Surface +Threat Intelligence +Security Controls =AI Threat AnalysisThe most important skill is not memorizing identifiers.
It is being able to look at an AI architecture and determine:
What could go wrong, how could it happen, what would the impact be, how would we prevent it, how would we detect it, and how would we respond?
Mission Complete
Section titled “Mission Complete”You have completed:
Lab 03 — Map AI Threats Using OWASP and MITRE ATLAS
You should now be able to:
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Identify AI threats from an enterprise architecture.
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Map application risks using OWASP guidance.
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Analyze adversary behavior using MITRE ATLAS.
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Build attack paths.
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Identify preventive and detective controls.
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Prioritize AI risks.
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Build an AI Threat Register.
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Communicate findings in enterprise language.
These skills will be reused throughout the AI Security Engineer Learning Path.
What’s Next?
Section titled “What’s Next?”➡️ Runbook 01 — AI Security Assessment Checklist
You have learned how to analyze an AI system and map its threats.
The next step is to turn that knowledge into a repeatable enterprise security assessment process.
In the next runbook, you will learn how to systematically review:
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Business context
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AI architecture
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Assets
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Data
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Identity and access
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Models
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LLM applications
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RAG systems
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AI agents
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APIs
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Infrastructure
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Supply chain
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Logging and monitoring
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Threats
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Security controls
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Governance
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Findings and evidence
The goal is to move from:
“I know how to identify AI threats.”
to:
“I can perform a structured AI Security Assessment.”
➡️ Next: Runbook 01 — AI Security Assessment Checklist