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Lab 03 Map AI Threats Using OWASP and MITRE ATLAS

Item Details
Mission Map AI Threats Using OWASP and MITRE ATLAS
Role Junior AI Security Engineer
Difficulty Beginner → Intermediate
Estimated Time 60–90 minutes
Primary Skills AI Threat Identification, OWASP Mapping, MITRE ATLAS Mapping, Risk Analysis
Environment Documentation / Threat Modeling Lab
Output AI Threat Register + Threat Mapping + Security Recommendations

You have recently joined the AI Security Engineering team of a fictional enterprise.

The organization is preparing to deploy an internal AI assistant called:

Enterprise Knowledge Assistant

Employees will use the assistant to search internal documentation, summarize information and answer business questions.

The application uses:

  • A web interface
  • Enterprise authentication
  • Application APIs
  • A Large Language Model
  • Retrieval-Augmented Generation
  • A vector database
  • Internal documents
  • Cloud storage
  • Logging and monitoring

The architecture team has asked the AI Security team to perform an initial threat assessment before production deployment.

Your task is to:

  1. Understand the architecture.
  2. Identify important assets.
  3. Identify possible AI attack scenarios.
  4. Map relevant risks to OWASP guidance.
  5. Map adversary behaviors to MITRE ATLAS.
  6. Identify existing and missing controls.
  7. Prioritize the threats.
  8. Produce an AI Threat Register.

You are not attacking a real system.

This is a threat modeling and security analysis exercise.

By completing this lab, you should understand the difference between:

A vulnerability category

and

An adversary technique or behavior.

OWASP guidance helps us understand important application security risk categories and defensive considerations.

MITRE ATLAS helps us understand how adversaries may target AI-enabled systems through tactics and techniques.

Together they provide different perspectives on the same environment.

By the end of this lab, you should be able to:

  • Analyze an enterprise AI architecture.
  • Identify important AI assets.
  • Identify trust boundaries.
  • Develop realistic AI attack scenarios.
  • Use OWASP AI/LLM security guidance during an assessment.
  • Use MITRE ATLAS to analyze adversary behavior.
  • Understand the difference between OWASP and MITRE ATLAS.
  • Map threats across multiple frameworks.
  • Identify preventive and detective controls.
  • Prioritize AI security risks.
  • Create an enterprise-style AI Threat Register.
  • Communicate AI security findings clearly.

Before beginning, you should have completed:

  • 01 Introduction to AI Security
  • 02 How AI and Machine Learning Systems Work
  • 03 Generative AI and LLM Architecture
  • 04 Enterprise AI Architecture
  • 05 AI Security Attack Surface
  • 06 AI Security Threat Landscape
  • 07 OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
  • 08 MITRE ATLAS

You should also have completed:

  • Lab 01 — Explore an Enterprise AI Architecture
  • Lab 02 — Identify AI Attack Surfaces

This lab combines those skills.

AI security frameworks evolve quickly.

For this lab, use the current official OWASP guidance relevant to LLM/Generative AI applications and the current MITRE ATLAS knowledge base when performing your mapping.

Do not treat framework identifiers as permanent.

The important skill is learning how to:

Identify the threat → locate the relevant framework entry → justify the mapping → recommend controls.

Before starting, understand what each framework contributes.

OWASP guidance helps security teams understand common security risks affecting AI and LLM-enabled applications.

It is useful for questions such as:

What application security weakness exists?

What design problem makes the attack possible?

What controls should developers consider?

Examples of areas you may encounter include:

  • Prompt injection
  • Sensitive information disclosure
  • Supply-chain risk
  • Data or model poisoning
  • Improper output handling
  • Excessive agency
  • System prompt leakage
  • Vector and embedding weaknesses
  • Misinformation
  • Resource or consumption risks

Use the terminology from the current OWASP guidance available when you perform the lab.

MITRE ATLAS focuses more heavily on adversarial behavior against AI-enabled systems.

It helps answer:

What is the attacker trying to achieve?

What technique could they use?

Where does this behavior fit in an attack lifecycle?

ATLAS can therefore help security teams understand potential adversary activity and connect AI security with:

  • Threat intelligence
  • Detection engineering
  • Red teaming
  • Threat hunting
  • Incident response

A simple way to remember the distinction is:

OWASP
"What security risks should we design and test for?"
MITRE ATLAS
"How might an adversary operate against this AI system?"

Neither replaces the other.

Together they can provide a stronger view.

The system being assessed looks like this:

Employees
┌───────────────┐
│ Web Interface │
└───────┬───────┘
┌───────────────┐
│ Application │
│ API │
└───────┬───────┘
┌───────────────┐
│ AI / LLM │
│ Application │
└───────┬───────┘
┌──────────────┼──────────────┐
│ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼
┌─────────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌───────────┐
│ LLM │ │ RAG │ │ Logging & │
│ Service │ │ Pipeline │ │ Monitoring│
└─────────┘ └─────┬─────┘ └───────────┘
┌───────────────┐
│ Vector │
│ Database │
└───────┬───────┘
┌───────────────┐
│ Enterprise │
│ Documents │
└───────────────┘

The application processes internal company information.

Some documents may contain:

  • HR information

  • Security procedures

  • Engineering documentation

  • Internal policies

  • Customer information

  • Operational documentation

This means both the AI system and the underlying enterprise data require protection.

Begin by identifying what the organization needs to protect.

Create an asset inventory.

Example:

Asset Why It Matters
LLM Application Provides the AI capability
Enterprise Documents May contain sensitive information
Vector Database Contains embeddings and indexed knowledge
Application API Provides access to backend functionality
User Identity Determines who can access the application
Service Credentials Allow components to communicate
System Instructions Influence application behavior
Logs Provide security and investigation evidence
Cloud Infrastructure Hosts supporting components

Add additional assets you identify.

Not every asset has the same sensitivity.

Create a simple classification.

Example:

Asset Classification
Public documentation Public
Internal procedures Internal
Architecture documentation Confidential
Customer records Confidential
Credentials Restricted
API keys Restricted

Ask:

What would happen if this asset were disclosed?

What would happen if it were modified?

What would happen if it became unavailable?

This introduces the traditional security principles of:

Confidentiality + Integrity + Availability

into AI threat analysis.

Look at the architecture again.

Identify locations where data moves between different security contexts.

Potential trust boundaries include:

Employee
Web Application
Application
LLM Service
RAG Pipeline
Enterprise Documents
Application
External AI Provider

Each trust boundary deserves security attention.

Ask:

  • Is the caller authenticated?

  • Is authorization enforced?

  • Is input trusted?

  • Is output trusted?

  • Is communication protected?

  • Is activity logged?

Now consider who or what could create risk.

Possible threat actors include:

Attempts to gain unauthorized access.

Already has legitimate access but intentionally abuses it.

A legitimate identity is controlled by an attacker.

A connected system has been breached.

Documents or external content contain instructions intended to influence AI behavior.

Compromises models, packages, dependencies or supporting components.

Record the threat actors relevant to your scenario.

Determine how information enters the AI environment.

Potential entry points include:

  • User prompts

  • Uploaded documents

  • RAG documents

  • APIs

  • Model inputs

  • External websites

  • Plugins

  • Agent tools

  • Third-party data

  • Software dependencies

Represent them as:

User Prompt
AI Application

and:

External Document
RAG Pipeline
LLM Context

The second path is especially important.

The user may not directly control everything that enters the model context.

Step 6 — Create Initial Threat Scenarios

Section titled “Step 6 — Create Initial Threat Scenarios”

Now create realistic scenarios.

Do not start with framework identifiers.

Start with the business and technical threat.

Threat Scenario 1 — Direct Prompt Manipulation

Section titled “Threat Scenario 1 — Direct Prompt Manipulation”

An employee submits specially crafted instructions attempting to make the AI ignore intended restrictions.

Potential impact:

  • Unauthorized behavior

  • Security control bypass

  • Information disclosure

  • Unexpected application actions

Threat Scenario 2 — Malicious RAG Document

Section titled “Threat Scenario 2 — Malicious RAG Document”

An attacker places malicious instructions inside a document that later enters the RAG knowledge base.

Flow:

Malicious Document
Document Repository
RAG Ingestion
Vector Database
Retrieved Context
LLM
Manipulated Response

This represents an important indirect trust problem.

Threat Scenario 3 — Sensitive Information Disclosure

Section titled “Threat Scenario 3 — Sensitive Information Disclosure”

A user attempts to retrieve information they should not be permitted to access.

Potential targets:

  • HR records

  • Customer information

  • Credentials

  • Internal architecture

  • Security procedures

The model produces output that another component treats as trusted instructions or executable content.

Flow:

LLM Output
Application
Trusted Processing
Security Impact

Threat Scenario 5 — Poisoned Knowledge Source

Section titled “Threat Scenario 5 — Poisoned Knowledge Source”

An attacker modifies enterprise content used by the AI system.

The system begins producing manipulated or incorrect responses.

Potential impact:

  • Integrity loss

  • Misinformation

  • Incorrect decisions

  • Security control manipulation

Threat Scenario 6 — AI Supply-Chain Compromise

Section titled “Threat Scenario 6 — AI Supply-Chain Compromise”

A compromised dependency, model, library or package is introduced into the environment.

Potential impact:

  • Code execution

  • Data theft

  • Backdoors

  • Model manipulation

  • Infrastructure compromise

Threat Scenario 7 — Excessive AI Permissions

Section titled “Threat Scenario 7 — Excessive AI Permissions”

An AI component or future AI agent has more permissions than required.

If manipulated or compromised, the AI may access unrelated systems or data.

An attacker repeatedly sends expensive requests.

Potential consequences:

  • Increased cost

  • Resource exhaustion

  • Service degradation

  • Availability problems

Now use the official OWASP guidance.

For every threat scenario:

  1. Search the relevant OWASP AI/LLM security guidance.

  2. Identify the closest applicable risk category.

  3. Read the description.

  4. Compare it with your scenario.

  5. Record the mapping.

  6. Explain why the mapping applies.

Your worksheet might look like:

Threat Scenario OWASP Mapping Why It Applies
Direct prompt manipulation Current prompt-injection category Untrusted instructions attempt to influence model behavior
Sensitive data exposure Current sensitive-information category AI output may expose protected information
Unsafe downstream processing Current output-handling category Application trusts model-generated output
Poisoned knowledge source Current poisoning category Manipulated information influences AI behavior
Excessive AI permissions Current agency/permission-related category AI capabilities exceed required authorization

Do not copy this table blindly.

Validate every mapping using the current official OWASP documentation.

For each OWASP-mapped threat, identify controls.

Example:

Possible controls may include:

  • Input handling

  • Context separation

  • Authorization enforcement

  • Output validation

  • Least privilege

  • Human approval for sensitive actions

  • Monitoring

Possible controls may include:

  • Data classification

  • Access control

  • RAG authorization

  • Data minimization

  • Output filtering where appropriate

  • Logging and monitoring

Possible controls may include:

  • Least privilege

  • Restricted tool access

  • Scoped credentials

  • Action allowlists

  • Human approval

  • Transaction validation

  • Monitoring

The key principle is:

Do not rely on the LLM alone to enforce critical security boundaries.

Now switch perspective.

Instead of asking:

What application weakness exists?

ask:

How could an adversary operate against this AI environment?

Review the current MITRE ATLAS knowledge base.

Look for relevant:

  • Tactics

  • Techniques

  • Sub-techniques where applicable

  • Case studies

  • Mitigations

Do not attempt to memorize the entire framework.

Learn how to navigate it.

Step 10 — Understand Tactics and Techniques

Section titled “Step 10 — Understand Tactics and Techniques”

A tactic describes an adversary objective.

A technique describes how an adversary may achieve that objective.

Conceptually:

Adversary Goal
Tactic
Technique
Observed Behavior

This is useful when analyzing an attack as a sequence of behaviors rather than a single vulnerability.

Step 11 — Map Your Threat Scenarios to ATLAS

Section titled “Step 11 — Map Your Threat Scenarios to ATLAS”

Return to your scenarios.

For each scenario:

  1. Identify the adversary objective.

  2. Search ATLAS for related behavior.

  3. Identify applicable techniques.

  4. Record the technique.

  5. Explain the relationship.

  6. Record relevant mitigations or detection opportunities.

Create:

Threat Scenario ATLAS Tactic ATLAS Technique Reason
Malicious AI input Validate from current ATLAS Validate Attacker attempts to influence model behavior
Poisoned knowledge Validate from current ATLAS Validate Adversary manipulates AI data or knowledge
Sensitive information theft Validate from current ATLAS Validate Adversary seeks protected information
Model manipulation Validate from current ATLAS Validate Adversary attempts to alter system behavior

Again:

Use the current ATLAS knowledge base to complete the exact mappings.

The objective is learning the mapping process, not copying static identifiers.

Now combine both perspectives.

Your threat register can contain:

ID Threat Asset OWASP MITRE ATLAS Impact Control
T01 Direct prompt manipulation LLM App Validate Validate High Input/output controls + authorization
T02 Malicious RAG content RAG Validate Validate High Content governance + isolation
T03 Sensitive data disclosure Enterprise Data Validate Validate Critical Authorization + data controls
T04 Poisoned knowledge RAG Data Validate Validate High Source validation + integrity controls
T05 Excessive AI permissions AI Agent Validate Validate Critical Least privilege + approval
T06 Supply-chain compromise AI Platform Validate Validate Critical Provenance + dependency controls

Complete the exact framework mappings yourself.

Choose one scenario.

For example:

Indirect manipulation through RAG content

Map the possible attack path:

Threat Actor
Creates Malicious Document
Document Enters Trusted Repository
RAG Pipeline Ingests Document
Vector Database Stores Representation
User Performs Related Search
Malicious Content Is Retrieved
Content Enters LLM Context
Model Behavior Is Manipulated
Potential Data / Action Impact

Now identify where security controls could interrupt the path.

Malicious Document
[Content Governance]
RAG Ingestion
[Source Validation]
Retrieval
[Context Controls]
LLM
[Output Validation]
Application
[Authorization + Least Privilege]

This is defense in depth.

Preventive controls attempt to stop the threat.

Examples may include:

  • Authentication

  • Authorization

  • Least privilege

  • Data classification

  • Input validation

  • Output validation

  • Secure RAG design

  • Trusted data sources

  • Dependency verification

  • Network restrictions

  • Secret management

  • Agent permission boundaries

  • Human approval

Record which threats each control addresses.

Prevention will not always succeed.

Ask:

How would we know this attack was happening?

Potential telemetry includes:

Authentication Logs
Application Logs
API Logs
Prompt Activity
Model Responses
RAG Retrieval Activity
Document Ingestion Logs
Agent Actions
Cloud Audit Logs
Security Alerts

For each major threat, identify at least one detection opportunity.

Example:

Threat Possible Detection
Prompt manipulation Suspicious prompt patterns or anomalous interactions
Data access abuse Unusual retrieval activity
Resource abuse Request-rate and cost anomalies
Agent misuse Unexpected tool invocation
Knowledge poisoning Unauthorized document changes

Now ask:

If this threat becomes an incident, what would we do?

Possible actions include:

Detect
Validate
Identify User / Workload
Collect Evidence
Determine Affected Data
Disable Access if Required
Contain AI Capability
Remove Malicious Content
Rotate Credentials
Remediate Control
Retest

This connects threat modeling with AI Security Operations.

Use a simple qualitative model.

  • Low

  • Medium

  • High

  • Low

  • Medium

  • High

  • Critical

Example:

Threat Likelihood Impact Priority
Prompt manipulation High High High
Sensitive data disclosure Medium Critical Critical
Knowledge poisoning Medium High High
Resource abuse High Medium Medium/High
Supply-chain compromise Low/Medium Critical High

Your rating should be justified by the scenario.

Do not assign severity simply because a framework lists a threat.

Translate technical threats into business language.

Instead of only:

Prompt injection exists.

Explain:

Manipulated model behavior could allow unauthorized disclosure of internal information or trigger actions outside the intended business workflow.

Instead of:

RAG poisoning exists.

Explain:

Manipulated knowledge sources could cause employees to receive incorrect or malicious information from a system they believe is authoritative.

This is how security findings become useful to decision-makers.

Step 19 — Create Your AI Threat Register

Section titled “Step 19 — Create Your AI Threat Register”

Create:

AI-Threat-Register.md

Use:

# Enterprise Knowledge Assistant — AI Threat Register
## System
Enterprise Knowledge Assistant
## Assessment Scope
- Web Application
- Application API
- LLM
- RAG
- Vector Database
- Enterprise Documents
- Identity
- Supporting Infrastructure
## Threat Register
| ID | Threat | Asset | Threat Actor | Attack Path | OWASP Mapping | MITRE ATLAS Mapping | Likelihood | Impact | Existing Controls | Recommended Controls |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
## Critical Findings
## High-Risk Findings
## Detection Opportunities
## Recommended Security Controls
## Residual Risk
## Assessment Conclusion

Complete the register using your analysis.

Step 20 — Create a Threat Mapping Matrix

Section titled “Step 20 — Create a Threat Mapping Matrix”

Create:

AI-Threat-Mapping-Matrix.md

Structure:

# AI Threat Mapping Matrix
| Threat | OWASP | MITRE ATLAS | Prevent | Detect | Respond |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
## Observations
## Framework Gaps
## Security Recommendations

The Prevent → Detect → Respond columns are important.

A mature security program needs all three.

Your security manager does not need every technical detail first.

Create a short executive summary.

Example structure:

## Executive Summary
The assessment identified several security risks associated with the
Enterprise Knowledge Assistant.
The most significant areas include:
- Manipulation of LLM behavior through untrusted input
- Unauthorized disclosure of enterprise information
- Manipulation of RAG knowledge sources
- Excessive permissions assigned to AI components
- AI software supply-chain risks
The assessment recommends implementing defense-in-depth controls across
identity, data access, RAG ingestion, application processing, AI permissions,
logging and security monitoring before production deployment.

Do not exaggerate findings.

Security reporting should be evidence-based.

Step 22 — Review Your Architecture Again

Section titled “Step 22 — Review Your Architecture Again”

Return to the architecture.

Your view should now be different.

At the beginning you saw:

User
Application
API
LLM
RAG
Vector Database
Documents

Now you should begin seeing:

Assets
+
Entry Points
+
Trust Boundaries
+
Threat Actors
+
Attack Paths
+
OWASP Risks
+
ATLAS Techniques
+
Preventive Controls
+
Detection Opportunities
+
Response Actions

That shift is the real objective of this lab.

By the end of the mission, you should have:

Lab-03/
├── AI-Threat-Register.md
├── AI-Threat-Mapping-Matrix.md
├── Architecture.md
├── Attack-Paths.md
├── Executive-Summary.md
└── Evidence/
├── OWASP-Mapping/
└── MITRE-ATLAS-Mapping/

Your evidence may include screenshots or notes showing how you validated framework mappings.

Capture evidence showing:

  • Enterprise architecture reviewed

  • Assets identified

  • Trust boundaries identified

  • Threat actors identified

  • Entry points identified

  • Threat scenarios documented

  • OWASP mappings validated

  • MITRE ATLAS mappings validated

  • Preventive controls identified

  • Detective controls identified

  • Response actions considered

  • Threats prioritized

  • Threat register completed

  • Executive summary completed

Before completing the lab, answer these questions without referring to your notes.

What is the primary difference between OWASP AI/LLM security guidance and MITRE ATLAS?

Why should framework mappings be validated against the current official documentation?

Why is prompt injection not purely an input-validation problem?

How can malicious content enter an LLM without being directly submitted by the user?

Why does RAG introduce additional trust boundaries?

Why should AI agents follow least privilege?

What is the difference between a preventive and detective control?

Why should AI security threats be translated into business impact?

Why should security teams understand attack paths rather than individual vulnerabilities only?

How could OWASP and MITRE ATLAS complement each other during an enterprise AI security assessment?

If you can explain these clearly, you have understood the purpose of the lab.

In a real organization, you may receive an architecture diagram and be asked:

“Can Security review this AI solution before production?”

You will rarely receive a perfect checklist telling you exactly what to investigate.

You may need to:

Understand the Business Use Case
Understand the Architecture
Identify Sensitive Assets
Identify Trust Boundaries
Identify Threats
Consult Security Frameworks
Map Attack Scenarios
Review Existing Controls
Identify Gaps
Prioritize Risk
Recommend Controls
Document Findings

That is why this lab focuses on the methodology, not memorizing framework numbers.

Frameworks change.

The engineering thought process remains valuable.

Mistake 1 — Starting With Framework Numbers

Section titled “Mistake 1 — Starting With Framework Numbers”

Do not begin by searching for something to map.

First understand the system and identify the threat.

Then use frameworks to support the analysis.

Mistake 2 — Treating OWASP and ATLAS as Identical

Section titled “Mistake 2 — Treating OWASP and ATLAS as Identical”

They provide different perspectives.

Use them together where appropriate.

Mistake 3 — Mapping Everything to Everything

Section titled “Mistake 3 — Mapping Everything to Everything”

Not every OWASP category or ATLAS technique applies to every system.

Only map what you can justify.

Mistake 4 — Ignoring Traditional Security

Section titled “Mistake 4 — Ignoring Traditional Security”

AI applications still require:

  • IAM

  • API security

  • Cloud security

  • Data security

  • Network security

  • Application security

  • Logging

AI-specific frameworks do not replace these controls.

Security architecture should not consist only of preventive controls.

Ask:

How would we detect failure or abuse?

A technical weakness becomes meaningful when you understand what it could do to:

  • Data

  • Customers

  • Operations

  • Revenue

  • Reputation

  • Compliance

  • Business decisions

Before approving your assessment:

  • I understand the business use case.

  • I understand the architecture.

  • I identified important assets.

  • I identified trust boundaries.

  • I identified realistic threat actors.

  • I documented realistic attack scenarios.

  • I validated OWASP mappings.

  • I validated MITRE ATLAS mappings.

  • I identified preventive controls.

  • I identified detective controls.

  • I considered incident response.

  • I prioritized threats.

  • I documented business impact.

  • I recommended actionable controls.

  • I retained evidence supporting my assessment.

You have now moved beyond simply learning individual AI threats.

You have practiced how to analyze them systematically.

Remember:

OWASP helps you understand important application security risks and defensive considerations.

MITRE ATLAS helps you understand adversarial behaviors targeting AI-enabled systems.

But frameworks alone do not perform threat analysis.

The AI Security Engineer must understand:

Architecture
+
Assets
+
Data
+
Identity
+
Trust Boundaries
+
Attack Surface
+
Threat Intelligence
+
Security Controls
=
AI Threat Analysis

The most important skill is not memorizing identifiers.

It is being able to look at an AI architecture and determine:

What could go wrong, how could it happen, what would the impact be, how would we prevent it, how would we detect it, and how would we respond?

You have completed:

Lab 03 — Map AI Threats Using OWASP and MITRE ATLAS

You should now be able to:

  • Identify AI threats from an enterprise architecture.

  • Map application risks using OWASP guidance.

  • Analyze adversary behavior using MITRE ATLAS.

  • Build attack paths.

  • Identify preventive and detective controls.

  • Prioritize AI risks.

  • Build an AI Threat Register.

  • Communicate findings in enterprise language.

These skills will be reused throughout the AI Security Engineer Learning Path.

➡️ Runbook 01 — AI Security Assessment Checklist

You have learned how to analyze an AI system and map its threats.

The next step is to turn that knowledge into a repeatable enterprise security assessment process.

In the next runbook, you will learn how to systematically review:

  • Business context

  • AI architecture

  • Assets

  • Data

  • Identity and access

  • Models

  • LLM applications

  • RAG systems

  • AI agents

  • APIs

  • Infrastructure

  • Supply chain

  • Logging and monitoring

  • Threats

  • Security controls

  • Governance

  • Findings and evidence

The goal is to move from:

“I know how to identify AI threats.”

to:

“I can perform a structured AI Security Assessment.”

➡️ Next: Runbook 01 — AI Security Assessment Checklist