Lab 04 Windows Forensic Artifact Investigation
Mission Overview
Section titled “Mission Overview”Welcome to Lab 04 — Windows Forensic Artifact Investigation.
Windows endpoints contain some of the richest forensic evidence found in enterprise environments.
A single Windows system can provide evidence about:
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user logons
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program execution
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recent files
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USB activity
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services
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scheduled tasks
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Registry changes
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browser activity
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file access
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system startup
-
security events
The challenge is not simply collecting artifacts.
The challenge is correlating them.
For example:
User Logon ↓Program Execution ↓File Access ↓USB Connection ↓Scheduled Task ↓Network ActivityWhen several independent artifacts support the same sequence, your conclusions become much stronger.
Mission Goal: Examine a provided Windows forensic image or artifact set, identify evidence of user activity and program execution, correlate multiple Windows artifacts, reconstruct a preliminary timeline, and produce a Windows Endpoint Forensic Investigation Report.
Mission Information
Section titled “Mission Information”| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Difficulty | Intermediate |
| Estimated Time | 120–150 minutes |
| Primary Skill | Windows Forensics |
| Secondary Skill | Artifact Correlation |
| Environment | GoHackersCloud Digital Forensics Lab |
| Evidence Type | Windows forensic image / exported artifacts |
| Testing Type | Read-Only Examination |
| Primary Outcome | Windows Forensic Evidence Register |
| Safety Level | Authorized Training Evidence Only |
Learning Objectives
Section titled “Learning Objectives”By completing this lab, you will be able to:
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identify Windows forensic evidence sources
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locate user profiles
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analyze Windows Event Logs
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identify authentication activity
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examine Registry artifacts
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understand Prefetch evidence
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review Recent Items
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understand LNK shortcut files
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examine Jump Lists
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identify USB/device evidence
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review Windows services
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analyze scheduled tasks
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identify potential program-execution artifacts
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examine filesystem activity
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distinguish evidence presence from proven user action
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correlate multiple artifacts
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construct an evidence-backed Windows activity timeline
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document confidence and limitations
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produce a professional forensic report
Windows Forensics Methodology
Section titled “Windows Forensics Methodology”Use:
User → Authentication → Execution → File Activity → Device Activity → System Change → Timeline → Correlation → Evidence
Conceptually:
Windows Evidence │ ▼User Identification │ ▼Authentication │ ▼Program Execution │ ▼File Activity │ ▼Device Activity │ ▼System Changes │ ▼Timeline │ ▼Correlated ConclusionThe central question is:
What does each artifact prove, and what becomes stronger only when several artifacts agree?
Part 1 — Confirm Evidence Integrity
Section titled “Part 1 — Confirm Evidence Integrity”Before examining anything, document:
Case ID:
Evidence ID:
Windows Image / Artifact Set:
Expected SHA-256:
Current SHA-256:
Hash Match:
Investigator:
Date:
Start Time:If working from a forensic image:
sha256sum Windows-Evidence.ddUse the verified working copy.
Do not analyze the preserved original.
Part 2 — Create the Lab Workspace
Section titled “Part 2 — Create the Lab Workspace”Create:
Digital-Forensics-Labs/└── Lab-04/ ├── Notes/ ├── Evidence/ │ ├── Event-Logs/ │ ├── Registry/ │ ├── Prefetch/ │ ├── LNK/ │ ├── Jump-Lists/ │ ├── USB/ │ ├── Services/ │ ├── Scheduled-Tasks/ │ └── Filesystem/ ├── Screenshots/ ├── Timeline/ ├── Findings/ └── Report/Create:
Lab-04-Windows-Forensics-Journal.mdSuggested structure:
# Lab 04 — Windows Forensic Artifact Investigation
## Mission Objective
## Evidence Information
## Integrity Verification
## Windows Version
## Hostname
## Timezone
## User Profiles
## Authentication Activity
## Event Logs
## Registry
## Prefetch
## Recent Files
## LNK Files
## Jump Lists
## USB / Device Evidence
## Services
## Scheduled Tasks
## Filesystem Activity
## Timeline
## Correlation
## Findings
## Limitations
## ConclusionPart 3 — Identify the Windows Installation
Section titled “Part 3 — Identify the Windows Installation”Determine:
Windows Version:
Build:
Architecture:
Hostname:
Timezone:Possible evidence sources include:
-
Registry
-
system files
-
forensic-tool operating-system identification
-
Event Logs
Do not rely on folder names alone if better evidence is available.
Part 4 — Identify User Profiles
Section titled “Part 4 — Identify User Profiles”Review:
C:\Users\or the equivalent path inside the forensic image.
You may see:
Administrator
Public
Default
lab-user
analystCreate:
| Profile | Path | Relevant | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| lab-user | C:\Users\lab-user |
Yes | Primary user |
| Public | C:\Users\Public |
Context | Shared profile |
A profile directory proves the profile exists.
It does not by itself prove recent interactive use.
Part 5 — Build the User Profile Register
Section titled “Part 5 — Build the User Profile Register”For each relevant user, record:
Username:
Profile Path:
SID:If available
Profile Creation Evidence:
Last-Use Evidence:
Relevant Artifacts:Potential profile artifacts include:
Desktop
Documents
Downloads
AppData
Recent
NTUSER.DATPart 6 — Understand the Windows Registry
Section titled “Part 6 — Understand the Windows Registry”The Registry stores configuration and activity-related data.
Important hives include:
SYSTEM
SOFTWARE
SAM
SECURITY
NTUSER.DAT
UsrClass.datFor this lab, focus on interpretation, not credential extraction.
Do not attempt to recover password hashes.
Part 7 — Build the Registry Evidence Map
Section titled “Part 7 — Build the Registry Evidence Map”Conceptually:
SYSTEM ↓Machine Configuration
SOFTWARE ↓Installed Software / Configuration
SAM ↓Local Account Information
NTUSER.DAT ↓User-Specific Activity
UsrClass.dat ↓Shell / User ActivityRecord which hives are available.
Part 8 — Identify the Hostname
Section titled “Part 8 — Identify the Hostname”The Windows Registry can contain system identity information.
Use the forensic Registry viewer provided in the lab.
Record:
Hostname:
Registry Hive:
Key:
Value:
Confidence:This supports host attribution.
Part 9 — Determine Timezone
Section titled “Part 9 — Determine Timezone”Timezone is essential before creating timelines.
Record:
Configured Timezone:
Evidence Source:
UTC Offset:
Daylight Saving Context:
Timeline Standard:UTC / LocalDo not mix timestamps from different sources without normalization.
Part 10 — Examine Windows Event Logs
Section titled “Part 10 — Examine Windows Event Logs”Common log locations include:
C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Important logs include:
Security.evtx
System.evtx
Application.evtxAdditional channels may exist depending on configuration.
Use the provided forensic/event-log viewer.
Part 11 — Understand Event Log Value
Section titled “Part 11 — Understand Event Log Value”Windows Event Logs can provide evidence relating to:
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authentication
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system startup
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service activity
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process creation
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account changes
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security controls
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scheduled tasks
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PowerShell
-
remote access
Not every event type is enabled in every system.
Part 12 — Analyze Logon Activity
Section titled “Part 12 — Analyze Logon Activity”Authentication evidence may answer:
Which account authenticated, when, and through what type of logon?
Record:
| Time | Account | Event | Source | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Logon | Security | Success | ||
| Logon | Security | Failure |
Do not assume all successful logons are interactive keyboard logons.
Part 13 — Understand Logon Types
Section titled “Part 13 — Understand Logon Types”Windows may record different logon categories depending on activity.
Examples can include:
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interactive
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network
-
remote interactive
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service
-
batch
Your forensic tool may expose the associated logon type.
Record the actual value and interpret it carefully.
Part 14 — Build the Authentication Timeline
Section titled “Part 14 — Build the Authentication Timeline”Create:
08:42 — User logon
08:44 — Application activity
08:48 — File access evidence
09:02 — User logoffAt this stage, use only evidence-backed events.
Part 15 — Review Failed Authentication
Section titled “Part 15 — Review Failed Authentication”Look for relevant failed logon activity within the investigation window.
Record:
Account:
Time:
Source:
Failure Reason:
Repeated:
Security Relevance:A few failures may be normal.
Do not automatically interpret them as attack activity.
Part 16 — Investigate Prefetch
Section titled “Part 16 — Investigate Prefetch”Windows Prefetch may provide evidence that an executable was run.
Common location:
C:\Windows\Prefetch\Files may resemble:
NOTEPAD.EXE-XXXXXXXX.pf
CHROME.EXE-XXXXXXXX.pfPrefetch availability depends on Windows version and configuration.
Part 17 — Understand What Prefetch Can Support
Section titled “Part 17 — Understand What Prefetch Can Support”Prefetch can help establish:
Executable Name
Execution Evidence
Execution CountWhere supported
Last Execution TimesWhere supported
Referenced FilesDepending on parserThe exact fields depend on operating-system version and tool support.
Part 18 — Avoid Overclaiming Prefetch
Section titled “Part 18 — Avoid Overclaiming Prefetch”Good:
Prefetch evidence indicates that
APP.EXEwas executed on the system.
Avoid:
The user intentionally launched the application.
Prefetch usually does not independently prove which person initiated execution.
Part 19 — Build the Prefetch Register
Section titled “Part 19 — Build the Prefetch Register”| Executable | Last Run | Run Count | User Attribution | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unknown |
Correlate execution with user-logon and other evidence.
Part 20 — Review Recent Items
Section titled “Part 20 — Review Recent Items”User profiles may contain evidence of recently accessed files.
Examples may include:
Recent Items
LNK shortcuts
Jump ListsThese artifacts can provide context around files and applications.
Part 21 — Understand LNK Files
Section titled “Part 21 — Understand LNK Files”Windows shortcut files can contain information such as:
Target Path
Original Location
Volume Information
Timestamps
Drive Informationdepending on the shortcut.
A shortcut can remain after the target file is moved or deleted.
This makes LNK files valuable forensic evidence.
Part 22 — Build the LNK Evidence Register
Section titled “Part 22 — Build the LNK Evidence Register”| LNK | Target | Original Path | Timestamp | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Record exact parser output.
Part 23 — Correlate LNK with Deleted Files
Section titled “Part 23 — Correlate LNK with Deleted Files”Suppose Lab 03 found:
Deleted:C:\Users\lab-user\Downloads\report.docxLab 04 may reveal an LNK file referencing:
C:\Users\lab-user\Downloads\report.docxNow you have corroborating evidence.
Conceptually:
Deleted File Artifact +LNK Reference =Stronger Evidence of Prior File PresenceStill avoid claiming exactly who opened it unless supported.
Part 24 — Investigate Jump Lists
Section titled “Part 24 — Investigate Jump Lists”Jump Lists may track application-associated recent or frequent items.
They can help connect:
Application ↓Recent File ↓File PathAvailability and interpretation vary across Windows versions.
Part 25 — Build the Jump List Register
Section titled “Part 25 — Build the Jump List Register”| Application | Referenced File | Path | Timestamp | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Use Jump Lists as corroborating evidence.
Part 26 — Investigate RecentDocs
Section titled “Part 26 — Investigate RecentDocs”Registry-based user artifacts can sometimes record recently accessed filenames or categories.
Review with a forensic Registry parser.
Record:
User:
Artifact:
Referenced Filename:
Timestamp:If independently available
Investigative Relevance:Do not assume a Registry entry itself provides an exact access timestamp unless the artifact actually contains one.
Part 27 — Examine UserAssist Conceptually
Section titled “Part 27 — Examine UserAssist Conceptually”UserAssist artifacts can provide evidence related to GUI-based program usage.
Potentially useful information may include:
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executable references
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run counts
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timestamps
Interpret the data using a trusted forensic parser.
Part 28 — Build the Program Execution Evidence Matrix
Section titled “Part 28 — Build the Program Execution Evidence Matrix”Combine:
| Application | Prefetch | UserAssist | Event Log | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| App01 | Yes | Yes | Yes | High |
| App02 | Yes | No | No | Medium |
Multiple independent artifacts increase confidence.
Part 29 — Understand Amcache
Section titled “Part 29 — Understand Amcache”Amcache can provide information about programs/files known to the system.
It may help identify:
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executable paths
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metadata
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application information
But:
Presence in Amcache does not always prove execution.
Treat it as contextual or supporting evidence unless the artifact and version support a stronger conclusion.
Part 30 — Understand Shimcache / AppCompatCache
Section titled “Part 30 — Understand Shimcache / AppCompatCache”Application Compatibility Cache artifacts can provide historical information about executables observed by Windows.
Again:
Presence does not automatically prove program execution.
This is a common forensic interpretation mistake.
Use appropriate confidence language.
Part 31 — Create the Execution Artifact Comparison
Section titled “Part 31 — Create the Execution Artifact Comparison”| Artifact | Can Indicate | Does Not Necessarily Prove |
|---|---|---|
| Prefetch | Execution | Specific user action |
| UserAssist | GUI program usage | Malicious intent |
| Amcache | Program/file presence | Execution in all cases |
| Shimcache | Historical executable presence | Execution |
| Event Log | Logged process activity | Activity not audited |
This table is worth remembering.
Part 32 — Review Download-Related Filesystem Evidence
Section titled “Part 32 — Review Download-Related Filesystem Evidence”Examine:
C:\Users\<user>\Downloads\Look for case-relevant training artifacts.
Record:
Filename:
Path:
Created:
Modified:
File Type:
Hash:
Status:Existing / DeletedCorrelate with Lab 03.
Part 33 — Review Desktop and Documents
Section titled “Part 33 — Review Desktop and Documents”Relevant files may appear under:
Desktop
DocumentsCompare:
-
names
-
timestamps
-
hashes
-
shortcut references
-
recent-item artifacts
Do not collect unrelated private files.
Part 34 — Investigate USB / Device Artifacts
Section titled “Part 34 — Investigate USB / Device Artifacts”Windows may retain evidence relating to connected USB storage devices.
Potential evidence sources include Registry data and setup logs.
Depending on available artifacts, you may identify:
Device Identifier
Vendor
Product
Serial Number
Connection EvidenceDo not assume every USB device is removable storage.
Part 35 — Build the USB Device Register
Section titled “Part 35 — Build the USB Device Register”| Device | Identifier | User Context | First/Last Evidence | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
The exact timestamps available depend on artifact type.
Part 36 — Correlate USB with File Activity
Section titled “Part 36 — Correlate USB with File Activity”Suppose:
09:15 — USB connection evidence09:17 — LNK references E:\project.docx09:18 — recent file referenceTogether, these may support interaction with a file located on removable media.
Do not automatically conclude the file was copied.
For copying, seek additional evidence.
Part 37 — Review Windows Services
Section titled “Part 37 — Review Windows Services”Services can provide evidence of:
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legitimate applications
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security software
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system functionality
-
unusual system changes
Review relevant service configuration.
Record:
Service Name:
Display Name:
Executable Path:
Start Type:
Account:
Evidence Timestamp:
Security Relevance:Part 38 — Build the Service Evidence Register
Section titled “Part 38 — Build the Service Evidence Register”| Service | Executable | Account | Start Type | Expected | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Do not classify unknown services as malicious without context.
Part 39 — Review Service Installation Evidence
Section titled “Part 39 — Review Service Installation Evidence”Event Logs or Registry data may indicate that a service was installed or modified.
Record:
Time:
Service:
Configuration:
Evidence Source:
Confidence:Correlate with filesystem and execution evidence.
Part 40 — Investigate Scheduled Tasks
Section titled “Part 40 — Investigate Scheduled Tasks”Scheduled tasks may execute:
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applications
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scripts
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maintenance actions
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update processes
They can also be relevant during incident investigations.
Review task configuration from the forensic evidence.
Part 41 — Build the Scheduled Task Register
Section titled “Part 41 — Build the Scheduled Task Register”| Task | Run As | Action | Trigger | Expected | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Do not execute the task.
This is forensic examination.
Part 42 — Correlate Task with Filesystem Evidence
Section titled “Part 42 — Correlate Task with Filesystem Evidence”Suppose a task references:
C:\Users\Public\update.ps1Now check whether that file exists in the image.
Record:
Task:
Referenced File:
File Exists:
Hash:
Timestamps:
Other Execution Evidence:The relationship can be important even without executing anything.
Part 43 — Review PowerShell Evidence
Section titled “Part 43 — Review PowerShell Evidence”Depending on logging configuration, evidence may exist in:
-
Event Logs
-
PowerShell history
-
script files
-
execution artifacts
Only analyze available training evidence.
Do not run recovered scripts.
Part 44 — Treat Recovered Scripts as Evidence
Section titled “Part 44 — Treat Recovered Scripts as Evidence”If you find:
script.ps1do not execute it.
Instead:
Preserve ↓Hash ↓Read as Evidence ↓DocumentThe same principle applies to executables and unknown files.
Part 45 — Review File Hashes
Section titled “Part 45 — Review File Hashes”For important extracted artifacts:
sha256sum extracted-fileBuild:
| Evidence ID | File | SHA-256 | Parent Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| WIN-F01 | E01-W01 |
Hashes support derived-evidence integrity.
Part 46 — Examine Filesystem Timestamps
Section titled “Part 46 — Examine Filesystem Timestamps”For relevant files, record:
Created
Modified
Accessed
Metadata Changewhere supportedBe precise about timestamp type.
Do not simplify them all to:
File TimePart 47 — Understand Windows Timestamp Interpretation
Section titled “Part 47 — Understand Windows Timestamp Interpretation”File timestamps can change because of:
-
creation
-
editing
-
copying
-
extraction
-
application behavior
-
filesystem behavior
Therefore:
One timestamp should rarely carry an entire forensic conclusion.
Part 48 — Build the Windows Artifact Timeline
Section titled “Part 48 — Build the Windows Artifact Timeline”Combine:
Authentication
Prefetch
LNK
Jump Lists
USB
Services
Scheduled Tasks
Files
Event LogsExample:
| Time | Artifact | Event | Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09:01 | lab-user | Logon | Security log | Confirmed |
| 09:08 | browser.exe | Execution | Prefetch | Confirmed |
| 09:14 | report.docx | Referenced | LNK | Supported |
| 09:30 | USB01 | Device evidence | Registry | Supported |
Part 49 — Normalize Timeline Times
Section titled “Part 49 — Normalize Timeline Times”Before correlation:
Source Timezone:
Timeline Timezone:
UTC Conversion Applied:Yes / NoEnsure all events use one standard.
This becomes critical when adding network and server logs later.
Part 50 — Build the Artifact Correlation Matrix
Section titled “Part 50 — Build the Artifact Correlation Matrix”Create:
| Question | Artifact 1 | Artifact 2 | Artifact 3 | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Was App X executed? | Prefetch | UserAssist | Event Log | High |
| Did File Y exist? | Filesystem | LNK | Jump List | High |
| Was USB connected? | Registry | Setup Log | LNK | High |
This is one of the most important deliverables in the lab.
Part 51 — Understand Corroboration
Section titled “Part 51 — Understand Corroboration”One artifact may suggest activity.
Three independent artifacts may strongly support it.
Conceptually:
Artifact A +Artifact B +Artifact C =Stronger ConclusionBut only if they are genuinely independent and interpreted correctly.
Part 52 — Separate Fact, Interpretation, and Hypothesis
Section titled “Part 52 — Separate Fact, Interpretation, and Hypothesis”Prefetch artifact exists for APP.EXE.Interpretation
Section titled “Interpretation”The artifact supports execution of APP.EXE.Hypothesis
Section titled “Hypothesis”The logged-in user intentionally executed APP.EXE as part of the incident.The third statement requires more evidence.
Part 53 — Build the Investigation Hypothesis Register
Section titled “Part 53 — Build the Investigation Hypothesis Register”| Hypothesis | Supporting Evidence | Missing Evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| User opened document | LNK + Jump List | Direct user attribution | Supported |
| USB copied document | USB + LNK | Copy evidence | Unconfirmed |
| Task executed script | Task config | Execution event | Possible |
This keeps the investigation honest.
Part 54 — Identify Positive Evidence
Section titled “Part 54 — Identify Positive Evidence”Do not focus only on suspicious artifacts.
Examples:
Windows Defender enabled
Expected update services present
No unexpected administrative task found
Normal account logon pattern
Expected service configurationPositive evidence can rule out hypotheses.
Part 55 — Example Finding: Program Execution
Section titled “Part 55 — Example Finding: Program Execution”Finding:Execution evidence identified for the designated training program.
Evidence:Prefetch and user-activity artifacts contain references toTRAININGAPP.EXE within the incident window.
Interpretation:The available artifacts support execution of the application onthe investigated Windows endpoint.
Limitation:The artifacts do not independently establish which human userinitiated the execution.Part 56 — Example Observation: USB Device
Section titled “Part 56 — Example Observation: USB Device”Observation:Evidence indicates that the designated training USB device wasconnected to the Windows endpoint during the investigation period.
Supporting Evidence:Relevant device information was identified in Windows forensicartifacts.
Investigative Relevance:The connection occurred near the time a shortcut referenced afile located on removable media.
Limitation:The evidence does not independently prove that a file was copiedto or from the device.Part 57 — Example Scheduled Task Finding
Section titled “Part 57 — Example Scheduled Task Finding”Finding:Scheduled task references a case-relevant script.
Observation:The task configuration specifies the training script as itsexecution action.
Correlation:The referenced script exists in the forensic image and itsfilesystem timestamps overlap the investigation window.
Limitation:The task configuration alone does not prove the task actuallyexecuted during the incident period.If execution evidence exists, update the conclusion accordingly.
Part 58 — Build the Windows Forensic Evidence Register
Section titled “Part 58 — Build the Windows Forensic Evidence Register”Create:
| ID | Artifact | User/Host | Time | Observation | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WIN-01 | Security Log | lab-user | Logon | Confirmed | |
| WIN-02 | Prefetch | Host | Program execution | High | |
| WIN-03 | LNK | lab-user | File reference | Supported | |
| WIN-04 | USB | Host | Device connection | Supported |
Add:
-
source path
-
evidence ID
-
hash where applicable
-
follow-up requirement
Part 59 — Build the Evidence Lineage
Section titled “Part 59 — Build the Evidence Lineage”Example:
E01 — Windows Disk Image │ ▼E01-W01 — Working Copy │ ├── WIN-EVTX-01 — Security Log ├── WIN-REG-01 — Registry Hive ├── WIN-PF-01 — Prefetch ├── WIN-LNK-01 — Shortcut └── WIN-TASK-01 — Scheduled TaskEvery extracted artifact should remain traceable.
Part 60 — Hash Important Extracted Artifacts
Section titled “Part 60 — Hash Important Extracted Artifacts”For evidence files exported from the forensic image:
sha256sum Security.evtxand similarly for other key artifacts where appropriate.
Record:
Evidence ID:
Source Evidence:
Original Path:
Export Path:
SHA-256:
Export Time:
Investigator:Part 61 — Reverify Working Evidence
Section titled “Part 61 — Reverify Working Evidence”At the end of the lab:
sha256sum Windows-Evidence.ddCompare:
Pre-Examination Hash:
Post-Examination Hash:
Match:
Integrity Status:Expected:
Match:Yeswhen working read-only.
Part 62 — Mission Challenge
Section titled “Part 62 — Mission Challenge”Using the supplied Windows evidence, answer:
CASE INFORMATION
Case ID:
Evidence ID:
Windows Version:
Hostname:
Timezone:
USER ACTIVITY
Primary User Profile:
Relevant SID:
Logon Time:
Logoff Time:
Failed Authentication:
Remote Logon Evidence:
PROGRAM EXECUTION
Application 01:
Prefetch Present:
UserAssist Present:
Event Log Evidence:
Execution Confidence:
Application 02:
Evidence:
Confidence:
FILE ACTIVITY
Relevant File:
Original Path:
LNK Evidence:
Jump List Evidence:
RecentDocs Evidence:
Filesystem Evidence:
Deleted:Yes / No
Correlation:
USB / DEVICE ACTIVITY
Device:
Identifier:
Connection Evidence:
Relevant Time:
File Relationship:
Confidence:
SYSTEM CHANGES
New/Relevant Service:
Scheduled Task:
Referenced Script/Application:
Execution Evidence:
Security Relevance:
TIMELINE
Earliest Relevant Event:
Event 01:
Event 02:
Event 03:
Event 04:
Latest Relevant Event:
CORRELATION
Strongest Correlation:
Most Important Artifact:
Highest-Confidence Finding:
Largest Evidence Gap:
Unconfirmed Hypothesis:
FINAL CONCLUSION
What Happened:
What Is Confirmed:
What Is Supported:
What Remains Unknown:
Recommended Next Investigation:Part 63 — What Not to Do
Section titled “Part 63 — What Not to Do”Do not:
Modify original Windows evidence
Boot the evidence image normally
Execute recovered programs
Execute recovered PowerShell scripts
Extract password hashes
Dump credentials
Attempt account access
Treat Prefetch as user attribution
Treat Amcache as guaranteed execution
Treat Shimcache as guaranteed execution
Assume USB connection means file copying
Assume task configuration proves task execution
Change evidence timestamps
Collect unrelated personal information
Ignore timezone differences
Present hypotheses as factsThe principle is:
Parse → Correlate → Qualify → Conclude
Part 64 — Troubleshooting
Section titled “Part 64 — Troubleshooting”Prefetch Directory Is Empty
Section titled “Prefetch Directory Is Empty”Possible reasons include:
-
feature disabled
-
cleanup
-
Windows version/configuration
-
artifact not included in evidence set
Record the absence.
Do not infer that no applications executed.
Security Log Has Few Events
Section titled “Security Log Has Few Events”Audit configuration may have been limited.
Use other artifacts.
Absence of logging is not proof that activity did not occur.
LNK Target No Longer Exists
Section titled “LNK Target No Longer Exists”That may be valuable.
A shortcut can remain after the underlying file is deleted or moved.
Correlate with Lab 03.
Registry Parser Gives Different Times
Section titled “Registry Parser Gives Different Times”Check:
-
timestamp semantics
-
timezone conversion
-
parser version
-
source hive
-
artifact interpretation
Document the method used.
USB Evidence Exists but No File Evidence
Section titled “USB Evidence Exists but No File Evidence”Do not infer copying.
Record only device connection evidence.
Scheduled Task Exists but No Execution Event Exists
Section titled “Scheduled Task Exists but No Execution Event Exists”Classify:
Task Exists:Confirmed
Task Executed:UnconfirmedEvidence Requirements
Section titled “Evidence Requirements”Capture:
Evidence 01
Section titled “Evidence 01”Working-image integrity verification.
Evidence 02
Section titled “Evidence 02”Windows version and hostname.
Evidence 03
Section titled “Evidence 03”Timezone evidence.
Evidence 04
Section titled “Evidence 04”User Profile Register.
Evidence 05
Section titled “Evidence 05”Authentication timeline.
Evidence 06
Section titled “Evidence 06”Relevant Security Event Log evidence.
Evidence 07
Section titled “Evidence 07”Registry artifact evidence.
Evidence 08
Section titled “Evidence 08”Prefetch Register.
Evidence 09
Section titled “Evidence 09”LNK evidence.
Evidence 10
Section titled “Evidence 10”Jump List evidence.
Evidence 11
Section titled “Evidence 11”Recent-file evidence.
Evidence 12
Section titled “Evidence 12”Program Execution Evidence Matrix.
Evidence 13
Section titled “Evidence 13”USB Device Register.
Evidence 14
Section titled “Evidence 14”Service Evidence Register.
Evidence 15
Section titled “Evidence 15”Scheduled Task Register.
Evidence 16
Section titled “Evidence 16”Relevant filesystem evidence.
Evidence 17
Section titled “Evidence 17”Windows Artifact Timeline.
Evidence 18
Section titled “Evidence 18”Artifact Correlation Matrix.
Evidence 19
Section titled “Evidence 19”Hypothesis Register.
Evidence 20
Section titled “Evidence 20”Windows Forensic Evidence Register.
Evidence 21
Section titled “Evidence 21”Evidence lineage.
Evidence 22
Section titled “Evidence 22”Post-examination hash verification.
Mission Deliverables
Section titled “Mission Deliverables”Complete:
-
evidence integrity verified
-
Windows version identified
-
hostname identified
-
timezone documented
-
user profiles identified
-
User Profile Register created
-
Event Logs examined
-
authentication activity reconstructed
-
Registry evidence reviewed
-
Prefetch analyzed
-
Recent Items reviewed
-
LNK artifacts analyzed
-
Jump Lists reviewed
-
program-execution evidence correlated
-
USB/device evidence reviewed
-
services examined
-
scheduled tasks examined
-
relevant filesystem evidence correlated
-
timeline normalized
-
Windows Artifact Timeline created
-
Artifact Correlation Matrix created
-
facts separated from hypotheses
-
positive evidence documented
-
Windows Forensic Evidence Register completed
-
evidence lineage maintained
-
extracted evidence hashed where appropriate
-
working evidence reverified
-
final report completed
Lab Report Template
Section titled “Lab Report Template”# Lab 04 — Windows Forensic Artifact Investigation
## Executive Summary
## Mission Objective
## Case Information
## Evidence Information
## Integrity Verification
## Windows System Profile
### Windows Version### Hostname### Timezone
## User Profiles
## Authentication Analysis
## Windows Event Log Analysis
## Registry Analysis
## Program Execution Analysis
### Prefetch### UserAssist### Amcache### Shimcache
## Recent File Analysis
### Recent Items### LNK Files### Jump Lists### RecentDocs
## USB / Device Analysis
## Service Analysis
## Scheduled Task Analysis
## Filesystem Analysis
## Evidence Correlation
## Windows Artifact Timeline
## Investigation Hypotheses
## Positive Evidence
## Windows Forensic Evidence Register
## Findings
## Limitations
## Recommended Follow-Up
## Conclusion
## Appendix A — Evidence Index
## Appendix B — Timeline
## Appendix C — Hashes
## Appendix D — Evidence LineageKnowledge Check
Section titled “Knowledge Check”Question 1 — Why are Windows forensic artifacts valuable?
Section titled “Question 1 — Why are Windows forensic artifacts valuable?”Because Windows stores many independent traces of user, application, device, authentication, and system activity that can be correlated.
Question 2 — Does a user profile directory prove that the user recently logged on?
Section titled “Question 2 — Does a user profile directory prove that the user recently logged on?”No.
Additional authentication or activity evidence is needed.
Question 3 — What can Prefetch commonly support?
Section titled “Question 3 — What can Prefetch commonly support?”Evidence that a particular executable was run, subject to Windows version and configuration.
Question 4 — Does Prefetch alone identify the human who executed a program?
Section titled “Question 4 — Does Prefetch alone identify the human who executed a program?”No.
User attribution requires correlation.
Question 5 — Why are LNK files useful?
Section titled “Question 5 — Why are LNK files useful?”They can retain references to files and paths even when the original file has been moved or deleted.
Question 6 — Does Amcache always prove program execution?
Section titled “Question 6 — Does Amcache always prove program execution?”No.
Interpretation depends on the artifact, operating-system version, and available supporting evidence.
Question 7 — Does a USB connection prove data was copied?
Section titled “Question 7 — Does a USB connection prove data was copied?”No.
It proves device-related activity when properly supported by the artifact. File-transfer conclusions require additional evidence.
Question 8 — Does a scheduled task configuration prove execution?
Section titled “Question 8 — Does a scheduled task configuration prove execution?”No.
Execution should be supported by additional task, log, process, or filesystem evidence.
Question 9 — Why normalize timezone information?
Section titled “Question 9 — Why normalize timezone information?”So artifacts from different evidence sources can be accurately correlated in one timeline.
Question 10 — What makes a Windows forensic conclusion strong?
Section titled “Question 10 — What makes a Windows forensic conclusion strong?”Multiple correctly interpreted, independent artifacts supporting the same conclusion.
Skills Achieved
Section titled “Skills Achieved”After completing this lab, you should understand:
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Windows forensic image examination
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Windows system identification
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Windows user profiles
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Event Log analysis
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authentication forensics
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Registry artifact analysis
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Prefetch
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UserAssist concepts
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Amcache concepts
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Shimcache concepts
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LNK files
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Jump Lists
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RecentDocs
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USB/device artifacts
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Windows services
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scheduled tasks
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filesystem evidence
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program-execution correlation
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timestamp normalization
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Windows timeline construction
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evidence correlation
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hypothesis management
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evidence lineage
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professional Windows forensic reporting
Professional Takeaway
Section titled “Professional Takeaway”Windows forensics should never depend on a single artifact.
Instead, think:
Logon Evidence +Prefetch +Registry +LNK +Jump List +Filesystem +Device Evidence =Much Stronger InvestigationThe key professional distinction is:
Artifact presence is not always the same as user action.
For example:
Executable Present ≠Executable Executedand:
USB Connected ≠File Copiedand:
Scheduled Task Exists ≠Scheduled Task RanYour job is to connect independent evidence until the conclusion becomes defensible.
User → Authentication → Execution → File → Device → System Change → Timeline → Correlation
That is the core Windows forensic workflow.
What’s Next?
Section titled “What’s Next?”➡️ Lab 05 — Linux Forensic Investigation
In the next lab, you will investigate a Linux system using evidence from:
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/var/log -
authentication logs
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users and groups
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sudo activity
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SSH
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shell history
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cron
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systemd
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services
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filesystem metadata
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configuration files
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user home directories
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application logs
The methodology becomes:
Identity → Authentication → Command Activity → Privilege → Process/Service → File Activity → Logs → Timeline → Evidence
By the end of Lab 05, you should be able to answer:
“Which accounts were active on the Linux system, what relevant activity occurred, which services and scheduled actions were involved, and what sequence of events is supported by the available forensic evidence?”