Skip to content

09 β€” Enterprise Cloud Pentesting Projects

Welcome to Module 09 β€” Enterprise Cloud Pentesting Projects.

You have now completed the major technical areas of the Cloud Penetration Tester learning path:

  • Cloud Offensive Security Foundations
  • AWS Cloud Penetration Testing
  • Azure Cloud Penetration Testing
  • Google Cloud Penetration Testing
  • Kubernetes Offensive Security
  • Container Security
  • Serverless Security
  • Cloud Red Team Operations

This module changes the learning model.

You are no longer going to study individual cloud security concepts in isolation.

You are going to operate as a Cloud Penetration Tester working through complete enterprise security engagements.

The objective is to connect:

Reconnaissance
↓
Cloud Asset Discovery
↓
Identity Enumeration
↓
Misconfiguration Analysis
↓
Privilege Path Discovery
↓
Controlled Validation
↓
Lateral Movement Analysis
↓
Critical Asset Impact
↓
Evidence Collection
↓
Risk Analysis
↓
Professional Reporting
↓
Remediation

These projects should be completed only within CloudNova or another explicitly authorised training environment.


Your mission is to complete five realistic enterprise Cloud Penetration Testing projects.

Each project introduces a different environment and security challenge.

By the end of the module, you should be able to move from:

β€œI understand individual cloud attacks.”

to:

β€œI can assess an enterprise cloud environment systematically, identify realistic attack paths, validate security weaknesses safely, document evidence, explain business impact, and produce professional remediation guidance.”


Project Environment Primary Focus
Project 01 AWS Enterprise AWS Security Assessment
Project 02 Azure Enterprise Azure Identity & Cloud Assessment
Project 03 Google Cloud GCP IAM & Workload Security Assessment
Project 04 Kubernetes + Containers Cloud-Native Application Compromise Assessment
Project 05 Multi-Cloud Enterprise Cloud Red Team Capstone

The projects intentionally increase in complexity.

Project 01
Single Cloud
AWS
↓
Project 02
Single Cloud + Enterprise Identity
Azure
↓
Project 03
Cloud IAM + Workload Identity
GCP
↓
Project 04
Cloud-Native Infrastructure
Kubernetes + Containers
↓
Project 05
Multi-Cloud Enterprise
AWS + Azure + GCP + Kubernetes

Project 01 β€” Enterprise AWS Penetration Testing Assessment

Section titled β€œProject 01 β€” Enterprise AWS Penetration Testing Assessment”

You have been engaged to perform an authorised penetration test of a fictional organisation’s AWS environment hosted in CloudNova.

The organisation operates:

Internet
↓
Application Load Balancer
↓
EC2 Application Tier
↓
Database
↓
S3 Storage
Application
↓
IAM Role
↓
AWS Services

The security team wants to understand whether an attacker who gains limited access could expand their privileges or reach sensitive cloud resources.

Assess:

  • AWS account exposure

  • IAM users and roles

  • IAM policies

  • Trust policies

  • EC2 security

  • Instance roles

  • Storage permissions

  • Network exposure

  • Secrets

  • Logging

  • Privilege relationships

  • Cross-service attack paths

You begin with a low-privileged authorised CloudNova identity.

Your task is to determine:

What Can I See?
↓
What Can I Access?
↓
Which Identity Am I?
↓
What Permissions Exist?
↓
Which Trust Relationships Exist?
↓
Can Privilege Expand?
↓
Which Critical Assets Become Reachable?

Document:

AWS Account
Region
Authorised Identity
Allowed Services
Excluded Resources
Testing Restrictions
Stop Conditions

Identify:

  • Account context

  • Regions

  • IAM identities

  • Compute resources

  • Storage

  • Databases

  • Networking

  • Serverless resources

  • Logging services

Create:

AWS Asset Inventory

Review:

Users
↓
Groups
↓
Roles
↓
Policies
↓
Trust Relationships
↓
Effective Permissions

Look for security themes such as:

  • Excessive permissions

  • Broad resource permissions

  • Unnecessary role assumption

  • Weak trust relationships

  • Powerful workload identities

  • Privilege-changing permissions

Review EC2 instances for:

  • Network exposure

  • Administrative access

  • Attached IAM roles

  • Security groups

  • Instance configuration

  • Workload trust

Assess authorised lab storage for:

  • Public exposure

  • Excessive identity access

  • Cross-account access

  • Sensitive synthetic information

  • Logging

  • Encryption controls

Develop possible paths such as:

Low-Privilege Identity
↓
IAM Misconfiguration
↓
Workload Control
↓
Powerful Instance Role
↓
Sensitive S3 Resource

Validate only the minimum steps necessary to demonstrate the risk.

Capture:

AWS-ENV-001
AWS-IAM-001
AWS-IAM-002
AWS-EC2-001
AWS-S3-001
AWS-PATH-001

Produce:

Enterprise AWS Penetration Testing Report

Include:

  1. Executive Summary

  2. Scope

  3. AWS Architecture

  4. Methodology

  5. Attack Surface

  6. IAM Analysis

  7. Validated Findings

  8. Attack Paths

  9. Evidence

  10. Recommendations

  11. Retest Plan

Project 01/
β”œβ”€β”€ AWS Architecture Diagram
β”œβ”€β”€ Asset Inventory
β”œβ”€β”€ IAM Permission Map
β”œβ”€β”€ Network Exposure Matrix
β”œβ”€β”€ Attack Path Diagram
β”œβ”€β”€ Evidence Register
β”œβ”€β”€ Findings Register
└── AWS Penetration Testing Report

Project 02 β€” Enterprise Azure Identity & Cloud Penetration Test

Section titled β€œProject 02 β€” Enterprise Azure Identity & Cloud Penetration Test”

CloudNova now places you inside a fictional enterprise Azure environment.

The organisation uses:

Microsoft Entra ID
↓
Azure Subscriptions
↓
Resource Groups
↓
Virtual Machines
↓
Applications
↓
Managed Identities
↓
Key Vault / Storage

This project focuses heavily on identity-driven cloud attack paths.

Assess:

  • Entra identities

  • Azure RBAC

  • Role assignments

  • Managed identities

  • Resource groups

  • Virtual machines

  • Storage

  • Key Vault

  • Network controls

  • Administrative relationships

  • Privilege paths

Do not simply ask:

Which Azure resources are vulnerable?

Ask:

Which identities can control which resources, and can those relationships eventually provide access to higher privilege or sensitive information?

Build:

User
↓
Entra Group
↓
Azure Role
↓
Scope
↓
Resource
↓
Managed Identity
↓
Additional Resources

Map tenant and subscription context.

Inventory authorised resources.

Analyse Entra identities and groups.

Analyse Azure RBAC.

Review managed identities.

Assess VM and network exposure.

Review Key Vault and storage security.

Build identity-driven attack paths.

Example:

Developer
↓
Can Modify Application
↓
Application Uses Managed Identity
↓
Managed Identity
↓
Key Vault Access
↓
Sensitive Application Secret

Determine remediation choke points.

For example:

Attack Path
↓
Excessive Developer Permission
↓
Remove Permission
↓
Path Broken
Project 02/
β”œβ”€β”€ Azure Architecture Diagram
β”œβ”€β”€ Entra Identity Map
β”œβ”€β”€ Azure RBAC Matrix
β”œβ”€β”€ Managed Identity Inventory
β”œβ”€β”€ Key Vault Assessment
β”œβ”€β”€ Network Exposure Matrix
β”œβ”€β”€ Attack Path Diagram
β”œβ”€β”€ Evidence Register
β”œβ”€β”€ Findings Register
└── Azure Penetration Testing Report

Project 03 β€” Google Cloud IAM & Workload Security Assessment

Section titled β€œProject 03 β€” Google Cloud IAM & Workload Security Assessment”

Your third CloudNova engagement involves a fictional organisation running production workloads in Google Cloud.

Architecture:

Organisation
↓
Folders
↓
Projects
↓
IAM
↓
Compute / Serverless
↓
Service Accounts
↓
Storage / Databases

This project focuses on:

IAM inheritance and workload identity.

Assess:

  • Organisation hierarchy

  • Projects

  • IAM bindings

  • Custom roles

  • Service accounts

  • Service account relationships

  • Compute workloads

  • Storage

  • Secrets

  • Serverless services

  • Logging

  • Privilege paths

Google Cloud access may inherit through:

Organisation
↓
Folder
↓
Project
↓
Resource

Therefore, do not review permissions only at the resource level.

Build:

Human Identity
↓
Permission
↓
Workload
↓
Service Account
↓
Cloud Permission
↓
Sensitive Resource
Developer
↓
Controls Workload
↓
Workload Uses Service Account
↓
Service Account Has Excessive Permissions
↓
Sensitive Cloud Storage

Perform:

Environment Discovery
↓
Resource Inventory
↓
IAM Analysis
↓
Service Account Analysis
↓
Compute Assessment
↓
Storage Assessment
↓
Serverless Assessment
↓
Secret Management Review
↓
Attack Path Development
↓
Controlled Validation
↓
Reporting
Project 03/
β”œβ”€β”€ GCP Architecture Diagram
β”œβ”€β”€ Organisation Hierarchy Map
β”œβ”€β”€ IAM Binding Matrix
β”œβ”€β”€ Service Account Inventory
β”œβ”€β”€ Workload Identity Map
β”œβ”€β”€ Storage Assessment
β”œβ”€β”€ Attack Path Diagram
β”œβ”€β”€ Evidence Register
β”œβ”€β”€ Findings Register
└── GCP Penetration Testing Report

Project 04 β€” Kubernetes & Container Enterprise Compromise Assessment

Section titled β€œProject 04 β€” Kubernetes & Container Enterprise Compromise Assessment”

CloudNova provides an enterprise cloud-native application.

Architecture:

Internet
↓
Ingress
↓
Kubernetes Service
↓
Application Pod
↓
Kubernetes Service Account
↓
Cluster Permissions
↓
Cloud Workload Identity
↓
Cloud Resources

This project tests whether weaknesses across the application, container, Kubernetes, and cloud layers can combine into a meaningful attack path.

Assess:

  • Container configuration

  • Kubernetes workloads

  • Namespaces

  • RBAC

  • Service accounts

  • Secrets

  • Network policies

  • Pod security

  • Workload identities

  • Cluster trust

  • Cloud integration

  • Logging and detection

Do not assess:

Container
Kubernetes
Cloud

as unrelated systems.

Assess:

Application
↓
Container
↓
Pod
↓
Service Account
↓
Kubernetes RBAC
↓
Cloud Identity
↓
Cloud Resource

Identify:

Cluster
Namespaces
Workloads
Services
Ingress
Service Accounts
RBAC
Secrets
Cloud Integration

Assess:

  • Runtime identity

  • Image configuration

  • Privileged settings

  • Mounted resources

  • Secrets exposure

  • Host interaction

  • Excessive capabilities

Build:

Subject
↓
Role
↓
Permission
↓
Resource
↓
Namespace

Determine:

Which Pod
↓
Uses Which Service Account
↓
With Which Permissions

Assess:

Namespace A
↓
Allowed?
↓
Namespace B

and approved external/cloud destinations.

Identify:

Kubernetes Identity
↓
Cloud Workload Identity
↓
Cloud Role
↓
Cloud Resource

Example:

Application Weakness
↓
Application Pod
↓
Kubernetes Service Account
↓
Excessive RBAC
↓
Additional Workload
↓
Cloud Workload Identity
↓
Sensitive Cloud Resource

The purpose is not to maximise compromise.

Stop when sufficient evidence demonstrates the risk.

Project 04/
β”œβ”€β”€ Kubernetes Architecture Diagram
β”œβ”€β”€ Namespace Inventory
β”œβ”€β”€ Workload Inventory
β”œβ”€β”€ RBAC Matrix
β”œβ”€β”€ Service Account Map
β”œβ”€β”€ Container Security Review
β”œβ”€β”€ Network Policy Matrix
β”œβ”€β”€ Cloud Identity Map
β”œβ”€β”€ Attack Path Diagram
β”œβ”€β”€ Evidence Register
β”œβ”€β”€ Findings Register
└── Kubernetes Penetration Testing Report

Project 05 β€” Enterprise Multi-Cloud Red Team Capstone

Section titled β€œProject 05 β€” Enterprise Multi-Cloud Red Team Capstone”

This is the final CloudNova project.

You are now acting as a Cloud Penetration Tester on a complex enterprise engagement.

The fictional organisation operates:

Users
↓
Microsoft Entra ID
↓
Azure
Developers
↓
CI/CD
↓
AWS
Applications
↓
Kubernetes
↓
Cloud Workload Identities
Analytics
↓
Google Cloud

Your objective is to understand how trust relationships across these environments affect enterprise security.

This is not a collection of five separate penetration tests.

It is an enterprise attack-path assessment.

Enterprise Identity
β”‚
β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”Όβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
↓ ↓ ↓
AWS Azure GCP
β”‚ β”‚ β”‚
└──────┐ β”‚ β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
↓ ↓ ↓
CI/CD
↓
Kubernetes
↓
Workloads
↓
Business Data

Assess:

  • External cloud exposure

  • Enterprise identities

  • Cloud IAM

  • Cross-account trust

  • Cross-subscription relationships

  • Service accounts

  • Managed identities

  • Workload identities

  • CI/CD permissions

  • Kubernetes RBAC

  • Secrets

  • Cloud networking

  • Storage

  • Logging

  • Security monitoring

  • Attack paths

Create:

Scope
Rules of Engagement
Testing Windows
Cloud Accounts
Subscriptions
Projects
Clusters
Approved Identities
Excluded Systems
Stop Conditions

Build a complete enterprise diagram.

Do not begin with exploitation.

Begin with:

What Exists?

Create:

Asset Platform Identity Exposure Criticality
APP01 AWS AppRole Internet High
KV01 Azure Managed Identity Internal Critical
DATA01 GCP Service Account Internal Critical
K8S01 Kubernetes Workload Identity Internal High

Map:

Human Identities
Service Accounts
Managed Identities
IAM Roles
Workload Identities
CI/CD Identities
Kubernetes Service Accounts

Now connect them.

Developer
↓
Git Repository
↓
CI/CD
↓
Cloud Deployment Identity
↓
Kubernetes
↓
Workload Identity
↓
Cloud Resources

Analyse:

External Exposure
Administrative Exposure
Identity Exposure
Application Exposure
CI/CD Exposure
Container Exposure
Cloud API Exposure

Create:

ID Hypothesis Evidence Needed Status
H-001 CI/CD identity may control production workload IAM + pipeline Open
H-002 Workload identity may access sensitive storage IAM policy Open
H-003 Developer may indirectly control privileged identity Trust map Open

Do not treat hypotheses as findings.

Use the CloudNova lab to validate approved hypotheses.

For every validation:

Hypothesis
↓
Minimal Test
↓
Observation
↓
Evidence
↓
Stop

Your final attack paths should connect multiple controls.

Example:

Developer Identity
↓
Excessive CI/CD Permission
↓
Deployment Pipeline
↓
Production Kubernetes Workload
↓
Workload Identity
↓
Cloud Role
↓
Sensitive Storage

Another:

Low-Privilege Cloud Identity
↓
Resource Modification
↓
Privileged Workload
↓
Managed Identity
↓
Secret Store
↓
Enterprise Application

Do not only ask:

How many vulnerabilities exist?

Ask:

Which control would break the greatest number of attack paths?

Example:

Excessive CI/CD Role
β”‚
β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”Όβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
↓ ↓ ↓
Path 01 Path 02 Path 03

Reducing that privilege may eliminate multiple attack paths.

That is enterprise security thinking.

For each validated path identify:

Attack Step
↓
Expected Log
↓
Security Telemetry
↓
Detection
↓
Alert
↓
Investigation

Document whether defensive visibility exists.

Connect technical compromise to:

Sensitive Data
Production Systems
Customer Services
Administrative Control
Compliance
Business Operations

Avoid exaggeration.

Only claim what your evidence supports.

Your final report might contain findings such as:

CLOUD-001
CI/CD Deployment Identity Has Excessive Production Permissions
CLOUD-002
Workload Identity Provides Unnecessary Access to Sensitive Storage
CLOUD-003
Cloud Administrative Trust Is Broader Than Operationally Required
K8S-001
Application Service Account Has Excessive Cluster Permissions
IAM-001
Cloud Identity Governance Allows Indirect Privilege Escalation

Create:

Path Initial Access Intermediate Critical Asset Risk
AP-01 Developer CI/CD β†’ K8s Storage Critical
AP-02 Cloud User Workload Secrets High
AP-03 Application Identity Chain Production High

Maintain:

EV-001
EV-002
EV-003
...

Every significant conclusion should trace back to evidence.

Evidence
↓
Finding
↓
Attack Path
↓
Business Risk

Separate recommendations into:

Remove Excessive Privileges
Rotate Exposed Lab Secrets
Restrict Administrative Exposure
Break Critical Trust Paths
Improve IAM Governance
Harden Workload Identities
Strengthen Network Segmentation
Improve CI/CD Security
Implement Kubernetes Least Privilege
Cloud Identity Governance
Zero Trust
Privileged Access Management
Continuous Cloud Security Monitoring
Attack-Path Management
Automated Policy Enforcement

After remediation:

Original Attack Path
↓
Control Changed
↓
Retest
↓
Can Path Still Succeed?

Record:

Resolved
Partially Resolved
Not Resolved
Project 05/
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 01 Scope
β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ Scope Document
β”‚ └── Rules of Engagement
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 02 Architecture
β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ Enterprise Architecture
β”‚ └── Trust Boundary Diagram
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 03 Inventories
β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ Asset Inventory
β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ Identity Inventory
β”‚ └── Cloud Resource Inventory
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 04 IAM
β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ AWS IAM
β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ Azure RBAC
β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€ GCP IAM
β”‚ └── Kubernetes RBAC
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 05 Attack Surface
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 06 Hypotheses
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 07 Evidence
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 08 Findings
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 09 Attack Paths
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 10 Detection Analysis
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 11 Remediation Roadmap
β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€ 12 Retest
β”‚
└── 13 Final Report

Your final deliverable should resemble a professional consulting engagement.

Enterprise Cloud Penetration Testing Report
1. Executive Summary
2. Engagement Objectives
3. Scope
4. Rules of Engagement
5. Environment Overview
6. Architecture
7. Methodology
8. Attack Surface
9. Identity & Access Analysis
10. Validated Findings
11. Enterprise Attack Paths
12. Business Impact
13. Detection Observations
14. Remediation Priorities
15. Strategic Recommendations
16. Conclusion
17. Technical Evidence
18. Retest Plan

The five projects should progressively build your capability:

Project 01
AWS
↓
Understand Cloud IAM & Resource Security
Project 02
Azure
↓
Understand Enterprise Identity & Managed Identity
Project 03
GCP
↓
Understand Service Accounts & Workload Trust
Project 04
Kubernetes
↓
Understand Cloud-Native Attack Paths
Project 05
Multi-Cloud Capstone
↓
Understand Enterprise Trust Relationships

By Project 05 you should no longer think primarily in terms of:

AWS Vulnerability
Azure Vulnerability
Kubernetes Vulnerability

Instead think:

Identity
↓
Permission
↓
Trust
↓
Workload
↓
Another Identity
↓
Critical Resource

For every project, evaluate yourself across five areas.

Area Expected Capability
Discovery Identify relevant assets and identities
Analysis Understand permissions and trust
Validation Safely validate security hypotheses
Attack Paths Connect weaknesses into realistic paths
Reporting Explain evidence, impact and remediation

Use:

Level 1 β€” Requires Guidance
Level 2 β€” Can Perform With Checklist
Level 3 β€” Can Perform Independently
Level 4 β€” Can Explain and Defend Decisions

Your target by the end of this module should be:

Level 3 across the complete Cloud Penetration Testing workflow.


All five projects must remain within the authorised CloudNova training environment.

Before every project:

[ ] Confirm CloudNova environment
[ ] Confirm authorised accounts
[ ] Confirm authorised identities
[ ] Confirm scope
[ ] Confirm excluded resources
[ ] Confirm permitted techniques
[ ] Confirm stop conditions
[ ] Use synthetic data only
[ ] Record evidence
[ ] Clean up changes

Never transfer CloudNova testing techniques directly to systems you do not own or have explicit permission to assess.


These five projects can become the foundation of your Cloud Penetration Tester portfolio.

Your portfolio can demonstrate:

AWS Assessment
+
Azure Assessment
+
GCP Assessment
+
Kubernetes Assessment
+
Enterprise Multi-Cloud Capstone

For each project retain sanitised:

Architecture Diagram
Methodology
Asset Inventory
IAM Analysis
Attack Path Diagram
Example Finding
Remediation
Lessons Learned

Do not publish credentials, secrets, tokens, or restricted CloudNova environment information.


After completing all five projects, you should be able to answer:

Can I scope a cloud penetration test?
Can I map an unfamiliar cloud environment?
Can I identify important cloud assets?
Can I analyse IAM?
Can I understand effective permissions?
Can I analyse workload identities?
Can I evaluate cloud trust relationships?
Can I assess AWS?
Can I assess Azure?
Can I assess GCP?
Can I assess Kubernetes?
Can I connect cloud and Kubernetes identities?
Can I analyse CI/CD trust?
Can I develop attack hypotheses?
Can I validate them safely?
Can I build enterprise attack paths?
Can I identify remediation choke points?
Can I collect professional evidence?
Can I explain business impact?
Can I write a professional penetration testing report?
Can I retest remediation?

If you can confidently demonstrate these capabilities in an authorised environment, you have moved significantly beyond simply knowing cloud security tools.

You are developing the methodology of a Cloud Penetration Tester.


Module 09 is where the previous modules come together.

Remember:

Enterprise cloud penetration testing is not vulnerability scanning.

Cloud attacks are frequently identity attacks.

Permissions must be analysed in context rather than individually.

Workload identities can connect application compromise with cloud privilege.

Kubernetes, containers, CI/CD, identity, and cloud infrastructure must be analysed as one connected system.

A hypothesis is not a finding until it is validated.

Use the minimum controlled action necessary to prove risk.

Every important conclusion should be supported by evidence.

Attack paths often provide more value than isolated vulnerability lists.

Identify security choke points that break multiple attack paths.

A professional Cloud Penetration Tester must understand remediation as well as offensive techniques.

The final deliverable is not the attackβ€”it is the security improvement created from the assessment.

Your project progression is:

AWS
↓
Azure
↓
GCP
↓
Kubernetes + Containers
↓
Multi-Cloud Enterprise
↓
Attack Path Analysis
↓
Business Risk
↓
Professional Reporting

➑️ 10 β€” Interview Preparation

You have now completed the practical technical journey of the Cloud Penetration Tester learning path.

In the next module, you will prepare to explain these skills during technical interviews.

You will practise questions covering:

  • Cloud penetration testing methodology

  • AWS security

  • Azure security

  • Google Cloud security

  • Kubernetes offensive security

  • Container security

  • Serverless security

  • IAM privilege analysis

  • Workload identities

  • Cloud networking

  • Cloud attack paths

  • Cloud red team concepts

  • Evidence and reporting

  • Scenario-based troubleshooting

Most importantly, you will learn how to answer questions using your five CloudNova projects as practical evidence.

Instead of saying:

β€œI have studied AWS penetration testing.”

you should be able to say:

β€œIn an authorised enterprise AWS lab, I mapped the environment, analysed IAM and workload trust, developed a potential privilege path, validated the minimum required steps, documented the evidence, identified the root cause, and produced remediation recommendations.”

That transitionβ€”from knowledge to demonstrated experienceβ€”is the purpose of these five projects.