"Lab 11 — Phishing Email Investigation"
Mission Information
Section titled “Mission Information”| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Lab | 11 |
| Lab Name | Phishing Email Investigation |
| Track | CompTIA CySA+ |
| Difficulty | Intermediate |
| Estimated Time | 120–150 minutes |
| Primary Role | Cybersecurity Analyst / SOC Analyst |
| Environment | CySA+ SOC Investigation Lab |
| Primary Systems | Analyst Workstation + SIEM + Email Evidence |
| Primary Tools | Email Header Analysis, CyberChef, VirusTotal or Approved Threat Intelligence Sources |
| Skills | Phishing Analysis, Header Analysis, URL Analysis, IOC Extraction, Attachment Triage, Threat Intelligence, Incident Classification |
Mission Scenario
Section titled “Mission Scenario”You are working as a Cybersecurity Analyst at GHC Enterprise.
A user has reported a suspicious email appearing to originate from the organization’s IT support team.
The message claims:
URGENT: Your account will be disabled.
We detected unusual activity associated with your account.
Verify your identity immediately to prevent account suspension.The email contains a link labeled:
Verify AccountShortly after the message was received, your SIEM detected unusual authentication activity associated with the recipient’s account.
Your SOC needs to determine whether the email is related to the authentication activity investigated in the previous mission.
You have been assigned the suspicious message for analysis.
You must determine:
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who actually sent the message
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whether the visible sender was spoofed
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which systems handled the email
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whether SPF, DKIM, and DMARC passed
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where embedded links lead
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whether domains are suspicious
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whether attachments exist
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whether any indicators are known malicious
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whether the recipient interacted with the message
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whether the email may have contributed to account compromise
Mission Objective: Perform a structured phishing investigation and determine whether the suspicious email represents benign communication, spam, phishing, credential theft, or another malicious email threat.
Mission Objectives
Section titled “Mission Objectives”By completing this lab, you will be able to:
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understand phishing investigation methodology
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preserve suspicious email evidence
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analyze
.emlmessages safely -
distinguish display name from actual sender address
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investigate
From -
investigate
Return-Path -
investigate
Reply-To -
analyze
Receivedheaders -
interpret SPF results
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interpret DKIM results
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interpret DMARC results
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extract URLs safely
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investigate domains
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recognize lookalike domains
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identify URL obfuscation
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inspect attachments safely
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calculate attachment hashes
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enrich indicators using threat intelligence
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correlate phishing evidence with SIEM telemetry
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assess user interaction
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classify phishing incidents
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document analyst findings
1. Understand the Phishing Investigation Workflow
Section titled “1. Understand the Phishing Investigation Workflow”A typical phishing investigation follows:
Suspicious Email Reported ↓Preserve Evidence ↓Review Message Content ↓Analyze Sender ↓Analyze Headers ↓Validate Authentication ↓Extract URLs ↓Extract Attachments ↓Identify IOCs ↓Threat Intelligence ↓Investigate Recipient Activity ↓Correlate SIEM Evidence ↓Determine Impact ↓Analyst VerdictDo not begin by clicking links or opening attachments.
2. Phishing Is More Than a Suspicious Link
Section titled “2. Phishing Is More Than a Suspicious Link”Phishing messages may attempt to:
Steal CredentialsDeliver MalwareCollect Financial InformationConvince Users to Transfer MoneyCapture MFA CodesRedirect Users to Fake PortalsInitiate Business Email CompromiseSome messages contain attachments.
Others contain only links.
Some contain neither and instead attempt to convince the recipient to reply.
Therefore:
Analyze the complete message, not just one indicator.
3. Understand Common Email Threat Categories
Section titled “3. Understand Common Email Threat Categories”Unwanted or unsolicited email without necessarily having malicious intent.
Phishing
Section titled “Phishing”Messages designed to deceive recipients into revealing information or performing actions.
Spear Phishing
Section titled “Spear Phishing”Phishing tailored toward a particular individual or organization.
Credential Phishing
Section titled “Credential Phishing”Attempts to steal usernames, passwords, session information, or MFA information.
Business Email Compromise
Section titled “Business Email Compromise”Social engineering involving trusted business identities, executives, suppliers, or financial processes.
Malware Delivery
Section titled “Malware Delivery”Messages containing or linking to malicious files or software.
4. Start the Lab Environment
Section titled “4. Start the Lab Environment”Start:
CYSA-ANALYST10.10.10.10
CYSA-SIEM10.10.10.40Keep the suspicious email isolated from normal production mailboxes.
For this lab, use only instructor-provided, synthetic, or otherwise safe email evidence.
5. Create the Investigation Workspace
Section titled “5. Create the Investigation Workspace”On CYSA-ANALYST:
mkdir -p ~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB11/{Email,Headers,Attachments,IOCs,Screenshots,Findings}Create investigation notes:
touch ~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB11/investigation-notes.mdUse:
Investigation ID:LAB11-PHISH-0016. Preserve the Original Email
Section titled “6. Preserve the Original Email”Ideally, preserve the suspicious message as:
suspicious-email.emlStore it under:
~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB11/Email/Avoid modifying the original evidence.
Create a working copy:
cp suspicious-email.eml suspicious-email-working.emlThe investigation model becomes:
Original Evidence ↓Preserved ↓Working Copy ↓Analysis7. Calculate the Email Hash
Section titled “7. Calculate the Email Hash”Calculate SHA-256:
sha256sum suspicious-email.emlRecord the result.
Example:
SHA256:<email-hash>This helps demonstrate evidence integrity.
8. Perform Initial Visual Triage
Section titled “8. Perform Initial Visual Triage”Without clicking anything, review:
Display NameSender AddressRecipientSubjectDateMessage BodyLinksAttachmentsUrgencyBrandingGrammarRequested ActionRecord anything suspicious.
Example:
Display Name:GHC IT Support
Visible Sender:support@gohackerscloud.example
Subject:URGENT — Account Verification Required
Requested Action:Verify account using embedded link9. Identify Social Engineering Indicators
Section titled “9. Identify Social Engineering Indicators”Look for language such as:
UrgentImmediate Action RequiredAccount SuspendedPassword ExpiringPayment RequiredInvoice AttachedSecurity AlertVerify IdentityMFA ExpiredMailbox FullSocial engineering commonly creates:
FearUrgencyAuthorityCuriosityFinancial PressureThese are indicators—not proof by themselves.
10. Understand Display-Name Spoofing
Section titled “10. Understand Display-Name Spoofing”Consider:
Display Name:GHC Security Team
Email:security-update@example.invalidA user may focus only on:
GHC Security Teamand overlook the actual address.
Always compare:
Display Name vsActual Sender Address11. View the Raw Email
Section titled “11. View the Raw Email”On Linux:
less suspicious-email.emlOr:
cat suspicious-email.emlYou should see headers followed by the message body.
Headers may include:
From:To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:Return-Path:Reply-To:Received:Authentication-Results:DKIM-Signature:Content-Type:12. Extract the Headers
Section titled “12. Extract the Headers”Extract the header portion into:
~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB11/Headers/email-headers.txtReview it separately.
The exact header structure depends on the email system that processed the message.
13. Investigate the From Header
Section titled “13. Investigate the From Header”Locate:
From:Example:
From: GHC IT Support <support@example.invalid>Ask:
Does the domain belong to the claimed organization?
Is the spelling correct?
Is this address expected?
Does it match the visible display name?14. Investigate Return-Path
Section titled “14. Investigate Return-Path”Locate:
Return-Path:This can identify the address used for delivery-related responses.
Compare:
From vsReturn-PathA mismatch is not automatically malicious.
Legitimate mailing platforms often use different envelope senders.
But the relationship should be investigated.
15. Investigate Reply-To
Section titled “15. Investigate Reply-To”Locate:
Reply-To:Example:
From:support@trusted.example
Reply-To:helpdesk@unrelated.exampleA suspicious Reply-To can indicate an attempt to redirect the conversation to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Again, legitimate systems can also use different reply addresses.
Context matters.
16. Compare Sender Identity Fields
Section titled “16. Compare Sender Identity Fields”Build:
| Field | Value | Observation |
|---|---|---|
| Display Name | GHC IT Support | Trusted-looking |
| From | support@example.invalid | Investigate |
| Return-Path | mail@example.invalid | Investigate |
| Reply-To | help@example.invalid | Investigate |
The objective is to understand the sender identity chain.
17. Investigate Received Headers
Section titled “17. Investigate Received Headers”Email servers add Received headers as messages pass through infrastructure.
You may see multiple entries.
Conceptually:
Sending Infrastructure ↓Mail Relay ↓Security Gateway ↓Recipient Mail ServerThese records help reconstruct the email delivery path.
18. Read Received Headers Correctly
Section titled “18. Read Received Headers Correctly”Received headers are generally analyzed:
Bottom ↑ ↑ ↑TopThe earliest trustworthy hop is typically lower in the chain.
Do not blindly trust every header value supplied by the sender.
Focus on headers added by infrastructure you trust.
19. Build the Email Delivery Path
Section titled “19. Build the Email Delivery Path”Document:
Originating Infrastructure ↓Intermediate Relay ↓Email Gateway ↓Recipient EnvironmentRecord:
IP addressesHostnamesTimestampsThis becomes part of your IOC investigation.
20. Understand SPF
Section titled “20. Understand SPF”Sender Policy Framework — SPF helps receiving systems determine whether an IP address is authorized to send mail for a domain.
You may see:
spf=passor:
spf=failOther possible results include:
neutralsoftfailnonetemperrorpermerror21. Understand SPF Limitations
Section titled “21. Understand SPF Limitations”An SPF pass does not automatically mean:
Email is safe.An attacker may legitimately control:
malicious-example.invalidand configure SPF correctly.
SPF answers a narrower question:
Was this sending infrastructure authorized for the evaluated domain?
22. Understand DKIM
Section titled “22. Understand DKIM”DomainKeys Identified Mail — DKIM uses cryptographic signatures to help validate that selected message content was signed by a domain and has not been altered in ways covered by the signature.
Look for:
dkim=passor:
dkim=failAlso inspect:
DKIM-Signature:23. Understand DMARC
Section titled “23. Understand DMARC”Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance — DMARC builds on SPF and DKIM and checks domain alignment with the visible From domain.
Possible results include:
dmarc=passdmarc=failDMARC helps organizations establish policies for handling authentication failures.
24. Analyze Authentication Results Together
Section titled “24. Analyze Authentication Results Together”Create:
| Control | Result | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| SPF | Pass / Fail | Sending authorization |
| DKIM | Pass / Fail | Message/domain signature validation |
| DMARC | Pass / Fail | Domain alignment and policy |
Do not evaluate these controls independently of sender and message context.
25. Investigate Authentication-Results
Section titled “25. Investigate Authentication-Results”Locate:
Authentication-Results:Example structure:
spf=passdkim=passdmarc=passor:
spf=faildkim=nonedmarc=failRecord the exact results in your investigation notes.
26. Extract URLs Safely
Section titled “26. Extract URLs Safely”Do not click suspicious links.
Instead, inspect the raw message and extract URLs as text.
You can search:
grep -Eo 'https?://[^ "<>]+' suspicious-email.emlDepending on MIME encoding, URLs may require additional decoding before they become visible.
Store extracted URLs in:
~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB11/IOCs/urls.txt27. Compare Displayed Link and Actual Destination
Section titled “27. Compare Displayed Link and Actual Destination”A message may display:
https://login.example.comwhile the actual hyperlink points somewhere else.
For HTML email, inspect:
<a href="ACTUAL-DESTINATION"> DISPLAYED-TEXT</a>Always investigate the:
hrefrather than trusting the visible text.
28. Recognize Lookalike Domains
Section titled “28. Recognize Lookalike Domains”Attackers may use domains visually similar to trusted brands.
Conceptual examples:
company.examplecornpany.examplecompany-security.examplecompany-login.exampleLook for:
Character substitutionAdded wordsUnexpected subdomainsDifferent top-level domainsHyphenationBrand name embedded inside unrelated domain29. Understand URL Structure
Section titled “29. Understand URL Structure”Consider:
https://login.security.example.invalid/account/verifyBreak it into:
Scheme:https
Hostname:login.security.example.invalid
Path:/account/verifyThe important question is:
Which domain actually controls the destination?
Do not judge a URL merely because trusted words appear somewhere inside it.
30. Watch for Misleading Subdomains
Section titled “30. Watch for Misleading Subdomains”Consider:
https://gohackerscloud.com.attacker-example.invalid/loginThe controlling registrable domain is not:
gohackerscloud.comThe trusted-looking text is only part of the hostname.
This is a common phishing technique.
31. Investigate URL Encoding
Section titled “31. Investigate URL Encoding”Suspicious URLs may contain encoded characters such as:
%2F%3A%40Use a decoding tool such as CyberChef in a controlled analysis workflow.
Decode only the text.
Do not browse to the resulting suspicious URL.
32. Investigate Redirect Parameters
Section titled “32. Investigate Redirect Parameters”A URL may contain:
redirect=url=target=continue=next=Example concept:
trusted-site.example/redirect?url=suspicious-site.exampleThe first domain may appear legitimate while the final destination is not.
Document the full redirect chain only using safe analysis methods.
33. Extract Domain Indicators
Section titled “33. Extract Domain Indicators”Create:
~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB11/IOCs/domains.txtRecord domains found in:
FromReturn-PathReply-ToReceived headersURLsAttachments or message contentRemove obvious trusted infrastructure only after validating it.
34. Extract IP Indicators
Section titled “34. Extract IP Indicators”Create:
~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB11/IOCs/ip-addresses.txtPotential IP sources include:
Received headersURLs using direct IP addressesEmail gateway telemetrySIEM eventsDNS records35. Perform Threat Intelligence Enrichment
Section titled “35. Perform Threat Intelligence Enrichment”For suspicious indicators, use approved threat-intelligence sources.
You may investigate:
DomainIP AddressURLFile HashLook for:
ReputationPrevious detectionsMalware associationsPhishing reportsFirst-seen informationDetection consensusNever upload confidential organizational files to public analysis services without authorization.
36. Understand Threat Intelligence Limitations
Section titled “36. Understand Threat Intelligence Limitations”If a reputation service reports:
0 detectionsthat does not prove the indicator is safe.
The infrastructure may be:
NewRareUnreportedShort-livedTargetedThreat intelligence is supporting evidence.
It is not the entire investigation.
37. Investigate Domain Context
Section titled “37. Investigate Domain Context”Where approved, investigate:
Domain ageRegistration contextDNS recordsHosting infrastructureCertificate informationHistorical reputationA domain created recently and impersonating a known brand may deserve increased scrutiny.
Do not use domain age as the sole basis for classification.
38. Investigate Attachments
Section titled “38. Investigate Attachments”First identify whether the email contains attachments.
Possible types include:
PDFDOCXXLSXZIPHTMLISOImageExecutableScriptDo not double-click suspicious attachments.
39. Save Attachments Safely
Section titled “39. Save Attachments Safely”If your email-analysis tooling supports safe extraction, place attachments in:
~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB11/Attachments/Do not execute them.
Keep analysis inside your isolated environment.
40. Calculate Attachment Hashes
Section titled “40. Calculate Attachment Hashes”For each extracted file:
sha256sum <filename>You may also calculate:
md5sum <filename>and:
sha1sum <filename>For modern IOC tracking, prefer:
SHA-25641. Identify the File Type
Section titled “41. Identify the File Type”Use:
file <filename>Do not rely only on the filename extension.
For example:
invoice.pdfmay not necessarily be a PDF.
The actual file type should be verified.
42. Check Basic File Metadata
Section titled “42. Check Basic File Metadata”Run:
ls -lh <filename>Record:
FilenameSizeFile TypeSHA-256This creates a basic attachment inventory.
43. Perform Safe Static Triage
Section titled “43. Perform Safe Static Triage”Depending on the file type, you may inspect:
MetadataStringsArchive contentsDocument structureHashesEmbedded URLsDo not execute suspicious binaries or scripts as part of this introductory lab.
Dynamic malware analysis belongs in an isolated malware-analysis environment.
44. Search for URLs Inside Extracted Text
Section titled “44. Search for URLs Inside Extracted Text”If you safely extract text from a document, search for:
http://https://Record any discovered indicators.
An attachment can be used simply as another layer leading the victim to a credential phishing site.
45. Create the IOC Inventory
Section titled “45. Create the IOC Inventory”Build:
| Type | Indicator | Source | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| sender@example.invalid | From | Suspicious | |
| Domain | example.invalid | URL | Investigate |
| IP | 192.0.2.50 | Received | Investigate |
| URL | hxxps://example[.]invalid/login |
Suspicious | |
| SHA-256 | <hash> |
Attachment | Investigate |
When documenting malicious URLs for reports, consider defanging them.
46. Understand Defanging
Section titled “46. Understand Defanging”Instead of writing an active indicator such as:
https://malicious.examplean analyst may document:
hxxps://malicious[.]exampleThis reduces accidental clicking.
Similarly:
192.0.2.10may be represented as:
192[.]0[.]2[.]10when appropriate for reports.
47. Search the SIEM for the Recipient
Section titled “47. Search the SIEM for the Recipient”Now connect the email investigation to your authentication investigation.
Search:
Recipient UsernameLook for events occurring:
Before EmailDuring Email DeliveryAfter EmailThe objective is to determine whether suspicious account activity followed the phishing message.
48. Search for Phishing Domains in the SIEM
Section titled “48. Search for Phishing Domains in the SIEM”Search the extracted domain across available telemetry.
Potential sources include:
DNSZeekProxyFirewallEndpointEDRAsk:
Did the recipient’s endpoint communicate with the suspicious infrastructure?
49. Search Zeek DNS Telemetry
Section titled “49. Search Zeek DNS Telemetry”If Zeek logs are ingested into the SIEM, search:
Suspicious DomainA match could indicate:
Endpoint ↓DNS Query ↓Suspicious DomainThis does not automatically prove the user visited the site.
But it strengthens the investigation.
50. Search Zeek Connection Telemetry
Section titled “50. Search Zeek Connection Telemetry”If the suspicious domain resolved to an IP, search for connections to that IP.
Look for:
Source IPDestination IPDestination PortTimestampServiceCompare the timestamp with email delivery and authentication events.
51. Search Suricata Telemetry
Section titled “51. Search Suricata Telemetry”Search Suricata events for:
Suspicious DomainSuspicious IPRecipient EndpointReview any relevant IDS alerts.
This provides another source of network evidence.
52. Investigate Browser or Proxy Evidence
Section titled “52. Investigate Browser or Proxy Evidence”If available in your environment, review:
Web Proxy LogsBrowser HistoryDNS LogsSecure Web Gateway LogsEndpoint TelemetryDetermine whether the user accessed the suspicious URL.
Do not assume interaction merely because the email was delivered.
53. Determine Whether the User Clicked
Section titled “53. Determine Whether the User Clicked”Possible evidence:
DNS query for phishing domain ↓Connection to phishing IP ↓HTTP/TLS sessionThis can support:
Possible User InteractionBut additional evidence may be required to determine exactly what information was submitted.
54. Correlate Authentication Activity
Section titled “54. Correlate Authentication Activity”Suppose:
09:00Phishing Email Delivered
09:05Endpoint Resolves Suspicious Domain
09:06Endpoint Connects to Suspicious Infrastructure
09:15Account Authentication from New Source
09:17Privileged ActivityThe investigation now has a possible chain:
Phishing ↓User Interaction ↓Possible Credential Exposure ↓Suspicious Authentication ↓Account ActivityCorrelation is essential.
55. Do Not Confuse Correlation with Proof
Section titled “55. Do Not Confuse Correlation with Proof”The timeline may strongly suggest credential theft.
But be precise.
For example:
Evidence confirms:Email deliveryDomain resolutionNetwork connectionSuspicious authenticationIt may not confirm:
User entered password into phishing pageunless additional evidence supports that conclusion.
Analyst reports should distinguish:
ConfirmedLikelyPossibleUnknown56. Investigate Other Recipients
Section titled “56. Investigate Other Recipients”Search the email environment or SIEM for:
SenderSubjectDomainURLMessage-ID patternsDetermine whether the same campaign targeted additional users.
Example:
1 Suspicious Email ↓Search Environment ↓27 Matching MessagesThe investigation may now become a broader phishing campaign response.
57. Identify Potentially Affected Users
Section titled “57. Identify Potentially Affected Users”Create:
| Recipient | Delivered | Click Evidence | Suspicious Login | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| user01 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Investigate |
| user02 | Yes | No | No | Monitor |
| user03 | Yes | Unknown | No | Investigate |
This helps prioritize response.
58. Determine the Email Verdict
Section titled “58. Determine the Email Verdict”Possible classifications include:
BenignSpamSuspiciousPhishingCredential PhishingMalware DeliveryBusiness Email CompromiseBase the verdict on multiple indicators.
59. Build a Phishing Scoring Model
Section titled “59. Build a Phishing Scoring Model”For learning purposes, evaluate:
Sender mismatchAuthentication failuresLookalike domainSuspicious URLRecently observed domainAttachment riskThreat intelligence hitsUser interactionSuspicious authentication afterwardThe more independent evidence sources agree, the stronger your conclusion becomes.
Do not treat this as a universal numerical risk formula.
60. Map the Activity to MITRE ATT&CK
Section titled “60. Map the Activity to MITRE ATT&CK”Depending on the evidence, relevant ATT&CK context may include:
PhishingSpearphishing LinkSpearphishing AttachmentValid AccountsOnly map techniques supported by the observed evidence.
61. Determine Incident Scope
Section titled “61. Determine Incident Scope”Ask:
How many recipients?
How many clicked?
How many accounts show suspicious authentication?
Were privileged accounts affected?
Was malware delivered?
Were additional systems contacted?
Did the attacker perform post-login activity?Scope determines incident severity.
62. Determine Containment Requirements
Section titled “62. Determine Containment Requirements”For a confirmed phishing incident, possible actions include:
Block senderBlock domainBlock URLBlock malicious IPRemove matching emailsReset compromised credentialsRevoke sessionsRequire MFA reauthenticationIsolate affected endpoint if neededSearch for additional victimsPreserve evidenceFollow organizational incident-response procedures.
63. Mission Challenge — Phishing Investigation
Section titled “63. Mission Challenge — Phishing Investigation”The SOC provides:
A suspicious account-verification email was reported shortly before unusual authentication activity was detected. Determine whether the email and authentication events are related.
Investigate and answer:
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What is the visible sender?
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What is the actual sender address?
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What is the
Return-Path? -
Is a
Reply-Topresent? -
Do the sender fields align?
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What infrastructure delivered the email?
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What is the SPF result?
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What is the DKIM result?
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What is the DMARC result?
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What URLs are present?
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Do displayed links match actual destinations?
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Are lookalike domains present?
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Are redirects present?
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Are attachments present?
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What are the attachment hashes?
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What IOCs can be extracted?
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What does threat-intelligence enrichment show?
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Did the recipient endpoint resolve the suspicious domain?
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Did the endpoint connect to suspicious infrastructure?
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Did suspicious authentication occur afterward?
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Were additional recipients targeted?
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What is the final email classification?
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What is the incident scope?
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What response actions are recommended?
64. Document Your Findings
Section titled “64. Document Your Findings”Update:
~/CySA-Lab/Investigations/LAB11/investigation-notes.mdUse:
# LAB11 Phishing Investigation
## Investigation ID
LAB11-PHISH-001
## Email Summary
- Sender:- Recipient:- Subject:- Date:- Message-ID:
## Sender Analysis
- Display Name:- From:- Return-Path:- Reply-To:
## Email Authentication
- SPF:- DKIM:- DMARC:
## Delivery Path
Document relevant Received headers.
## URL Analysis
Document:- displayed URL- actual URL- domain- redirects- reputation
## Attachment Analysis
Document:- filename- file type- size- SHA-256- reputation
## Indicators of Compromise
Document:- domains- IP addresses- URLs- hashes- sender addresses
## SIEM Correlation
Document:- DNS activity- network connections- IDS alerts- authentication activity
## User Impact
Determine:- email delivered?- link accessed?- attachment opened?- credentials potentially exposed?- suspicious authentication?
## Scope
Document additional recipients or affected systems.
## Verdict
Benign / Spam / Suspicious / Phishing / Credential Phishing / Malware Delivery / BEC
## Severity
Low / Medium / High / Critical
## Recommended Actions
Document containment and follow-up actions.65. Example Analyst Findings
Section titled “65. Example Analyst Findings”A simulated lab assessment may resemble:
Investigation:LAB11-PHISH-001
Email Type:Account Verification Message
Sender Analysis:Display name impersonated the organization's IT support function.
Email Authentication:Sender authentication and alignment results contained indicators requiring investigation.
URL Analysis:Embedded link directed the recipient to infrastructure unrelated to the claimed organization.
Threat Intelligence:The destination exhibited suspicious characteristics.
Recipient Activity:Network telemetry indicated the recipient endpoint communicated with the suspicious infrastructure after email delivery.
Authentication Correlation:Suspicious authentication activity was observed shortly afterward.
Assessment:Evidence is consistent with a credential-phishing scenario.
Classification:Credential Phishing
Severity:High
Recommended Action:Contain affected identity, revoke active sessions, reset credentials, block identified indicators, search for additional recipients, and investigate post-authentication activity.66. Evidence to Capture
Section titled “66. Evidence to Capture”Capture:
01-original-email.png02-message-body.png03-display-name-and-sender.png04-raw-email-headers.png05-return-path.png06-reply-to.png07-received-chain.png08-spf-result.png09-dkim-result.png10-dmarc-result.png11-url-extraction.png12-lookalike-domain.png13-url-analysis.png14-attachment-inventory.png15-file-hash.png16-threat-intelligence.png17-ioc-inventory.png18-siem-domain-search.png19-zeek-correlation.png20-authentication-correlation.png21-incident-timeline.png22-analyst-verdict.png67. Validation Checklist
Section titled “67. Validation Checklist”-
Original email evidence was preserved
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Email SHA-256 was calculated
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Initial visual triage was completed
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Display name was investigated
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Actual sender was identified
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Fromwas analyzed -
Return-Pathwas analyzed -
Reply-Towas analyzed -
Receivedheaders were investigated -
Email delivery path was reconstructed
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SPF was investigated
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DKIM was investigated
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DMARC was investigated
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URLs were extracted without clicking
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Displayed and actual URLs were compared
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Lookalike domains were investigated
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Redirect indicators were reviewed
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Domain indicators were extracted
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IP indicators were extracted
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Attachments were identified
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Attachment file types were verified
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SHA-256 hashes were calculated
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Threat-intelligence enrichment was performed
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IOC inventory was created
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Recipient activity was investigated
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SIEM telemetry was correlated
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Zeek evidence was reviewed where available
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Suricata evidence was reviewed where available
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Authentication activity was correlated
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Additional recipients were investigated
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Incident scope was determined
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Email verdict was assigned
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Recommended response actions were documented
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Evidence was captured
68. Mission Review
Section titled “68. Mission Review”In this mission, you investigated the potential initial-access mechanism behind suspicious authentication activity.
You followed:
Suspicious Email ↓Preserve Evidence ↓Sender Analysis ↓Header Analysis ↓SPF / DKIM / DMARC ↓URL / Domain Analysis ↓Attachment Analysis ↓IOC Extraction ↓Threat Intelligence ↓SIEM Correlation ↓User Activity ↓Authentication Correlation ↓Scope ↓Analyst VerdictThe key lesson is:
A phishing verdict should be based on evidence from the complete message and surrounding environment—not simply on whether an email looks suspicious.
A strong investigation combines:
Email Evidence +Sender Identity +Authentication Results +URL / Attachment Evidence +Threat Intelligence +Endpoint / Network Telemetry +Identity Activity =Phishing Incident ContextSkills Developed
Section titled “Skills Developed”After completing this mission, you should be able to:
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preserve suspicious email evidence
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analyze raw email headers
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investigate sender identity
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analyze
From,Return-Path, andReply-To -
reconstruct email delivery paths
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interpret SPF, DKIM, and DMARC
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safely extract URLs
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identify misleading hyperlinks
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recognize lookalike domains
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analyze URL structure
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identify redirect indicators
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extract domains and IP addresses
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triage email attachments safely
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calculate file hashes
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build IOC inventories
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perform threat-intelligence enrichment
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correlate email and network telemetry
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investigate recipient interaction
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correlate phishing with authentication activity
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determine phishing campaign scope
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classify phishing incidents
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recommend containment actions
What’s Next?
Section titled “What’s Next?”Lab 12 — Malware Analysis Fundamentals
Section titled “Lab 12 — Malware Analysis Fundamentals”You have now investigated a potential phishing delivery mechanism.
A phishing email may also contain or deliver a malicious file.
In the next mission, you will move into foundational malware triage and analysis using safe, controlled samples and non-executing techniques.
You will investigate:
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malware-analysis safety
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static vs dynamic analysis
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file identification
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file extensions vs actual file types
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cryptographic hashes
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strings
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executable metadata
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PE file fundamentals
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suspicious imports
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embedded URLs and domains
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IOC extraction
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threat-intelligence enrichment
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behavioral indicators
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malware classification
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analyst reporting
The investigation progresses from:
Phishing Email ↓Suspicious Attachmentto:
Suspicious File ↓Static Analysis ↓Indicators ↓Threat Intelligence ↓Malware Assessment➡️ Next: Lab 12 — Malware Analysis Fundamentals