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Runbook 03 — Enterprise AWS Incident Response & Attack Path Investigation

Item Value
Module Module 02 — AWS Cloud Penetration Testing
Runbook 03 — Enterprise AWS Incident Response & Attack Path Investigation
Audience SOC Analysts, Cloud Incident Responders, DFIR Teams, Cloud Security Engineers
Assessment Type Enterprise Incident Response & Cloud Forensics
Estimated Duration 4–24 Hours
Frameworks NIST SP 800-61, MITRE ATT&CK, AWS Security Incident Response Guide, CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark

This runbook provides a structured methodology for investigating security incidents in AWS enterprise environments.

It enables responders to:

  • Detect cloud attacks
  • Contain incidents safely
  • Preserve forensic evidence
  • Identify attack paths
  • Determine root cause
  • Eradicate threats
  • Recover securely
  • Produce executive incident reports

CloudNova Technologies has been contacted by FinSecure Bank Ltd after their Security Operations Centre (SOC) detected unusual AWS activity.

Security alerts include:

  • New IAM Administrator created
  • CloudTrail disabled
  • Suspicious AssumeRole activity
  • New EC2 instance launched
  • Secrets Manager accessed
  • Large Amazon S3 downloads
  • GuardDuty High Severity Findings

Management requires an immediate investigation to determine:

  • What happened?
  • How the attacker gained access?
  • What resources were affected?
  • Whether customer data was compromised.
  • How future attacks can be prevented.

Preparation
Detection
Identification
Containment
Evidence Collection
Attack Path Analysis
Root Cause Analysis
Eradication
Recovery
Lessons Learned
Executive Reporting

Verify incident readiness.

Review:

  • AWS Accounts
  • Emergency Contacts
  • IAM Break Glass Accounts
  • Incident Response Plan
  • CloudTrail Logging
  • Security Hub
  • GuardDuty
  • AWS Config
  • Security Lake

  • Incident Activation Record
  • Initial Timeline

Determine how the incident was discovered.

Possible detection sources:

  • GuardDuty
  • Security Hub
  • CloudTrail
  • CloudWatch Alarms
  • AWS Config
  • SIEM
  • Amazon Detective
  • Security Lake
  • User Reports

Document:

  • Detection Time
  • Alert Source
  • Severity
  • Initial Scope

  • Incident Detection Report

Determine:

  • Compromised Account
  • AWS Region
  • Services Impacted
  • IAM Identities
  • Public Exposure
  • Business Criticality

Questions

  • Which AWS account was affected?
  • Is the incident ongoing?
  • Is production impacted?

  • Incident Scope Document

Collect evidence before making changes.

Sources include:

  • CloudTrail Logs
  • CloudWatch Logs
  • GuardDuty Findings
  • Security Hub Findings
  • AWS Config Timeline
  • EC2 Metadata
  • VPC Flow Logs
  • Kubernetes Audit Logs
  • Lambda Logs
  • S3 Access Logs

Evidence should remain read-only wherever possible.


CloudTrail

Terminal window
aws cloudtrail lookup-events

GuardDuty

Terminal window
aws guardduty list-findings

Security Hub

Terminal window
aws securityhub get-findings

AWS Config

Terminal window
aws configservice get-resource-config-history

CloudWatch Logs

Terminal window
aws logs describe-log-groups

  • Evidence Inventory
  • Timeline of Events

Review:

  • New Users
  • New Roles
  • New Policies
  • Access Keys
  • AssumeRole Activity
  • PassRole Activity
  • Trust Policy Changes

Commands

Terminal window
aws iam list-users
Terminal window
aws iam list-roles
Terminal window
aws iam get-role

Questions

  • Were administrator accounts created?
  • Were trust relationships modified?
  • Were credentials exposed?

  • IAM Investigation Report

Review:

  • New EC2 Instances
  • Security Groups
  • IMDS
  • User Data
  • IAM Roles
  • EBS Snapshots
  • Systems Manager

Determine:

  • Was malware deployed?
  • Was an attacker operating from EC2?

  • EC2 Investigation Report

Review:

  • Public Buckets
  • Bucket Policies
  • Object Downloads
  • Cross-Account Access
  • Sensitive Data Access
  • Versioning
  • Encryption

Questions

  • Was customer data accessed?
  • Were backups downloaded?
  • Was data modified?

  • Amazon S3 Investigation Report

Review:

  • Kubernetes Audit Logs
  • RBAC Changes
  • Service Accounts
  • IRSA
  • Secrets
  • Privileged Pods
  • New Deployments
  • CronJobs

Commands

Terminal window
kubectl get pods -A
Terminal window
kubectl get clusterrolebindings
Terminal window
kubectl get events -A

Determine:

  • Was a container compromised?
  • Was Kubernetes used for lateral movement?

  • Kubernetes Investigation Report

Review:

  • Execution Roles
  • Environment Variables
  • Deployment History
  • Event Sources
  • CloudWatch Logs

Determine:

  • Were functions modified?
  • Were malicious Lambda functions deployed?

  • Serverless Investigation Report

Build the complete attacker timeline.

Example

Phishing
Developer Credentials
IAM User
PassRole
Administrator Role
EC2 Launch
Secrets Manager
Amazon S3
Customer Records

Identify:

  • Entry Point
  • Escalation
  • Persistence
  • Lateral Movement
  • Data Access

  • Enterprise Attack Path Diagram

Determine:

  • Initial Weakness
  • Failed Security Control
  • Missing Detection
  • Business Impact

Example

Finding Root Cause
Public EC2 Weak Security Group
IAM Escalation Excessive PassRole
S3 Exposure Public Bucket Policy
Kubernetes Compromise Privileged Pod

  • Root Cause Analysis Report

Contain the incident safely.

Examples:

  • Disable compromised IAM users
  • Rotate credentials
  • Stop malicious EC2 instances
  • Remove public Security Groups
  • Disable compromised Lambda functions
  • Block malicious IPs
  • Isolate Kubernetes Nodes
  • Suspend cross-account trust

Containment should minimize business disruption while preventing further attacker activity.


  • Containment Actions Log

Remove attacker access.

Examples:

  • Delete unauthorized IAM users
  • Remove malicious access keys
  • Delete rogue Lambda functions
  • Remove unauthorized Kubernetes objects
  • Delete malicious EventBridge rules
  • Patch vulnerable workloads
  • Remove persistence mechanisms

  • Eradication Report

Safely restore services.

Review:

  • IAM Permissions
  • CloudTrail
  • GuardDuty
  • Security Hub
  • Workload Integrity
  • Application Testing
  • Monitoring

Validate that:

  • Services function normally.
  • No attacker access remains.
  • Security controls are restored.

  • Recovery Validation Report

Conduct a post-incident review.

Questions

  • How did the attacker gain access?
  • What worked well?
  • Which controls failed?
  • How can detection improve?
  • Which processes should change?

  • Lessons Learned Document
  • Improvement Plan

Metric Result
Incident Severity
Detection Source
AWS Accounts Impacted
IAM Users Compromised
EC2 Instances Affected
S3 Buckets Accessed
EKS Clusters Impacted
Customer Data Exposed
Time to Detect
Time to Contain
Time to Recover

Time Event
09:05 GuardDuty generated High Severity finding
09:08 Suspicious AssumeRole detected
09:12 New Administrator IAM user created
09:20 Large S3 download initiated
09:30 Incident declared
09:42 Compromised account disabled
10:15 Recovery activities started

Investigation Area Status
CloudTrail Reviewed
GuardDuty Reviewed
Security Hub Reviewed
AWS Config Reviewed
IAM Investigated
EC2 Investigated
Amazon S3 Reviewed
Amazon EKS Reviewed
Lambda Reviewed
VPC Flow Logs Reviewed
Attack Path Built
Root Cause Identified
Containment Completed
Recovery Validated
Executive Report Delivered

At the completion of the investigation, provide:

  • Incident Summary
  • Incident Timeline
  • Evidence Inventory
  • IAM Investigation Report
  • EC2 Investigation Report
  • Amazon S3 Investigation Report
  • Amazon EKS Investigation Report
  • Lambda Investigation Report
  • Attack Path Analysis
  • Root Cause Analysis
  • Containment Report
  • Eradication Report
  • Recovery Validation Report
  • Executive Dashboard
  • Executive Incident Report
  • Lessons Learned Report
  • Security Improvement Roadmap

The incident response engagement is considered successful when:

  • The incident is fully contained.
  • All evidence has been preserved.
  • The attack path has been reconstructed.
  • Root cause has been identified.
  • Persistence mechanisms have been removed.
  • Business services have been safely restored.
  • Executive stakeholders understand the incident, business impact and remediation priorities.
  • Preventive and detective controls have been strengthened to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.

  • Enterprise AWS incident response requires coordinated investigation across IAM, networking, compute, storage, Kubernetes and serverless services.
  • CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Security Hub, AWS Config and Security Lake provide the foundation for cloud forensic investigations.
  • Attack path reconstruction helps explain how individual security weaknesses led to business impact.
  • Effective incident response balances rapid containment with careful evidence preservation and thorough root cause analysis.
  • Mature organizations continuously improve their cloud security posture through post-incident reviews, strengthened monitoring and recurring security assessments.