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Runbook 01 — Cloud Security Assessment

This runbook provides a repeatable professional workflow for assessing the security posture of a cloud environment.

Use it when reviewing:

AWS
Microsoft Azure
Google Cloud
Private Cloud
Hybrid Cloud
Multi-Cloud

The runbook is vendor-neutral.

Its purpose is to help you answer:

What exists?
What is exposed?
Who has access?
Where is sensitive data?
Which controls are missing?
What is the business risk?
What should be remediated first?

This runbook standardizes the transition from:

Cloud Environment
Security Review
Validated Findings
Risk Prioritization
Remediation
Management Reporting

Use it to avoid ad hoc assessments where different analysts review different controls every time.

This runbook covers:

  • Cloud governance
  • Asset inventory
  • Shared responsibility
  • Identity and access
  • Privileged access
  • Network security
  • Workload security
  • Data protection
  • Encryption
  • Key management
  • Logging
  • Detection
  • Vulnerability management
  • Backup and resilience
  • Incident readiness
  • Risk assessment
  • Remediation planning

Before starting, obtain as much of the following as possible:

Cloud Architecture Diagram
Account / Subscription / Project Inventory
Asset Inventory
IAM Export
Network Diagram
Data Classification
Logging Architecture
Backup Architecture
Security Policies
Risk Register
Previous Assessment Reports

At completion, produce:

Cloud Security Assessment Report
Risk Register
Finding Register
Remediation Roadmap
Executive Summary

Use the following sequence:

01 Confirm Scope
02 Understand Business Context
03 Inventory Cloud Assets
04 Confirm Shared Responsibility
05 Review Governance
06 Review Identity
07 Review Privileged Access
08 Review Network Security
09 Review Workloads
10 Review Data Protection
11 Review Encryption and Keys
12 Review Logging
13 Review Detection
14 Review Vulnerability Management
15 Review Backup and Resilience
16 Review Incident Readiness
17 Identify Findings
18 Rate Risk
19 Prioritize Remediation
20 Report

Document exactly what is included.

Capture:

Cloud Provider
Accounts / Subscriptions / Projects
Regions
Applications
Networks
Data Stores
User Populations
Administrative Systems
Third-Party Integrations
Assessment Name:
Business Unit:
Cloud Environment:
Production / Development:
Accounts / Subscriptions / Projects:
Applications:
Critical Data:
Excluded Areas:
Assessment Owner:
Assessment Date:

Ask:

Are all production environments included?
Are shared services included?
Are security accounts included?
Are external integrations included?
Are development environments excluded intentionally?

Do not proceed with a high-confidence assessment if the environment boundary is unknown.

Mark missing visibility as an assessment limitation.

Security risk should be evaluated against business impact.

Document:

Business Service
Criticality
Data Sensitivity
Availability Requirement
Primary Users
Major Dependencies

Ask:

What business process depends on this environment?
What happens if the service is unavailable?
What happens if data is exposed?
What happens if an administrator is compromised?
Which systems are considered critical?

Use:

Low
Medium
High
Critical
Service:
Customer Portal
Criticality:
Critical
Data:
Customer PII
Availability:
24x7
Primary Risk:
Unauthorized access and service disruption

Identify what exists before assessing how it is secured.

Capture:

  • Compute
  • Storage
  • Databases
  • Networks
  • Load balancers
  • IAM resources
  • Containers
  • Kubernetes
  • Serverless
  • Secrets
  • Keys
  • Logs
  • Backups
Asset Type Environment Owner Exposure Criticality
Customer Portal Application Production App Team Public Critical
Customer DB Database Production Data Team Private Critical
Admin Identity IAM Production Cloud Team Management Critical

Ask:

Does every asset have an owner?
Does every production asset have a purpose?
Are unused resources present?
Are legacy resources still active?
Are temporary resources still deployed?

Look for:

Unknown Owner
Unknown Purpose
Old Test Resources
Orphaned Storage
Unused Public IPs
Legacy Snapshots

Determine what the provider manages and what the customer manages.

Review:

IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
Managed Services
Control Area Provider Customer Shared
Physical infrastructure
IAM configuration
Application security
Data protection
Service availability

Validate the exact responsibility model for the service being assessed.

For every security control ask:

Who owns this?
Nobody Can Clearly Identify
the Responsible Party

This may indicate a control gap.

Assess whether the environment is governed consistently.

Review:

  • Account structure
  • Resource organization
  • Naming standards
  • Tagging
  • Security policies
  • Approved regions
  • Baselines
  • Exceptions
  • Ownership

Ask:

Who can create cloud environments?
Who approves production resources?
Are security standards defined?
Are exceptions documented?
Are resources tagged with ownership?

Review whether environments are deliberately separated.

Example:

Production
Development
Security
Shared Services

Avoid uncontrolled mixing of:

Production
+
Testing
+
Personal Experiments
Finding:
Cloud resources lack consistent ownership tags.
Risk:
Security and operations teams may be unable
to rapidly identify responsible owners during incidents.
Recommendation:
Establish mandatory ownership and environment tagging.

IAM should be treated as a primary cloud security control plane.

Review:

Users
Groups
Roles
Policies
Service Identities
Workload Identities
Federation
External Identities

Ask:

Who has access?
Why?
How was access granted?
How is access reviewed?
Is the access still required?

Check for:

  • Former employees
  • Dormant users
  • Contractors
  • Guest accounts
  • Shared accounts

Check:

MFA
Federation
SSO
Legacy Authentication
Session Controls

Privileged identities should receive strong authentication appropriate to risk.

Look for:

Full Administrator Roles
Wildcard Permissions
Direct User Permissions
Excessive Group Membership
Unused High Privilege

For each high-risk role ask:

What exact business function requires this access?

Identify every high-privilege identity.

Examples:

Global Administrator
Cloud Administrator
IAM Administrator
Security Administrator
Database Administrator
  • Named administrator accounts
  • Strong MFA
  • Least privilege
  • Periodic reviews
  • Logging
  • Emergency-access process
  • Temporary elevation where appropriate

Flag unnecessary:

Permanent Administrator

where temporary privilege is feasible.

Preferred model:

Administrator
Strong Authentication
Approval / Policy
Temporary Privilege
Administrative Action
Audit
Privileged Account Without MFA
Shared Administrator Account
Former Employee With Admin Access
Unknown High-Privilege Identity

Review:

Virtual Networks
Subnets
Routes
Firewalls
Security Rules
Public IPs
Private Endpoints
Hybrid Connectivity
Egress

List every public resource.

For each ask:

Why is this public?
Which service is exposed?
Who needs access?
Can private connectivity be used?
Resource Public Required? Risk
Web Application Yes Yes Expected
Database Yes No Critical
Admin Interface Yes Review High

Look for overly broad patterns such as:

Source:
Any
Destination:
Sensitive Resource
Action:
Allow

Preferred:

Internet
Web Tier
Application Tier
Data Tier

Avoid unnecessarily flat architecture.

Review whether administration is exposed directly to the internet.

Preferred:

Administrator
Strong Authentication
Controlled Management Path
Target

Ask:

Which workloads can access the internet?
Why?
Are outbound destinations restricted?
Could compromised workloads exfiltrate data?
Public Database
Open Administrative Ports
Any-to-Any Firewall Rules
Flat Network
Unrestricted Egress

Assess:

Virtual Machines
Containers
Kubernetes
Serverless
Managed Platforms
  • Approved image
  • Supported OS
  • Current patching
  • Endpoint security
  • Restricted IAM
  • Restricted network
  • Logging enabled

Flag:

Unsupported Operating System
Unsupported Runtime
End-of-Life Software

Assess:

Image Source
Image Vulnerabilities
Registry Access
Secrets
Runtime Privilege
Logging

Review:

  • RBAC
  • Service accounts
  • Workload identity
  • Secrets
  • Network policies
  • Admission controls
  • Audit logging

Review:

Function IAM
External Triggers
Secrets
Data Access
Logging
Root / High Privilege
Public Administrative Access
Unpatched Workload
Embedded Secret
Unknown Image Source

Identify all sensitive cloud data.

Classify:

Public
Internal
Confidential
Restricted

Ask:

Where is sensitive data stored?
Who can access it?
Is it publicly exposed?
Is it encrypted?
Where are backups stored?
How long is it retained?

Assess:

Data at Rest
Data in Transit
Data in Use

Check:

  • Public access
  • Anonymous access
  • Cross-account access
  • Encryption
  • Logging
  • Retention

Check:

  • Network exposure
  • IAM
  • Encryption
  • Administrative access
  • Logging
  • Backup
Public Sensitive Storage
Unencrypted Sensitive Data
Excessive Database Access
Unprotected Backup
Unknown Data Owner

Step 11 — Review Encryption and Key Management

Section titled “Step 11 — Review Encryption and Key Management”

Do not stop at:

Encryption Enabled

Review the full key lifecycle.

Generate
Store
Use
Rotate
Revoke
Destroy

Ask:

Who owns the key?
Who can administer it?
Who can use it?
Who can disable it?
Who can destroy it?
Are these actions logged?

Where justified, separate:

Data Administration

from:

Key Administration
One Identity Controls Data and Keys
Unused Keys
Unrestricted Key Administration
Missing Key Logging

Ensure the environment generates appropriate security telemetry.

Review:

Authentication
Administrative Activity
IAM Changes
Network Activity
Application Activity
Data Access

Ask:

Which logs are enabled?
Where are they stored?
How long are they retained?
Who can delete them?
Are they centralized?
IAM ──────────────┐
Network ──────────┤
Cloud Audit ──────┼──→ Central Logging
Application ──────┤
Database ─────────┘

Security logs should not be easily modified by the same administrators being monitored.

Audit Logging Disabled
Short Retention
Local Logs Only
Administrators Can Delete Evidence
Missing Data Access Logs

Logging without monitoring creates limited active defense.

Ask:

Which critical events generate alerts?

Review whether detections exist for:

New Administrator
Privilege Escalation
MFA Disabled
Logging Disabled
Public Resource Created
Firewall Rule Opened
Unusual Authentication
Threat Detection
Account compromise Suspicious authentication
Privilege escalation Admin role assignment
Exposure Public resource creation
Defense evasion Logging disabled
Network change Broad firewall rule
Logs Exist but No Alerts
No Privileged Activity Monitoring
No Public Exposure Detection
No IAM Change Detection

Step 14 — Review Vulnerability Management

Section titled “Step 14 — Review Vulnerability Management”

Assess how cloud workload vulnerabilities are managed.

Review:

Discovery
Prioritization
Remediation
Exceptions
Validation

Check:

  • Virtual machines
  • Containers
  • Applications
  • Dependencies
  • Configuration weaknesses

Use:

Severity
+
Exposure
+
Exploitability
+
Asset Criticality
+
Threat Activity
Internet-Facing Critical Vulnerability
Unsupported Production System
Old Container Image
Large Overdue Backlog

Cloud does not automatically provide complete business resilience.

Review:

  • Backup coverage
  • Backup protection
  • Restore testing
  • Redundancy
  • Recovery objectives
  • Critical dependencies

Ask:

How quickly must this system recover?

Ask:

How much data loss is acceptable?

Require:

Backup Exists
+
Backup Protected
+
Restore Tested

Ask:

Can one compromised administrator
delete both production and backups?
No Tested Restore
Single Point of Failure
Unprotected Backup
Recovery Objectives Undefined

Determine whether the organization can respond to a cloud compromise.

Ask:

Who receives alerts?
Who can disable compromised identities?
Who can isolate resources?
Who can preserve evidence?
Who contacts the provider?
Alert
Validate
Identify Principal
Review Activity
Determine Scope
Preserve Evidence
Contain
Recover

Possible evidence includes:

Authentication Logs
Cloud Audit Logs
Network Logs
Application Logs
Snapshots
Configuration History
  • Cloud incident contacts defined
  • IAM containment process defined
  • Workload isolation process defined
  • Evidence sources documented
  • Escalation process defined
  • Runbooks available
No Cloud Runbook
Unknown Evidence Sources
No Authority to Disable Accounts
No Security Contact for Provider

Every finding should be clear and evidence-based.

Use:

Finding
Affected Resource
Risk
Evidence
Recommendation
Priority
Finding:
[Security weakness]
Affected Resource:
[Cloud resource / environment]
Risk:
[Business and technical consequence]
Evidence:
[Validated observation]
Recommendation:
[Required remediation]
Priority:
[Critical / High / Medium / Low]
Finding:
Permanent Full Administrative Access
Affected Resource:
Production Cloud Environment
Risk:
Compromise of a standing administrator could
provide broad control of production resources.
Evidence:
Six users retain permanent full administrator roles.
Recommendation:
Validate business need,
reduce unnecessary privilege,
use temporary elevation where appropriate,
and monitor privileged activity.
Priority:
High
Finding:
Internet-Facing Sensitive Database
Affected Resource:
Customer Database
Risk:
Public exposure increases attack surface
against a critical data asset.
Evidence:
Database accepts network connections
from public address space.
Recommendation:
Remove unnecessary public access and require
approved private connectivity.
Priority:
Critical

Use:

Likelihood
+
Impact
Risk
Low
Medium
High
Critical

Consider:

Exposure
Exploitability
Privilege
Asset Criticality
Data Sensitivity
Business Impact
Existing Controls
ID Finding Likelihood Impact Risk Owner
R-001 Public DB 4 5 Critical Data Owner
R-002 Missing Admin MFA 4 5 Critical IAM Owner
R-003 Missing Logs 3 4 High Security Owner

Document where appropriate:

Inherent Risk
Existing Controls
Residual Risk

Use business risk rather than arbitrary ordering.

Examples:

Remove Sensitive Public Exposure
Disable Compromised Credentials
Enforce Critical Admin Protection

Examples:

Reduce Excessive Privilege
Enable Missing Logging
Patch Critical Systems

Examples:

Implement PAM
Improve Detection
Improve Segmentation
Standardize Baselines

Examples:

Cloud Governance
Zero Trust
Automated Policy Enforcement
Central Security Architecture
Finding Priority Owner Action Status
Public DB Critical Data Team Remove public access Open
Admin MFA Critical IAM Enforce MFA In Progress
Missing logs High Security Centralize logging Planned

The final assessment should contain:

01 Executive Summary
02 Scope
03 Business Context
04 Architecture Overview
05 Asset Inventory
06 Governance Findings
07 IAM Findings
08 Network Findings
09 Workload Findings
10 Data Findings
11 Logging and Detection Findings
12 Resilience Findings
13 Incident Readiness
14 Risk Register
15 Remediation Roadmap
16 Assessment Limitations
Assessment Objective:
Evaluate the security posture of the organization's
cloud environment.
Overall Risk Rating:
[Low / Moderate / High / Critical]
Key Risks:
1. [Risk]
2. [Risk]
3. [Risk]
Business Impact:
[Business-focused summary]
Immediate Actions:
1. [Action]
2. [Action]
3. [Action]
Strategic Recommendation:
[Longer-term program improvement]

Use a concise scorecard where useful.

Domain Rating
Governance Moderate
IAM High Risk
Privileged Access High Risk
Network Moderate
Workloads Moderate
Data Protection High Risk
Logging Moderate
Detection High Risk
Resilience Moderate
Incident Readiness Moderate

Do not report only:

Security Group Allows 0.0.0.0/0

Translate it.

Example:

A production administrative service is reachable
from the public internet, increasing the likelihood
of unauthorized access attempts against a critical system.
  • Scope defined
  • Owners identified
  • Resource organization reviewed
  • Standards defined
  • Exceptions reviewed
  • Users reviewed
  • MFA reviewed
  • Privileged roles reviewed
  • Dormant accounts reviewed
  • Service identities reviewed
  • Public exposure reviewed
  • Firewall rules reviewed
  • Segmentation reviewed
  • Admin paths reviewed
  • Egress reviewed
  • Patch status reviewed
  • Secure baseline reviewed
  • Container security reviewed
  • Kubernetes reviewed where applicable
  • Serverless reviewed where applicable
  • Sensitive data identified
  • Public access reviewed
  • Encryption reviewed
  • Key management reviewed
  • Backups reviewed
  • Audit logs enabled
  • Logs centralized
  • Retention reviewed
  • Detection coverage reviewed
  • Privileged changes monitored
  • Backups present
  • Restore tested
  • RTO defined
  • RPO defined
  • Critical dependencies identified
  • Runbook exists
  • Contacts identified
  • Evidence sources identified
  • Account containment documented
  • Workload isolation documented

For every major observation, ask:

What is the asset?
What is the weakness?
What threat could exploit it?
What is the business impact?
What control exists?
What risk remains?
What should happen next?

Mistake 1 — Reviewing Only Configuration

Section titled “Mistake 1 — Reviewing Only Configuration”

Cloud security also includes:

Governance
Identity
Operations
Resilience
Risk

Mistake 2 — Ignoring Shared Responsibility

Section titled “Mistake 2 — Ignoring Shared Responsibility”

Never assume the provider manages every control.

Mistake 3 — Focusing Only on Public Exposure

Section titled “Mistake 3 — Focusing Only on Public Exposure”

Identity compromise can be equally or more damaging.

Mistake 4 — Ignoring Non-Human Identities

Section titled “Mistake 4 — Ignoring Non-Human Identities”

Service and workload identities may hold significant privilege.

Mistake 5 — Treating Logging as Detection

Section titled “Mistake 5 — Treating Logging as Detection”

Logs must be monitored to support timely response.

Backups are part of the attack surface.

Mistake 7 — Reporting Technical Findings Without Business Context

Section titled “Mistake 7 — Reporting Technical Findings Without Business Context”

Always connect security weaknesses to risk.

The assessment is complete when:

  • Scope is confirmed
  • Assets are inventoried
  • Shared responsibility is documented
  • Governance is reviewed
  • IAM is reviewed
  • Privileged access is reviewed
  • Network security is reviewed
  • Workloads are reviewed
  • Data protection is reviewed
  • Encryption/key management is reviewed
  • Logging is reviewed
  • Detection is reviewed
  • Vulnerability management is reviewed
  • Resilience is reviewed
  • Incident readiness is reviewed
  • Findings are validated
  • Risk ratings are assigned
  • Owners are identified
  • Remediation priorities are defined
  • Executive report is complete

This runbook gives you a repeatable approach for moving from:

Unknown Cloud Environment
Structured Assessment
Security Findings
Business Risk
Remediation Priorities
Executive Reporting

A professional cloud security assessment should not end with:

Here are 100 configuration issues.

It should explain:

Which issues matter,
why they matter,
what could happen,
who owns the risk,
and what the organization should do next.

➡️ Runbook 02 — IAM Security Review

In the next runbook, you will turn the IAM lab into a repeatable identity-security review process covering:

Identity Inventory
Joiner-Mover-Leaver
Authentication
Authorization
Privileged Access
Service Identities
Federation
Access Reviews
IAM Monitoring
Risk and Remediation

The progression is:

Cloud Security Assessment
Identify Identity Risk
Perform Deep IAM Review