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Project 10 — End-to-End Kubernetes Security Capstone

Welcome to Project 10 — End-to-End Kubernetes Security Capstone.

This is the final project in the Enterprise Kubernetes Security Projects module.

In this capstone, you will combine the skills developed across the complete Kubernetes Security Engineer learning path into one enterprise engagement.

You will act as a:

  • Kubernetes Security Engineer
  • Cloud Security Architect
  • Amazon EKS Security Engineer
  • DevSecOps Engineer
  • Security Assessor
  • Detection Engineer
  • Incident Responder
  • Security Consultant

This project does not focus on one isolated security control.

You will assess, design, secure, validate, monitor, investigate and report on an enterprise Amazon EKS environment from beginning to end.

Business Requirements
Environment Discovery
Security Assessment
Threat Modelling
Target Architecture
Security Implementation
Control Validation
Incident Simulation
Investigation and Recovery
Compliance and Reporting
Executive Recommendation

CloudNova Technologies is preparing to launch a new enterprise digital platform on Amazon EKS.

The platform will support:

  • Customer-facing applications
  • Payment services
  • Internal administration workloads
  • Analytics services
  • Shared platform components
  • Security monitoring workloads

The organisation has completed several security initiatives, but the final production environment has not yet undergone a complete end-to-end validation.

Management has requested a full Kubernetes security engagement before production approval.

Your mission is to:

  1. Define the project scope.
  2. Discover the current environment.
  3. Assess the existing security posture.
  4. Identify critical risks.
  5. Design the target security architecture.
  6. Implement priority controls.
  7. Validate control effectiveness.
  8. Simulate a Kubernetes security incident.
  9. Investigate and contain the incident.
  10. Recover the environment securely.
  11. Produce compliance evidence.
  12. Present a final production recommendation.

CloudNova Technologies operates a multi-account AWS environment.

The new digital platform will run across:

  • Production AWS account
  • Security tooling account
  • Log archive account
  • Shared services account
  • CI/CD account

The production platform includes:

  • Amazon EKS
  • Private worker nodes
  • Amazon ECR
  • AWS Secrets Manager
  • AWS KMS
  • Amazon CloudWatch
  • AWS CloudTrail
  • Amazon GuardDuty
  • AWS Security Hub
  • Amazon Inspector
  • Falco
  • Prometheus
  • Grafana
  • Kyverno or OPA Gatekeeper
  • Velero or approved backup tooling
  • Enterprise SIEM

The organisation has identified several potential risks:

  • Broad cluster administrator access
  • Public Kubernetes API exposure
  • Excessive Service Account permissions
  • Workloads using node IAM roles
  • Privileged Pods
  • Missing default-deny Network Policies
  • Mutable container tags
  • Incomplete image scanning
  • Secrets stored in Kubernetes manifests
  • Inconsistent audit logging
  • Runtime-monitoring gaps
  • Untested incident runbooks
  • Incomplete backup-restoration evidence
  • Security exceptions without expiry dates

At the end of this project, CloudNova Technologies should have:

  • A complete Kubernetes security assessment
  • A documented current-state risk profile
  • A secure target-state architecture
  • Implemented high-priority controls
  • Validated workload and cluster security
  • Centralised security telemetry
  • Tested runtime detections
  • Tested incident-response workflows
  • Tested backup and recovery
  • Compliance evidence
  • A findings and remediation register
  • A production-readiness scorecard
  • An executive security recommendation

By completing this project, you will be able to:

  • Plan an enterprise Kubernetes security engagement
  • Define assessment scope and Rules of Engagement
  • Discover and inventory Amazon EKS environments
  • Assess IAM, RBAC and workload identity
  • Review cluster, node, workload and network security
  • Identify privileged workloads and high-risk configurations
  • Assess software supply-chain controls
  • Review secrets and data protection
  • Evaluate logging and runtime monitoring
  • Perform threat modelling
  • Design a production Kubernetes security architecture
  • Implement security controls
  • Test positive and negative security scenarios
  • Conduct a controlled security incident simulation
  • Investigate Pod, identity, runtime and network activity
  • Perform containment and recovery
  • Conduct Root Cause Analysis
  • Validate compliance and production readiness
  • Produce executive and technical reports
  • Present a final risk-based recommendation

Level: Expert

Recommended Duration: 30–40 hours

This project should be completed over multiple practical sessions.

  • Enterprise capstone
  • Security assessment
  • Security architecture
  • Hands-on implementation
  • Detection engineering
  • Incident response
  • Compliance validation
  • Executive reporting
  • Portfolio project

You should understand:

  • Kubernetes architecture
  • Amazon EKS
  • AWS Organizations
  • AWS IAM
  • Kubernetes RBAC
  • Service Accounts
  • EKS Access Entries
  • EKS Pod Identity and IRSA
  • Amazon VPC
  • Security Groups
  • Kubernetes Network Policies
  • Pod Security Admission
  • Admission controllers
  • Container image security
  • Image scanning and signing
  • AWS Secrets Manager
  • AWS KMS
  • Kubernetes Audit Logs
  • Falco
  • GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring
  • SIEM concepts
  • Incident response
  • Pod and node forensics
  • Root Cause Analysis
  • Backup and disaster recovery
  • Compliance frameworks
  • AWS Management Console
  • AWS CLI
  • AWS IAM Identity Center
  • Amazon EKS
  • Amazon ECR
  • AWS Secrets Manager
  • AWS KMS
  • AWS CloudTrail
  • Amazon GuardDuty
  • AWS Security Hub
  • Amazon Inspector
  • AWS Config
  • Amazon CloudWatch
  • Amazon EventBridge
  • AWS Backup
  • kubectl
  • Helm
  • Kubernetes RBAC
  • Network Policies
  • Pod Security Admission
  • ResourceQuota
  • LimitRange
  • Admission controllers
  • Kubernetes Audit Logs
  • Falco
  • Falcosidekick
  • Kyverno or OPA Gatekeeper
  • Trivy
  • Kubescape
  • kube-bench
  • kubeaudit
  • Checkov
  • Prometheus
  • Grafana
  • Enterprise SIEM
  • Incident-management platform
  • Terraform
  • Git
  • GitHub or approved source-control platform
  • CI/CD pipeline
  • Diagramming tool
  • Markdown

This project may create billable AWS resources, including:

  • Amazon EKS cluster
  • EC2 worker nodes
  • NAT Gateways
  • Load balancers
  • CloudWatch Logs
  • GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring
  • Security Hub
  • Inspector
  • ECR
  • EBS volumes
  • Backup storage
  • Cross-Region copies
  • SIEM ingestion

Use an approved lab or enterprise account.

Destroy unnecessary resources after completing the project.

Perform this project only in:

  • Your own AWS account
  • An approved training environment
  • A dedicated lab cluster
  • An authorised enterprise environment

Do not perform:

  • Real malware execution
  • Uncontrolled reverse shells
  • Destructive production testing
  • Credential theft
  • Denial-of-Service tests
  • Container escape exploits
  • Production data extraction
  • Unauthorised security testing

All attack simulations must be safe, isolated and approved.

AWS Organization
├── Security Tooling Account
├── Log Archive Account
├── Shared Services Account
├── CI/CD Account
├── Production Workload Account
└── Non-Production Account
Enterprise Identity Provider
AWS IAM Identity Center
MFA and Temporary Roles
Restricted Amazon EKS API
EKS Access Entries
Kubernetes RBAC
Private Worker Nodes
Secure Namespaces
├── Pod Security Admission
├── ResourceQuota
├── LimitRange
├── Dedicated Service Accounts
├── Workload IAM Roles
└── Default-Deny Network Policies
Secure Software Supply Chain
├── Source Review
├── Secret Scanning
├── Dependency Scanning
├── Image Scanning
├── SBOM
├── Image Signing
└── Admission Verification
External Secrets and Encryption
Logging and Runtime Detection
SIEM and SOC
Incident Response and Recovery
Continuous Compliance and Governance

The project covers the following domains:

1. Governance and Scope
2. AWS Account Security
3. Amazon EKS Architecture
4. Identity and Access
5. Worker-Node Security
6. Namespace and Workload Security
7. Network Security
8. Software Supply Chain
9. Secrets and Data Protection
10. Logging and Monitoring
11. Runtime Security
12. Incident Response
13. Backup and Recovery
14. Compliance and Governance
15. Executive Reporting
  • Project charter
  • Scope statement
  • Rules of Engagement
  • Stakeholder register
  • Assumptions and constraints
  • Project plan
  • Evidence-handling plan
  • AWS account inventory
  • Cluster inventory
  • Namespace inventory
  • Workload inventory
  • Identity inventory
  • Network inventory
  • Security-tool inventory
  • Data-flow inventory
  • High-level architecture
  • AWS account architecture
  • Cluster architecture
  • Network architecture
  • Identity architecture
  • Workload identity flow
  • Software supply-chain architecture
  • Secrets architecture
  • Logging architecture
  • Runtime architecture
  • Incident-response architecture
  • Backup and recovery architecture
  • Trust-boundary diagram
  • Data-flow diagram
  • Terraform configuration
  • RBAC manifests
  • Service Account manifests
  • Pod Security labels
  • ResourceQuotas
  • LimitRanges
  • Network Policies
  • Admission policies
  • Secure workload manifests
  • Runtime rules
  • Monitoring configuration
  • Backup configuration
  • Safe incident-simulation manifests
  • Threat model
  • Security requirements
  • Security assessment
  • Findings register
  • Risk register
  • Exception register
  • Detection catalogue
  • Control-validation matrix
  • Compliance mapping
  • Root Cause Analysis
  • Remediation roadmap
  • Access-review procedure
  • Secure namespace onboarding
  • Vulnerability-management process
  • Runtime alert runbook
  • Compromised Pod runbook
  • Credential-compromise runbook
  • Container-escape runbook
  • Backup and restore runbook
  • Production-readiness checklist
  • Escalation matrix
  • RACI matrix
  • Executive summary
  • Current-state risk overview
  • Target-state security architecture
  • Security scorecard
  • Incident summary
  • Business-impact assessment
  • Remediation roadmap
  • Residual-risk statement
  • Final production recommendation
  • Final presentation
10-end-to-end-kubernetes-security-capstone/
├── README.md
├── 01-project-management/
│ ├── project-charter.md
│ ├── scope.md
│ ├── rules-of-engagement.md
│ ├── stakeholders.md
│ ├── assumptions.md
│ └── project-plan.md
├── 02-discovery/
│ ├── aws-inventory.md
│ ├── cluster-inventory.md
│ ├── namespace-inventory.md
│ ├── workload-inventory.md
│ ├── identity-inventory.md
│ ├── network-inventory.md
│ └── security-tool-inventory.md
├── 03-assessment/
│ ├── account-security.md
│ ├── eks-security.md
│ ├── identity-rbac.md
│ ├── node-security.md
│ ├── workload-security.md
│ ├── network-security.md
│ ├── image-security.md
│ ├── secrets-security.md
│ ├── logging-runtime.md
│ └── backup-recovery.md
├── 04-threat-model/
│ ├── assets.md
│ ├── threat-actors.md
│ ├── trust-boundaries.md
│ ├── attack-paths.md
│ └── control-mapping.md
├── 05-architecture/
│ ├── high-level-architecture.md
│ ├── account-architecture.md
│ ├── cluster-architecture.md
│ ├── network-architecture.md
│ ├── identity-architecture.md
│ ├── workload-identity.md
│ ├── supply-chain-architecture.md
│ ├── secrets-architecture.md
│ ├── logging-architecture.md
│ ├── runtime-architecture.md
│ ├── incident-response-architecture.md
│ └── backup-dr-architecture.md
├── 06-implementation/
│ ├── terraform/
│ ├── namespaces/
│ ├── rbac/
│ ├── service-accounts/
│ ├── workloads/
│ ├── network-policies/
│ ├── admission-policies/
│ ├── secrets/
│ ├── logging/
│ ├── runtime/
│ └── backup/
├── 07-validation/
│ ├── validation-plan.md
│ ├── identity-tests.md
│ ├── workload-tests.md
│ ├── network-tests.md
│ ├── image-tests.md
│ ├── runtime-tests.md
│ ├── monitoring-tests.md
│ └── recovery-tests.md
├── 08-incident-simulation/
│ ├── scenario.md
│ ├── test-manifests/
│ ├── detection-evidence/
│ ├── investigation-notes/
│ ├── containment-actions/
│ ├── recovery-evidence/
│ └── root-cause-analysis.md
├── 09-compliance/
│ ├── cis-mapping.md
│ ├── nist-mapping.md
│ ├── policy-reports/
│ ├── compliance-scorecard.md
│ └── exception-register.md
├── 10-evidence/
│ ├── commands/
│ ├── manifests/
│ ├── logs/
│ ├── alerts/
│ ├── screenshots/
│ ├── scans/
│ ├── dashboards/
│ └── restore-tests/
├── 11-findings/
│ ├── findings-register.md
│ ├── risk-register.md
│ ├── remediation-roadmap.md
│ └── residual-risk.md
├── 12-runbooks/
│ ├── access-review.md
│ ├── compromised-pod.md
│ ├── credential-compromise.md
│ ├── runtime-alert.md
│ ├── container-escape.md
│ ├── malicious-image.md
│ ├── backup-restore.md
│ └── cluster-recovery.md
└── 13-report/
├── executive-summary.md
├── technical-report.md
├── security-scorecard.md
├── production-readiness.md
├── final-recommendation.md
└── final-presentation.md

The project contains 18 phases.

Phase 1 — Project Initiation
Phase 2 — Scope and Rules of Engagement
Phase 3 — Environment Discovery
Phase 4 — Current-State Security Assessment
Phase 5 — Threat Modelling
Phase 6 — Target Security Architecture
Phase 7 — Identity and Access Implementation
Phase 8 — Workload and Node Security
Phase 9 — Network Security
Phase 10 — Software Supply-Chain Security
Phase 11 — Secrets and Data Protection
Phase 12 — Logging and Runtime Detection
Phase 13 — Security Validation
Phase 14 — Incident Simulation
Phase 15 — Investigation and Containment
Phase 16 — Recovery and Root Cause Analysis
Phase 17 — Compliance and Production Readiness
Phase 18 — Final Reporting and Presentation

Document:

Organisation:
CloudNova Technologies
Project:
End-to-End Kubernetes Security Capstone
Platform:
Amazon EKS
Environment:
Production and approved test environment
Project Sponsor:
Chief Information Security Officer
Project Owner:
Cloud Security
Platform Owner:
Platform Engineering
Application Owner:
Digital Services
Monitoring Owner:
Security Operations Centre
Recovery Owner:
Site Reliability Engineering

Goals include:

  • Assess current Kubernetes risks.
  • Build the secure target state.
  • Implement priority controls.
  • Validate security controls.
  • Test monitoring and response.
  • Demonstrate secure recovery.
  • Produce audit evidence.
  • Support production approval.

The project succeeds when:

  • All critical assets are inventoried.
  • Critical risks are identified.
  • Target architecture is approved.
  • Priority controls are implemented.
  • Security tests pass.
  • Runtime detections operate.
  • Incident-response workflow is tested.
  • Recovery is validated.
  • Compliance evidence is complete.
  • Final production recommendation is issued.

Include:

  • AWS accounts
  • Regions
  • EKS clusters
  • Namespaces
  • Workloads
  • IAM roles
  • Service Accounts
  • VPC
  • ECR repositories
  • Security services
  • Logging systems
  • Backup systems
  • CI/CD pipeline

Task 2.2 — Define Out-of-Scope Activities

Section titled “Task 2.2 — Define Out-of-Scope Activities”

Examples:

  • Real production exploitation
  • Real malware
  • Destructive node testing
  • Denial-of-Service
  • Credential cracking
  • Social engineering
  • Unapproved data extraction
  • Uncontrolled container escape testing

Stop and escalate if:

  • Active compromise is discovered
  • Production availability is affected
  • Sensitive credentials are exposed
  • Unknown malware is identified
  • Node compromise is suspected
  • Security tests cause instability
  • Production data becomes accessible unexpectedly

Task 3.1 — Confirm the Kubernetes Context

Section titled “Task 3.1 — Confirm the Kubernetes Context”
Terminal window
kubectl config current-context
Terminal window
kubectl cluster-info
Terminal window
kubectl version
Terminal window
kubectl get nodes -o wide
Terminal window
kubectl get namespaces --show-labels
Terminal window
kubectl get deployments,statefulsets,daemonsets,jobs,cronjobs -A

Task 3.3 — Inventory Services and Exposure

Section titled “Task 3.3 — Inventory Services and Exposure”
Terminal window
kubectl get services -A
Terminal window
kubectl get ingress -A

Record:

  • LoadBalancer Services
  • NodePort Services
  • External IPs
  • Public hostnames
  • Administrative endpoints
  • TLS status
Terminal window
kubectl get serviceaccounts -A
Terminal window
kubectl get rolebindings -A
Terminal window
kubectl get clusterrolebindings

Review:

  • EKS access entries
  • Cluster administrators
  • Namespace users
  • Service Accounts
  • Pod Identity associations
  • IRSA roles
  • Node roles
  • CI/CD identities
Terminal window
kubectl get pods -A -o json \
| jq -r '
.items[]
| .metadata.namespace as $ns
| .metadata.name as $pod
| .spec.containers[]
| [$ns, $pod, .name, .image]
| @tsv
'

Identify:

  • Public registries
  • Mutable tags
  • latest
  • Unknown repositories
  • Missing digests

Phase 4 — Current-State Security Assessment

Section titled “Phase 4 — Current-State Security Assessment”

Assess the following domains.

  • Account separation
  • Organisational guardrails
  • CloudTrail
  • GuardDuty
  • Security Hub
  • Inspector
  • AWS Config
  • Central logging
  • Version
  • API endpoint
  • Logging
  • Encryption
  • Access mode
  • Add-ons
  • Tags
  • Infrastructure as Code
  • Federation
  • MFA
  • Temporary access
  • Cluster-admin
  • RBAC
  • Service Accounts
  • Workload IAM
  • Break-glass access
  • Private subnets
  • Public IPs
  • AMI
  • Patch level
  • IMDSv2
  • IAM role
  • Runtime agents
  • Administration
  • Encryption
  • Non-root
  • Privileged mode
  • Privilege escalation
  • Capabilities
  • Seccomp
  • Host namespaces
  • HostPath
  • Runtime sockets
  • Resource controls
  • Health probes
  • Default-deny policies
  • Ingress exposure
  • Egress controls
  • DNS
  • Security Groups
  • Flow Logs
  • WAF
  • Database isolation
  • Registry
  • Scanning
  • Signing
  • SBOM
  • Provenance
  • Digest pinning
  • Admission validation
  • Git exposure
  • Image exposure
  • Kubernetes Secrets
  • Secrets Manager
  • IAM access
  • KMS
  • Rotation
  • Logging
  • Audit Logs
  • Application logs
  • Falco
  • GuardDuty Runtime
  • SIEM
  • Monitoring health
  • Detection rules
  • RPO
  • RTO
  • Backup coverage
  • Encryption
  • Cross-account copies
  • Restore testing
  • Recovery runbooks

Include:

  • Kubernetes API
  • Administrator identities
  • Application Pods
  • Worker nodes
  • Container images
  • Service Account tokens
  • Workload IAM roles
  • Node IAM role
  • Secrets
  • Databases
  • Logs
  • Backups
  • CI/CD credentials
  • External attacker
  • Malicious insider
  • Compromised developer
  • Compromised application
  • Supply-chain attacker
  • Cloud credential thief
  • Ransomware operator
  • Third-party compromise
Internet
Vulnerable Application
Pod Shell
Service Account Token Access
Secret Enumeration
Internal Service Access
Data Exfiltration
Stolen Identity
Privileged AWS Role
EKS Access Entry
cluster-admin
Malicious Workload
Compromised Pipeline
Malicious Image
Trusted Registry
Production Deployment
Runtime Compromise
Privileged Pod
Runtime Socket
Worker Node
Node IAM Credentials
AWS Services

Design the target state using:

  • Separate production AWS account
  • Restricted EKS API endpoint
  • Private worker nodes
  • Federated access
  • EKS access entries
  • Namespace-scoped RBAC
  • Dedicated Service Accounts
  • Pod Identity or IRSA
  • Pod Security Admission
  • Admission policies
  • Default-deny networking
  • Approved image registries
  • Image scanning and signing
  • External secrets management
  • Central logging
  • Runtime monitoring
  • Tested recovery

Phase 7 — Identity and Access Implementation

Section titled “Phase 7 — Identity and Access Implementation”
Enterprise Identity Provider
IAM Identity Center
MFA
Temporary Role
EKS Access Entry
Kubernetes RBAC

Review:

Terminal window
kubectl get clusterrolebindings

Remove:

  • Unknown administrators
  • Unused groups
  • Shared identities
  • Unnecessary wildcard roles

Create:

  • Namespace administrator Role
  • Developer Role
  • Read-only Role
  • Auditor Role

Validate:

Terminal window
kubectl auth can-i list pods \
-n payments \
--as=<developer-identity>
Terminal window
kubectl auth can-i get secrets \
-n payments \
--as=<developer-identity>

Expected:

Pod access allowed.
Secret access denied.
Pod
Dedicated Service Account
EKS Pod Identity or IRSA
Dedicated IAM Role
Approved AWS Resource

Example:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: payments
labels:
pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted

Requirements:

  • Non-root
  • No privilege escalation
  • Drop capabilities
  • RuntimeDefault seccomp
  • Read-only root filesystem
  • Dedicated Service Account
  • Resource limits
  • Health probes
  • Approved image digest

Validate:

  • Private subnets
  • Approved AMI
  • Encrypted volumes
  • IMDSv2
  • Restricted node IAM
  • No unnecessary SSH
  • Runtime monitoring
  • Immutable replacement
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: default-deny-all
namespace: payments
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress

Create explicit DNS egress.

Task 9.3 — Allow Approved Application Flows

Section titled “Task 9.3 — Allow Approved Application Flows”

Example:

Customer Portal
Payment API
Allowed
Customer Portal
Payment Database
Denied

Review:

Terminal window
kubectl get services -A
Terminal window
kubectl get ingress -A

Remove or restrict unapproved public endpoints.

Phase 10 — Software Supply-Chain Security

Section titled “Phase 10 — Software Supply-Chain Security”

Task 10.1 — Secure the Source Repository

Section titled “Task 10.1 — Secure the Source Repository”

Require:

  • MFA
  • Protected branches
  • Pull-request approval
  • CODEOWNERS
  • Secret scanning
  • Audit logging

Implement:

Source Review
Secret Scan
Dependency Scan
Infrastructure Scan
Container Build
Image Scan
SBOM
Image Signing
Amazon ECR
Admission Verification

Require:

  • Approved registry
  • Immutable digest
  • Passed vulnerability gate
  • Signature
  • Provenance
  • SBOM

Test:

  • Unsigned image
  • Public registry image
  • Mutable tag
  • Critical-vulnerability image

Expected:

Admission denied.

Use:

  • AWS Secrets Manager
  • AWS KMS
  • Workload IAM
  • Secrets Store CSI Driver or approved retrieval method

Grant each workload access only to required resources.

Confirm:

  • Rotation completes
  • Application reloads safely
  • Previous credential is revoked
  • CloudTrail records access

Encrypt:

  • EBS
  • EFS
  • Databases
  • Logs
  • Backups
  • Registry
  • Evidence

Phase 12 — Logging and Runtime Detection

Section titled “Phase 12 — Logging and Runtime Detection”

Enable:

  • API Server
  • Audit
  • Authenticator
  • Controller Manager
  • Scheduler
EKS and AWS Sources
CloudWatch and Security Services
Central Log Archive
SIEM
SOC

Use:

  • Falco
  • GuardDuty Runtime Monitoring
  • Equivalent approved tooling

Detect:

  • Unexpected shell
  • Reverse shell
  • Package-manager execution
  • File execution from /tmp
  • Credential access
  • Runtime socket access
  • Privilege escalation
  • Cryptomining
  • Agent tampering

Confirm:

  • Alert generated
  • Parsed correctly
  • Enriched
  • Routed to SOC
  • Runbook attached
  • Delivery time measured

Create a validation matrix.

Domain Positive Test Negative Test Expected Result
RBAC Developer lists Pods Developer reads Secrets Secret access denied
Pod security Secure Pod deploys Privileged Pod deploys Privileged Pod denied
Network Portal reaches API Portal reaches database Database access denied
Image security Signed image deploys Unsigned image deploys Unsigned image denied
Secrets App reads required secret App reads unrelated secret Access denied
Runtime Normal process runs Unexpected shell starts Alert generated
Logging Event generated Pipeline interrupted Health alert generated
Backup Restore valid backup Restore invalid backup Invalid restore rejected

A vulnerable test application is simulated as compromised.

The scenario includes:

Authorised Test Request
Shell Started in Test Pod
Harmless File Created in /tmp
Non-Sensitive Test Token Path Accessed
Approved External Test Destination Contacted
Runtime Alert Generated

Do not use:

  • Real malware
  • Real stolen credentials
  • Real exfiltration
  • Real reverse shell infrastructure
  • Production data
  • Shell execution
  • File activity
  • Sensitive-path access
  • Network connection
  • Kubernetes Audit Log event
  • SIEM incident creation

Phase 15 — Investigation and Containment

Section titled “Phase 15 — Investigation and Containment”

Identify:

  • Cluster
  • Namespace
  • Pod
  • Container
  • Image
  • Process
  • Parent process
  • Service Account
  • Node
  • Source and destination
  • Detection rule

Preserve:

Terminal window
kubectl get pod <pod-name> \
-n <namespace> \
-o yaml \
> pod.yaml
Terminal window
kubectl logs <pod-name> \
-n <namespace> \
--timestamps \
> container.log

Collect:

  • Pod YAML
  • Pod JSON
  • Current logs
  • Previous logs
  • Process tree
  • Network connections
  • Audit events
  • Runtime alert
  • CloudTrail
  • VPC Flow Logs

Assess:

Container
Pod
Namespace
Node
Cluster
AWS Account

Approved actions may include:

  • Apply quarantine Network Policy
  • Remove Pod from Service traffic
  • Scale workload to zero
  • Revoke workload IAM association
  • Block test destination
  • Preserve evidence

Phase 16 — Recovery and Root Cause Analysis

Section titled “Phase 16 — Recovery and Root Cause Analysis”

Use:

  • Trusted source
  • Patched dependency
  • Clean pipeline
  • Scanned image
  • Signed image
  • Immutable digest
  • Secure manifest

Rotate all credentials accessible to the simulated workload.

Confirm:

  • Correct image digest
  • No suspicious process
  • No unexpected network connection
  • Runtime monitoring active
  • Logs active
  • Business function healthy
  • Security policies enforced

Document:

  • Initial access
  • Attack path
  • Control failures
  • Root causes
  • Contributing factors
  • Blast radius
  • Corrective actions
  • Preventive actions
The test application permitted command execution because a vulnerable dependency was not blocked by the CI/CD vulnerability gate.
The impact increased because the workload had unnecessary token access and unrestricted egress.

Phase 17 — Compliance and Production Readiness

Section titled “Phase 17 — Compliance and Production Readiness”

Assess applicable controls from:

  • CIS Kubernetes Benchmark
  • CIS Amazon EKS Benchmark
  • CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark

Map controls to applicable:

  • NIST Cybersecurity Framework
  • NIST SP 800-53

Every exception must include:

  • Control
  • Justification
  • Risk
  • Compensating controls
  • Owner
  • Approver
  • Expiry
  • Remediation plan

Task 17.4 — Complete Production Checklist

Section titled “Task 17.4 — Complete Production Checklist”

Validate:

  • Identity
  • Nodes
  • Workloads
  • Network
  • Images
  • Secrets
  • Logging
  • Runtime
  • Backup
  • Incident response
  • Compliance
  • Governance
Domain Weight Status Evidence
AWS governance Critical Pass/Fail Account assessment
EKS architecture Critical Pass/Fail Cluster configuration
Identity and RBAC Critical Pass/Fail Access review
Worker nodes Critical Pass/Fail Node validation
Workload security Critical Pass/Fail Policy report
Network security Critical Pass/Fail Connectivity tests
Supply chain High Pass/Fail Image evidence
Secrets Critical Pass/Fail Secret-access test
Logging Critical Pass/Fail Log evidence
Runtime High Pass/Fail Runtime alert
Incident response High Pass/Fail Exercise evidence
Recovery High Pass/Fail Restore test
Compliance Medium Pass/Fail Compliance report

Production approval should be blocked when:

  • Unknown cluster-admin access exists
  • EKS API exposure is unrestricted
  • Static credentials remain in workloads
  • Worker-node IAM permissions are excessive
  • Privileged production workloads are unresolved
  • Pod Security is not enforced
  • Network isolation is absent
  • Unapproved images can deploy
  • Secrets are stored in Git
  • Audit logging is missing
  • Runtime coverage is incomplete
  • Critical alerts do not reach the SIEM
  • Backup restoration fails
  • Critical vulnerabilities remain unresolved
  • Security exceptions are unapproved or expired
  • Incident-response procedures are unavailable

Phase 18 — Final Reporting and Presentation

Section titled “Phase 18 — Final Reporting and Presentation”
1. Executive Summary
2. Business Context
3. Project Scope
4. Current Security Posture
5. Critical Risks
6. Target Security Architecture
7. Implemented Controls
8. Validation Results
9. Incident Simulation Summary
10. Business Impact
11. Compliance Status
12. Remediation Roadmap
13. Residual Risk
14. Production Recommendation
1. Introduction
2. Scope and Rules of Engagement
3. Environment Discovery
4. Current-State Assessment
5. Threat Model
6. Target Architecture
7. Identity and Access
8. Node and Workload Security
9. Network Security
10. Software Supply Chain
11. Secrets and Data Protection
12. Logging and Runtime Security
13. Security Validation
14. Incident Simulation
15. Investigation and Containment
16. Recovery and Root Cause Analysis
17. Compliance Mapping
18. Findings and Risk Register
19. Evidence Index
20. Production Readiness
21. Final Recommendation
CloudNova Technologies commissioned an end-to-end Kubernetes security engagement for its production Amazon EKS platform.
The engagement included environment discovery, security assessment, threat modelling, architecture design, security implementation, control validation, incident simulation, investigation, recovery and compliance review.
The target architecture uses restricted cluster access, private worker nodes, federated identities, least-privilege RBAC, pod-level AWS identities, secure workload standards, default-deny Network Policies, signed container images, external secrets management, centralised audit logging, runtime threat detection and tested recovery procedures.
The project identified critical and high-risk findings that require remediation before full production approval. The final recommendation is based on verified controls, successful security testing, residual risk and business readiness.
Finding ID:
Title:
Severity:
Security Domain:
Affected Resource:
Description:
Evidence:
Technical Impact:
Business Impact:
Likelihood:
Recommendation:
Owner:
Target Date:
Status:
Finding ID:
CAP-SEC-001
Title:
Production Workload Uses Broad Node IAM Permissions
Severity:
Critical
Affected Resource:
payments/payment-api
Description:
The payment-api workload does not use a dedicated Pod Identity or IRSA role and can access permissions assigned to the worker-node IAM role.
Evidence:
CAP-IAM-04-node-role-review.json
Technical Impact:
A compromised Pod may obtain AWS permissions intended for node operations and access unrelated AWS resources.
Business Impact:
An attacker may access sensitive services, credentials or data beyond the application’s approved scope.
Recommendation:
Implement a dedicated workload IAM role, restrict the node IAM role and monitor CloudTrail for unexpected node-role activity.
Owner:
Platform Engineering
Status:
Open
  • Restrict cluster endpoint exposure.
  • Remove unknown administrators.
  • Revoke excessive credentials.
  • Enable audit logging.
  • Remediate privileged workloads.
  • Apply emergency network restrictions.
  • Close runtime-monitoring gaps.
  • Validate backups.
  • Implement namespace-scoped RBAC.
  • Deploy workload identities.
  • Enforce Pod Security Admission.
  • Implement default-deny Network Policies.
  • Deploy admission policies.
  • Implement external secrets.
  • Integrate alerts with the SIEM.
  • Test incident runbooks.
  • Implement image signing and verification.
  • Standardise secure EKS Terraform modules.
  • Automate compliance evidence.
  • Implement just-in-time administration.
  • Centralise egress inspection.
  • Mature threat hunting.
  • Conduct quarterly recovery tests.
  • Build an enterprise EKS landing zone.
  • Implement multi-cluster security governance.
  • Automate drift remediation.
  • Mature Zero Trust enforcement.
  • Implement cross-Region recovery for critical services.
  • Establish continuous control validation.
  • Build executive risk analytics.

All critical controls pass.

Minor non-critical issues remain with owners and deadlines.

Production approval is paused pending remediation.

Critical risk remains unresolved.

The capstone is complete when:

  • Project charter is approved
  • Scope and Rules of Engagement are complete
  • Environment inventory is complete
  • Current-state assessment is complete
  • Threat model is complete
  • Target architecture is approved
  • Identity controls are implemented
  • Workload controls are implemented
  • Network controls are implemented
  • Supply-chain controls are implemented
  • Secrets controls are implemented
  • Logging and runtime monitoring are operational
  • Security validations pass
  • Incident simulation is completed
  • Investigation evidence is collected
  • Containment workflow is tested
  • Recovery is validated
  • Root Cause Analysis is completed
  • Compliance mapping is completed
  • Findings and risks are documented
  • Remediation roadmap is approved
  • Production-readiness scorecard is complete
  • Executive and technical reports are complete
  • Final recommendation is issued
  • Final presentation is delivered

When presenting this capstone, explain:

CloudNova Technologies needed a complete security validation before launching a critical enterprise Kubernetes platform.

You acted as the lead Kubernetes Security Engineer and Cloud Security Architect.

  • AWS account governance
  • Amazon EKS
  • IAM and RBAC
  • Worker nodes
  • Workloads
  • Networking
  • Images
  • Secrets
  • Logging
  • Runtime monitoring
  • Recovery
  • Target security architecture
  • Identity model
  • Network segmentation
  • Secure workload baseline
  • Software supply-chain controls
  • Runtime monitoring
  • Incident-response workflows
  • Backup and recovery

Show selected examples of:

  • Terraform
  • RBAC
  • Service Accounts
  • Network Policies
  • Admission policies
  • Secure workload manifests
  • Runtime rules
  • Monitoring configuration
  • Backup configuration

Demonstrate:

  • Approved access succeeds.
  • Unapproved access fails.
  • Privileged Pods are denied.
  • Cross-namespace traffic is blocked.
  • Unsigned images are denied.
  • Secret access follows least privilege.
  • Runtime alerts reach the SIEM.
  • Incident runbooks operate.
  • Backups restore successfully.

Explain how the project:

  • Reduced attack surface
  • Limited identity blast radius
  • Prevented insecure workloads
  • Restricted lateral movement
  • Improved software trust
  • Increased threat visibility
  • Improved incident response
  • Strengthened compliance
  • Increased recovery confidence
  • Supported production approval

CloudNova Technologies completes the final pre-production security exercise.

A controlled test application simulates suspicious activity.

The Security Operations platform detects:

  • Unexpected shell execution
  • File creation under /tmp
  • Access to a protected test path
  • Outbound network communication
  • Kubernetes API activity

The response team:

  1. Validates the alert.
  2. Identifies the affected Pod and owner.
  3. Collects Pod metadata and logs.
  4. Correlates the event with Kubernetes Audit Logs.
  5. Reviews the workload IAM role.
  6. Reviews VPC Flow Logs.
  7. Applies a quarantine Network Policy.
  8. Removes the workload from Service traffic.
  9. Rotates test credentials.
  10. Rebuilds the application.
  11. Scans and signs the new image.
  12. Redeploys using an immutable digest.
  13. Validates runtime monitoring.
  14. Performs Root Cause Analysis.
  15. Updates the CI/CD vulnerability gate.
  16. Updates the runtime detection rule.
  17. Documents the result in the production-readiness report.

The final review confirms that:

  • Preventive controls reduced the attack path.
  • Detective controls generated useful alerts.
  • Response procedures worked.
  • Recovery used trusted artefacts.
  • Evidence supported audit and management review.
  • Enterprise Kubernetes security requires end-to-end integration.
  • Discovery and inventory are required before security decisions.
  • Identity and access determine the possible blast radius.
  • Workload, node and network controls must work together.
  • Software supply-chain security protects the deployment path.
  • Secrets should be externalised and access controlled.
  • Runtime monitoring detects attacks after deployment.
  • Incident response must be tested before production.
  • Recovery must use trusted images, credentials and configuration.
  • Root Cause Analysis converts incidents into lasting improvements.
  • Compliance evidence should be generated by design.
  • Production approval should be based on validated controls.
  • Technical findings must be translated into business risk.
  • A mature security programme continuously reassesses and improves controls.

1. Why is this project considered end to end?

Section titled “1. Why is this project considered end to end?”

Answer: It covers the complete Kubernetes security lifecycle, including discovery, assessment, architecture, implementation, validation, detection, incident response, recovery, compliance and executive reporting.

2. Why should the project include both positive and negative security tests?

Section titled “2. Why should the project include both positive and negative security tests?”

Answer: Positive tests confirm that approved activity still works, while negative tests confirm that prohibited activity is blocked or detected.

3. Why is a controlled incident simulation important?

Section titled “3. Why is a controlled incident simulation important?”

Answer: It validates monitoring, investigation, containment and recovery procedures without introducing real malicious risk.

4. Why should Root Cause Analysis follow the incident simulation?

Section titled “4. Why should Root Cause Analysis follow the incident simulation?”

Answer: Root Cause Analysis identifies the underlying technical and process weaknesses that allowed the simulated attack path and defines corrective and preventive actions.

5. What determines the final production recommendation?

Section titled “5. What determines the final production recommendation?”

Answer: The recommendation is based on control effectiveness, unresolved findings, residual risk, recovery readiness, compliance status and business acceptance.

You have completed Project 10 — End-to-End Kubernetes Security Capstone when the complete project evidence demonstrates that you can:

Assess
Design
Implement
Validate
Detect
Investigate
Contain
Recover
Report
Improve

You have completed the Enterprise Kubernetes Security Projects module.

You now have a complete portfolio of enterprise Kubernetes security projects covering:

  • Secure Amazon EKS architecture
  • Kubernetes security assessment
  • CIS Kubernetes auditing
  • Multi-tenant security
  • Production security architecture
  • Runtime threat detection
  • Kubernetes SOC integration
  • Zero Trust
  • Security Operations
  • End-to-end security delivery

You are now prepared to apply these skills in roles such as:

  • Kubernetes Security Engineer
  • Amazon EKS Security Engineer
  • Cloud Security Engineer
  • Platform Security Engineer
  • DevSecOps Engineer
  • Container Security Engineer
  • Cloud Security Architect
  • Kubernetes Security Consultant
  • Cloud SOC Engineer
  • Incident Response Engineer

➡️ Learning Path Complete — Kubernetes Security Engineer