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Runbook 02 Enterprise AI Security Architecture Review

This runbook provides a repeatable methodology for performing an Enterprise AI Security Architecture Review.

The goal is to evaluate whether an AI solution has been designed with appropriate security controls before production deployment or major architectural change.

A strong architecture review helps identify security weaknesses early, when they are easier and less expensive to correct.

The review should answer:

Does this architecture provide appropriate protection for the business use case, data, identities, AI components and supporting infrastructure?

Use this runbook to:

  • Understand the business use case.
  • Review the proposed AI architecture.
  • Identify security boundaries.
  • Review data flows.
  • Review identity and authorization.
  • Review LLM integration.
  • Review RAG architecture.
  • Review AI agents and tools.
  • Review API security.
  • Review cloud and platform security.
  • Review secrets management.
  • Review security logging.
  • Review resilience and availability.
  • Identify design weaknesses.
  • Recommend security controls.
  • Document architecture decisions.
  • Define security conditions for production approval.

Use this runbook when:

  • A new AI system is being designed.
  • A Generative AI capability is being introduced.
  • An organization is integrating an external LLM provider.
  • RAG is being added to an existing application.
  • AI agents or autonomous workflows are being introduced.
  • Sensitive enterprise data will be exposed to AI.
  • A new cloud AI platform is being deployed.
  • Major architectural changes are planned.
  • An AI platform is moving from development to production.
  • Security architecture approval is required.
  • A previous incident indicates architectural weaknesses.
Business Requirement
Solution Architecture
Security Architecture Review
Threat Modeling
Security Requirements
Engineering Changes
Security Validation
Risk Decision
Production Deployment

Security should ideally become involved before implementation is complete.

An architecture review may include:

  • AI Security Engineer

  • Security Architect

  • Enterprise Architect

  • Cloud Security Engineer

  • Application Security Engineer

  • AI / ML Engineer

  • Software Architect

  • DevSecOps Engineer

  • Data Engineer

  • Platform Engineer

  • Privacy

  • Risk and Compliance

  • AI Governance

  • Business Owner

The AI Security Engineer may lead or support the security review.

Collect:

  • Business requirements

  • Architecture diagrams

  • Data flow diagrams

  • AI / LLM design

  • RAG architecture

  • AI agent design

  • API specifications

  • Identity architecture

  • IAM roles

  • Cloud architecture

  • Network architecture

  • Data classification

  • Secrets management design

  • CI/CD architecture

  • Logging design

  • Monitoring design

  • Third-party integrations

  • Security requirements

  • Compliance requirements

  • Existing threat models

  • Deployment model

If an input is missing, record it.

Missing architecture information is itself a risk to effective review.

Understand Business Requirement
Identify Architecture Components
Map Data Flows
Identify Trust Boundaries
Identify Assets
Review Identity
Review Data Security
Review LLM Integration
Review RAG
Review AI Agents
Review APIs
Review Infrastructure
Review Security Controls
Review Logging
Review Resilience
Identify Threat Scenarios
Identify Architecture Gaps
Define Required Controls
Document Decision

Phase 1 — Understand the Business Requirement

Section titled “Phase 1 — Understand the Business Requirement”

Before reviewing components, understand what the system is trying to achieve.

Document:

Examples:

  • Internal knowledge assistant

  • Customer chatbot

  • Security analyst assistant

  • AI coding assistant

  • Document summarization

  • Fraud analysis

  • AI-driven automation

Identify:

  • Employees

  • Administrators

  • Customers

  • Partners

  • Developers

  • Service accounts

  • AI agents

Determine:

  • Low

  • Medium

  • High

  • Mission Critical

Ask whether the system can:

  • Access sensitive data

  • Modify records

  • Send communications

  • Execute code

  • Create resources

  • Change permissions

  • Perform financial actions

  • Make business decisions

The greater the capability, the stronger the security requirements.

  • Business use case documented

  • Business owner identified

  • Users identified

  • Criticality defined

  • Sensitive functions identified

  • Regulatory requirements identified

  • Data sensitivity understood

  • Human oversight requirements identified

Phase 2 — Identify Architecture Components

Section titled “Phase 2 — Identify Architecture Components”

List every significant component.

Example:

Users
Web Application
API Gateway
AI Application
├── LLM Provider
├── RAG Pipeline
├── Vector Database
├── Enterprise Data
└── AI Agents

Supporting components may include:

Cloud Account
IAM
Secrets Manager
Object Storage
Containers
Kubernetes
Databases
Logging
Monitoring
SIEM
CI/CD
Source Control

Create:

Component Purpose Owner Trust Level
Web Application User interface App Team Medium
API Gateway API entry point Platform Team High
LLM Service AI inference AI Team External/Internal
Vector Database RAG storage Data Team High
Agent Service Executes tools AI Team High

Document how data moves.

Example:

Employee
│ Prompt
Application
AI Service
├── Retrieve Data
│ ↓
│ Vector Database
└── Generate Response
Employee

For every data flow ask:

  • What data moves?

  • Is it sensitive?

  • Is it encrypted?

  • Is it authenticated?

  • Is authorization applied?

  • Is it logged?

  • Does it leave the organization?

  • User input mapped

  • Model input mapped

  • Model output mapped

  • RAG data flow mapped

  • Agent data flow mapped

  • External provider flow mapped

  • Logging flow mapped

  • Sensitive data paths identified

A trust boundary exists where data crosses between different security contexts.

Examples:

Internet
Web Application
Application
External LLM Provider
AI Agent
Production System
RAG Pipeline
Enterprise Data

For each boundary ask:

  • How is identity established?

  • How is authorization enforced?

  • Is traffic encrypted?

  • Is input trusted?

  • Is output trusted?

  • What logging exists?

  • Internet boundary identified

  • Cloud boundaries identified

  • External provider boundary identified

  • RAG boundary identified

  • Agent-to-tool boundary identified

  • Administrative boundary identified

  • Data boundary identified

Typical AI assets include:

  • Sensitive data

  • User prompts

  • LLM outputs

  • System prompts

  • Models

  • Embeddings

  • Vector databases

  • API keys

  • Credentials

  • Service accounts

  • Source code

  • AI agents

  • Logs

  • Business workflows

For each asset identify:

  • Owner

  • Classification

  • Required confidentiality

  • Required integrity

  • Required availability

Identity should be explicit throughout the design.

Review:

How does the application authenticate users?

How does the application authenticate to backend systems?

How do cloud workloads authenticate?

Does each AI agent have a separate identity?

How is privileged access controlled?

  • Central authentication used

  • MFA applied where appropriate

  • User identity propagated safely

  • Service identities separated

  • AI agents use dedicated identities

  • Least privilege applied

  • Privileged access separated

  • Long-lived credentials minimized

  • Identity events logged

Every significant actor should have an identifiable and appropriately scoped identity.

Avoid architectures where many components share one highly privileged credential.

Phase 7 — Review Authorization Architecture

Section titled “Phase 7 — Review Authorization Architecture”

Authentication answers:

Who are you?

Authorization answers:

What are you allowed to do?

Review whether authorization exists between:

User → Application
Application → Data
Application → LLM
RAG → Documents
Agent → Tools
Service → Service
  • User roles defined

  • Data authorization enforced

  • RAG respects user access rights

  • API permissions scoped

  • Agent permissions restricted

  • Administrative operations protected

  • Authorization occurs outside model instructions

  • Authorization failures logged

Never design:

User
LLM
"Decides whether user is allowed"

Prefer:

User
Trusted Authorization Layer
Approved Data / Action
LLM

The model should not become the primary security boundary.

Identify:

  • Data sources

  • Data owners

  • Data classifications

  • Storage locations

  • Processing locations

  • Retention

  • Data transfers

Review whether sensitive data enters:

  • Prompts

  • RAG

  • Logs

  • Model context

  • External AI providers

  • Data inventory exists

  • Sensitive data identified

  • Data classification applied

  • Data minimization considered

  • Encryption in transit enabled

  • Encryption at rest enabled

  • Retention defined

  • Deletion process exists

  • Cross-border considerations reviewed where applicable

  • Third-party data handling reviewed

  • Logging avoids unnecessary sensitive data

Phase 9 — Review LLM Integration Architecture

Section titled “Phase 9 — Review LLM Integration Architecture”

Understand how the application interacts with the model.

Example:

User Input
Application
Prompt Construction
LLM API
Model Output
Application Processing
User

Review:

  • Prompt construction

  • System instructions

  • Context

  • Input handling

  • Model outputs

  • Error handling

  • API credentials

  • Rate limits

  • Model provider identified

  • Model purpose documented

  • Prompt flow documented

  • Model input classified

  • Model output treated as untrusted

  • Output validation defined

  • API credentials protected

  • Rate limits defined

  • Failure behavior defined

  • Sensitive actions not dependent solely on model output

System prompts may contain:

  • Instructions

  • Business logic

  • Security guidance

  • Internal context

Do not assume system prompts can reliably act as strong access-control mechanisms.

Review:

  • Whether sensitive information is unnecessarily embedded

  • Whether secrets are embedded

  • Whether business rules rely entirely on prompt instructions

  • Whether application controls exist outside the prompt

  • No credentials embedded

  • No unnecessary sensitive data embedded

  • Security boundaries enforced outside prompt

  • Prompt changes controlled

  • Prompt versions tracked where appropriate

RAG commonly introduces:

Data Source
Ingestion
Processing
Embeddings
Vector Database
Retrieval
LLM Context

Every stage needs review.

  • Approved sources identified

  • Data owners identified

  • Sensitive content classified

  • Ingestion permissions restricted

  • Source validation exists

  • Changes logged

  • Malicious content considered

  • Access restricted

  • Encryption enabled

  • Network exposure minimized

  • Backup and recovery considered

  • User authorization enforced

  • Data segmentation implemented where required

  • Results filtered according to access

  • Retrieved content treated as untrusted

Retrieval must not bypass the organization’s existing data permissions.

If a user cannot open a document directly, the AI assistant should not automatically provide its contents.

Agents require special attention because they can move from:

Generate Information

to

Perform Actions

Example:

User
AI Agent
├── Email
├── Database
├── Cloud API
├── Ticketing
└── Code Repository

Review every connected tool.

  • Agent purpose defined

  • Agent identity defined

  • Tools inventoried

  • Permissions documented

  • Least privilege applied

  • High-risk operations identified

  • Tool inputs validated

  • Tool outputs validated

  • Human approval defined

  • Action limits defined

  • Actions logged

  • Emergency disable capability exists

Consider classifying agents.

Read-only access to public or low-sensitivity information.

Read access to internal information.

Ability to modify enterprise systems.

Ability to:

  • Change permissions

  • Execute production code

  • Transfer money

  • Delete critical data

  • Perform privileged administrative actions

Security controls should increase with agent capability.

AI systems commonly depend on multiple APIs.

Review:

User
Application API
AI API
Data API
Tool API
  • APIs inventoried

  • Authentication defined

  • Authorization defined

  • TLS used

  • Rate limiting implemented

  • Input validation defined

  • Error handling defined

  • Secrets protected

  • API logging enabled

  • Administrative APIs separated

  • Public exposure minimized

Identify where secrets exist.

Examples:

  • LLM API keys

  • Cloud credentials

  • Database passwords

  • Service tokens

  • Certificates

Prefer:

Application
Managed Identity / Secret Store
Backend Service

Avoid:

Source Code
Hardcoded API Key
  • Central secret management used

  • Hardcoded credentials prohibited

  • Short-lived credentials preferred

  • Secret access logged

  • Rotation supported

  • Environment separation implemented

  • Agent secret access minimized

If the solution is cloud-hosted, review:

  • Accounts / subscriptions

  • IAM

  • Networks

  • Storage

  • Compute

  • Containers

  • Logging

  • Key management

  • Secrets

  • AI services

  • Production environment separated

  • IAM least privilege applied

  • Network segmentation used

  • Public exposure minimized

  • Private connectivity considered

  • Encryption configured

  • Cloud audit logging enabled

  • Security monitoring enabled

  • Resource ownership defined

  • Backup and recovery defined

Phase 16 — Review Container & Kubernetes Architecture

Section titled “Phase 16 — Review Container & Kubernetes Architecture”

If containers are used:

  • Trusted images

  • Image scanning

  • Minimal images

  • Non-root execution

  • Runtime permissions

  • Secrets

  • Resource limits

If Kubernetes is used:

  • RBAC

  • Workload identities

  • Network policies

  • Admission controls

  • Secrets

  • Pod security

  • Logging

  • Trusted container registry used

  • Images scanned

  • Containers run with minimal privilege

  • Kubernetes RBAC reviewed

  • Workload identities separated

  • Network policies considered

  • Secrets managed appropriately

  • Resource limits configured

  • Audit logging enabled

Understand network flows.

Example:

Internet
WAF
Application
Private AI Service
Private Data Layer

Review:

  • Public endpoints

  • Private endpoints

  • Firewalls

  • Security groups

  • WAF

  • Egress restrictions

  • Service-to-service communication

  • Public endpoints identified

  • Public exposure justified

  • Internal services private where possible

  • Inbound restrictions implemented

  • Outbound restrictions considered

  • TLS enforced

  • Administrative paths restricted

  • Network monitoring available

Phase 18 — Review Supply-Chain Architecture

Section titled “Phase 18 — Review Supply-Chain Architecture”

Identify external dependencies.

Examples:

  • Models

  • Model repositories

  • Python packages

  • Container images

  • Plugins

  • Datasets

  • SaaS providers

  • AI APIs

Review trust relationships.

  • Model source verified

  • Dependency sources approved

  • Container provenance verified

  • Third-party AI providers reviewed

  • Dataset provenance understood

  • Vulnerability scanning implemented

  • Update process controlled

  • Dependency inventory maintained

Security architecture must include observability.

Potential logs:

Identity Logs
Application Logs
API Logs
LLM Activity
RAG Retrieval Logs
Agent Tool Logs
Cloud Audit Logs
Infrastructure Logs
Security Alerts

Review the path:

AI System
Logging
Central Log Platform
SIEM
Detection
SOC
  • Required log sources identified

  • Logs centralized

  • Agent actions logged

  • Authentication events logged

  • Authorization failures logged

  • RAG changes logged

  • Administrative changes logged

  • Sensitive data protected in logs

  • Retention defined

  • SOC access available

Phase 20 — Review Detection Architecture

Section titled “Phase 20 — Review Detection Architecture”

Ask:

If someone abuses this AI system, how will we detect it?

Potential detections:

  • Repeated prompt abuse

  • Abnormal retrieval patterns

  • Excessive data access

  • Unusual agent actions

  • Credential misuse

  • Knowledge-source modification

  • Abnormal resource consumption

  • Suspicious administrative changes

  • Important threat scenarios identified

  • Relevant telemetry available

  • Detection logic defined

  • Alerts routed to correct team

  • Escalation process defined

  • False-positive handling considered

Phase 21 — Review Incident Response Architecture

Section titled “Phase 21 — Review Incident Response Architecture”

Architecture should support containment.

Ask:

If the AI system is compromised, what can we disable?

Possible controls:

Disable User
Disable Agent
Revoke Token
Rotate Secret
Block API
Remove Data Source
Disable Model
Isolate Workload
Restrict Network
  • Users can be disabled

  • Agent identities can be disabled

  • Tokens can be revoked

  • Secrets can be rotated

  • Malicious data can be removed

  • Workloads can be isolated

  • Logs are retained

  • Response ownership defined

Phase 22 — Review Availability & Resilience

Section titled “Phase 22 — Review Availability & Resilience”

AI systems may depend on:

  • External model providers

  • APIs

  • Vector databases

  • Cloud services

  • Internet connectivity

Review failure scenarios.

Primary LLM Provider
X
Application Failure

Ask:

  • Is fallback required?

  • What happens when the model is unavailable?

  • What happens during high usage?

  • Are timeouts configured?

  • Are retry limits defined?

  • Critical dependencies identified

  • Single points of failure identified

  • Timeouts defined

  • Retry behavior controlled

  • Resource limits defined

  • Backup strategy defined

  • Recovery procedures documented

  • Provider outage considered

AI applications may process personal or confidential information.

Review:

  • What information enters prompts?

  • What is retained?

  • Who can retrieve it?

  • Is it used for model improvement?

  • Does it leave the organization?

  • Personal data identified

  • Purpose defined

  • Data minimization applied

  • Retention defined

  • Third-party processing understood

  • User transparency considered

  • Privacy team involved where required

Now challenge the architecture.

Potential scenarios:

Can malicious instructions alter expected behavior?

Can untrusted content influence responses?

Scenario 3 — Unauthorized Data Retrieval

Section titled “Scenario 3 — Unauthorized Data Retrieval”

Can users access information outside their authorization?

Can manipulation cause an agent to execute an unauthorized action?

Could compromise expose API keys or service identities?

Could a malicious model or dependency enter the environment?

Could abuse occur without sufficient investigation evidence?

Threat
Affected Component
Attack Path
Existing Control
Control Gap
Business Impact
Architecture Recommendation

Phase 25 — Identify Architecture Security Gaps

Section titled “Phase 25 — Identify Architecture Security Gaps”

A security architecture gap is different from a normal implementation bug.

Examples:

AI Agent
Shared Administrator Credential

Recommended:

AI Agent
Dedicated Identity
Least Privilege
User
AI
All Enterprise Documents

Recommended:

User
Authorization
Approved Documents
AI
LLM Output
Automatic Execution

Recommended:

LLM Output
Validation
Policy Check
Human Approval if Required
Execution

Convert identified gaps into architecture requirements.

Use:

REQ-AI-001
AI agent identities must use least privilege.
REQ-AI-002
RAG retrieval must enforce source-system authorization.
REQ-AI-003
LLM-generated actions must be validated before execution.
REQ-AI-004
AI agent tool calls must be centrally logged.
REQ-AI-005
Production API credentials must be stored in an approved secrets platform.

Good requirements are:

  • Specific

  • Testable

  • Actionable

  • Assignable

Phase 27 — Prioritize Architecture Findings

Section titled “Phase 27 — Prioritize Architecture Findings”

Classify findings based on:

  • Business impact

  • Data sensitivity

  • Exploitability

  • Privilege

  • User exposure

  • Existing controls

Example:

ID Architecture Finding Priority
AR-01 RAG bypasses source authorization Critical
AR-02 AI agent has broad write access Critical
AR-03 Model output executed without validation High
AR-04 AI activity not centrally logged High
AR-05 Public API lacks sufficient rate controls Medium

Architecture reviews should not only identify weaknesses.

Record strong controls as well.

Examples:

  • Dedicated workload identities

  • Private networking

  • Central secrets management

  • RAG authorization

  • Human approval

  • Central logging

  • Container scanning

This provides a more accurate assessment.

Phase 29 — Determine Architecture Decision

Section titled “Phase 29 — Determine Architecture Decision”

Possible decisions:

No material security architecture gaps identified.

Deployment may proceed if specified controls are completed.

Major design changes are required before production.

Known risks require formal business acceptance.

Architecture presents unacceptable risk.

# AI Security Architecture Decision
## System
## Business Owner
## Review Date
## Architecture Version
## Overall Security Assessment
## Critical Architecture Findings
## Required Security Controls
## Conditions for Production
## Residual Risks
## Security Recommendation
## Risk Owner
## Final Decision

Create:

Action Owner Priority Target Status
Implement RAG authorization AI Team Critical TBD Open
Restrict agent IAM role Platform Team Critical TBD Open
Enable centralized logging SOC Team High TBD In Progress

Do not close the architecture review until required security actions are addressed or formally accepted.

Maintain:

  • Architecture diagrams

  • Data flow diagrams

  • Threat models

  • IAM design

  • Network design

  • Data classification

  • Security requirements

  • Meeting decisions

  • Risk decisions

  • Validation evidence

  • Final approval

AI-Security-Architecture-Review/
├── 01-Business-Requirements.md
├── 02-Architecture.md
├── 03-Data-Flows.md
├── 04-Asset-Inventory.md
├── 05-Trust-Boundaries.md
├── 06-Threat-Model.md
├── 07-Security-Requirements.md
├── 08-Architecture-Findings.md
├── 09-Action-Register.md
├── 10-Architecture-Decision.md
└── Evidence/
├── IAM/
├── Data/
├── RAG/
├── Agents/
├── APIs/
├── Cloud/
├── Network/
└── Logging/
  • Use case understood

  • Owner identified

  • Criticality defined

  • Architecture reviewed

  • Components inventoried

  • Data flows mapped

  • Trust boundaries identified

  • User authentication reviewed

  • Service identities reviewed

  • Agent identities reviewed

  • Least privilege applied

  • Data access controlled

  • RAG authorization enforced

  • Agent actions authorized

  • LLM not used as primary authorization control

  • Sensitive data identified

  • Encryption reviewed

  • Retention reviewed

  • Third-party transfers reviewed

  • Integration reviewed

  • Output treated as untrusted

  • High-risk actions validated

  • Sources approved

  • Ingestion controlled

  • Retrieval authorized

  • Vector store secured

  • Tools inventoried

  • Permissions restricted

  • Human approval considered

  • Actions logged

  • Authentication defined

  • Authorization defined

  • Rate limiting considered

  • Secrets protected

  • IAM reviewed

  • Network segmentation reviewed

  • Public exposure minimized

  • Logging enabled

  • Images trusted

  • Privileges minimized

  • RBAC reviewed

  • Secrets protected

  • Models trusted

  • Dependencies reviewed

  • Third parties assessed

  • Security telemetry defined

  • Central logging available

  • Sensitive log data protected

  • Abuse scenarios mapped

  • Detection opportunities identified

  • SOC ownership established

  • Containment options available

  • Agent disable capability exists

  • Credentials can be revoked

  • Dependencies identified

  • Failure behavior defined

  • Recovery considered

  • Privacy reviewed

  • Risk reviewed

  • Human oversight defined

  • Findings documented

  • Security requirements created

  • Owners assigned

  • Production conditions documented

  • Final decision recorded

The LLM is one component.

Architecture review must include:

Identity
+
Data
+
Application
+
API
+
RAG
+
Agent
+
Cloud
+
Network
+
Operations

Treating Prompt Instructions as Security Controls

Section titled “Treating Prompt Instructions as Security Controls”

Prompt instructions may influence model behavior.

They should not replace trusted controls such as authorization.

If you do not know where information travels, you cannot reliably determine where it may leak.

An AI system that can take actions introduces significantly different risk from a simple chatbot.

Architecture must support:

  • Logging

  • Detection

  • Investigation

  • Containment

  • Recovery

Architecture review provides the most value before major engineering decisions become difficult to change.

For every component, ask:

Why Does It Exist?
What Does It Access?
Who Can Access It?
What Trusts It?
What Does It Trust?
What Could Manipulate It?
What Happens If It Is Compromised?
What Prevents That?
How Would We Detect It?
How Would We Contain It?

This thought process is more important than memorizing a checklist.

The review is complete when:

  • Business context is understood.

  • Architecture is documented.

  • Data flows are mapped.

  • Trust boundaries are documented.

  • Critical assets are identified.

  • Identity is reviewed.

  • Authorization is reviewed.

  • Data security is reviewed.

  • LLM integration is reviewed.

  • RAG is reviewed.

  • AI agents are reviewed.

  • APIs are reviewed.

  • Cloud and infrastructure are reviewed.

  • Network security is reviewed.

  • Supply-chain risks are reviewed.

  • Logging is reviewed.

  • Detection is reviewed.

  • Incident response is reviewed.

  • Resilience is reviewed.

  • Threat scenarios are documented.

  • Architecture gaps are identified.

  • Security requirements are defined.

  • Findings are prioritized.

  • Owners are assigned.

  • Architecture decision is documented.

The purpose of security architecture is not to make an AI system impossible to attack.

The purpose is to design the system so that:

Security Boundaries Are Clear
Access Is Restricted
Sensitive Data Is Protected
AI Capabilities Are Controlled
Failures Are Contained
Suspicious Activity Is Visible
Incidents Can Be Investigated
Risk Is Understood

The earlier these principles are incorporated into architecture, the stronger and easier the system becomes to secure.

You have completed:

Runbook 02 — Enterprise AI Security Architecture Review

You now have a structured methodology for reviewing an AI solution before production and translating security concerns into concrete architecture requirements.

This completes the practical assessment and architecture-review foundation for Module 01 — AI Security Foundations.

➡️ Module 02 — LLM Security

You now understand the foundations required to assess AI systems, including:

  • Enterprise AI architecture
  • AI attack surfaces
  • AI threat identification
  • OWASP and MITRE ATLAS mapping
  • AI security assessments
  • Enterprise AI security architecture reviews

The next module focuses on one of the most important areas in modern AI Security Engineering:

Securing applications built with Large Language Models.

You will learn how LLM-enabled applications can be attacked, abused, misconfigured and manipulated, and how security engineers assess and defend these systems.

In the next module, you will explore:

  • LLM security fundamentals
  • Prompt injection
  • Indirect prompt injection
  • Jailbreaking and safety bypass
  • Sensitive information disclosure
  • Insecure output handling
  • RAG security
  • Vector database security
  • AI agent and tool security
  • Model and data poisoning
  • Excessive agency
  • Enterprise LLM security architecture

You will also complete practical labs where you will analyze and test LLM applications inside authorized environments.

The goal is to move from:

“I understand AI security risks.”

to:

“I can identify, assess and help secure real LLM-enabled applications.”

➡️ Next Module: 02 — LLM Security