02 AWS IAM Security Review
IAM security is not just about who has access. It is about whether that access is necessary, temporary where possible, governed correctly, and resistant to privilege escalation or credential compromise.
Welcome to the AWS IAM Security Review Runbook.
This runbook builds directly on the IAM themes emphasized throughout the AWS Security β Specialty material, including:
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IAM users
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groups
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roles
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STS
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identity-based policies
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resource-based policies
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session policies
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permission boundaries
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Service Control Policies
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IAM Access Analyzer
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IAM Policy Simulator
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federation
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IAM Identity Center
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cross-account access
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least privilege
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troubleshooting authorization failures
The purpose is to move from:
I understand IAM concepts.
to:
I can perform a structured IAM security review and produce defensible findings.
π― Runbook Information
Section titled βπ― Runbook Informationβ| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Runbook | AWS IAM Security Review |
| Difficulty | Intermediate β Advanced |
| Estimated Time | 2β5 hours |
| Primary Focus | Identity, Authorization & Privilege |
| Target Roles | IAM Engineer, Cloud Security Engineer, Security Consultant, Cloud Security Architect |
| Certification Alignment | AWS Certified Security β Specialty |
| Output | IAM Findings, Risk Ratings, Remediation Plan |
π’ Scenario
Section titled βπ’ ScenarioβYou have been asked to review the IAM posture of an AWS environment.
Management is concerned that:
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users may retain unnecessary permissions
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long-term access keys may be widely used
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MFA may not be consistently enforced
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cross-account access may be poorly controlled
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role trust relationships may be too broad
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developers may have privilege-escalation opportunities
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service roles may have excessive permissions
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access reviews may not be performed regularly
Your task is to determine:
Who can access what, why they have access, and whether that access is appropriately controlled.
π― Review Objectives
Section titled βπ― Review ObjectivesβBy the end of this runbook, you should be able to:
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inventory IAM identities
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review workforce access
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assess IAM users
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assess IAM roles
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review trust policies
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evaluate access keys
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review MFA
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evaluate IAM policies
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identify wildcard permissions
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understand effective permissions
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assess permission boundaries
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review cross-account access
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assess federation
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review IAM Identity Center
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identify potential privilege escalation
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use Access Analyzer
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troubleshoot access
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document IAM findings
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recommend remediation
β οΈ Authorization and Scope
Section titled ββ οΈ Authorization and ScopeβBefore reviewing IAM, confirm:
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AWS accounts in scope
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Regions where applicable
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Organizations structure
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whether IAM Identity Center is in use
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whether external identity providers are in scope
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whether permission changes are permitted
For production reviews, prefer read-only assessment until remediation has been approved.
π§ IAM Review Workflow
Section titled βπ§ IAM Review WorkflowβUse:
Scope βIdentity Inventory βAuthentication Review βUser Review βRole Review βPolicy Review βTrust Review βCross-Account Review βPrivilege Escalation Review βAccess Analysis βFindings βRemediation βValidation01 β Understand the Identity Model
Section titled β01 β Understand the Identity ModelβBefore reviewing individual permissions, understand how people and workloads authenticate.
Determine whether access uses:
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IAM users
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IAM roles
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IAM Identity Center
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SAML federation
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OIDC
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external identity providers
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workload roles
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cross-account roles
π§ First Question
Section titled βπ§ First QuestionβAsk:
Is this environment designed around long-term identities or temporary role-based access?
The SCS-C02 study guide repeatedly emphasizes the use of roles and temporary STS credentials rather than long-term keys for workloads.
02 β Inventory IAM Users
Section titled β02 β Inventory IAM UsersβCreate an inventory.
| User | Purpose | Console | MFA | Access Keys | Permissions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
For each user determine:
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owner
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business purpose
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console access
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MFA status
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active keys
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last-used information
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direct policies
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group membership
π¨ Review Questions
Section titled βπ¨ Review QuestionsβAsk:
Is this user still required?
Could this access be provided through federation?
Is console access necessary?
Are long-term API credentials necessary?
03 β Review MFA
Section titled β03 β Review MFAβFor every human interactive identity, determine whether strong MFA is required and enabled.
π¨ Example Finding
Section titled βπ¨ Example FindingβFinding:Privileged IAM User Without MFA
Severity:High
Observation:The user has elevated permissions and interactive console access without MFA.
Risk:Password compromise could result in privileged AWS access.
Recommendation:Require MFA and migrate workforce access toward centralized federation where appropriate.04 β Review Access Keys
Section titled β04 β Review Access KeysβFor each key review:
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owner
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status
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age
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last used
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services accessed
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business requirement
π© Red Flags
Section titled βπ© Red FlagsβLook for:
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unused active keys
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old keys
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keys assigned to humans without clear need
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keys owned by former users
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multiple active keys
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unclear ownership
π§ Security Principle
Section titled βπ§ Security PrincipleβPrefer:
Workload βIAM Role βTemporary Credentialsinstead of:
Workload βStored Access Key05 β Review IAM Groups
Section titled β05 β Review IAM GroupsβIf groups are used, review:
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members
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attached policies
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business purpose
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privilege level
Ask:
Are group permissions aligned with job function?
Avoid groups becoming permanent dumping grounds for broad access.
06 β Inventory IAM Roles
Section titled β06 β Inventory IAM RolesβCreate:
| Role | Purpose | Trusted Principal | Permission Level | Last Used |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Classify roles into:
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workload roles
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human/federated roles
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cross-account roles
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service-linked roles
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administrative roles
07 β Review Role Trust Policies
Section titled β07 β Review Role Trust PoliciesβFor every role ask:
Who can assume this role?
Review:
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AWS principals
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account principals
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services
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federated identities
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conditions
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external IDs where relevant
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MFA requirements where appropriate
π§ Key Distinction
Section titled βπ§ Key DistinctionβThe SCS-C02 IAM material separates:
Trust Policyβ Who may assume the role
Permission Policyβ What the role may doBoth must be secure.
π¨ Example Finding
Section titled βπ¨ Example FindingβFinding:Overly Broad Cross-Account Role Trust
Severity:High
Observation:A privileged role trusts an external account without sufficient restrictive conditions.
Risk:Unexpected principals in the trusted account may be able to assume the role.
Recommendation:Restrict the trusted principal and add appropriate conditions based on the business access model.08 β Review Workload Roles
Section titled β08 β Review Workload RolesβReview roles attached to:
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EC2
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Lambda
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ECS
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other workloads
Ask:
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does the workload need all permissions?
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are resources scoped?
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does it use
*unnecessarily? -
could compromise of the workload expose sensitive AWS privileges?
π§ Blast Radius Thinking
Section titled βπ§ Blast Radius ThinkingβFor a workload role, ask:
If this EC2 instance is compromised, what can the attacker do using the instance role?
That question often reveals excessive permissions quickly.
09 β Review Identity-Based Policies
Section titled β09 β Review Identity-Based PoliciesβReview:
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AWS managed policies
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customer managed policies
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inline policies
Look at:
EffectActionResourceCondition10 β Identify Wildcard Actions
Section titled β10 β Identify Wildcard ActionsβSearch for patterns such as:
"Action": "*"or broad action families such as:
"s3:*""iam:*""ec2:*"Do not automatically label all wildcard usage as vulnerable.
Determine whether the scope is justified.
11 β Review Wildcard Resources
Section titled β11 β Review Wildcard ResourcesβLook for:
"Resource": "*"Some AWS actions require it.
But for actions that support resource-level restriction, ask whether access can be narrowed.
12 β Review Policy Conditions
Section titled β12 β Review Policy ConditionsβThe SCS-C02 guide emphasizes IAM condition keys such as:
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aws:SourceIp -
aws:SecureTransport -
aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent -
principal tags
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request tags
Review whether sensitive permissions could benefit from:
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MFA conditions
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network restrictions
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tags
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resource conditions
13 β Review Explicit Denies
Section titled β13 β Review Explicit DeniesβRemember:
Explicit deny is a powerful IAM control.
When reviewing effective access, identify whether denies exist in:
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identity policies
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resource policies
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SCPs
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session policies
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endpoint policies
14 β Review Resource-Based Policies
Section titled β14 β Review Resource-Based PoliciesβWhere applicable, review resource policies on services such as:
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S3
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SNS
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SQS
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KMS
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Lambda
Ask:
Does this resource trust principals outside the intended boundary?
15 β Review Permission Boundaries
Section titled β15 β Review Permission BoundariesβThe study guide describes permission boundaries as controls that limit the maximum permissions a user or role can receive.
Review:
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which identities have boundaries
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what ceiling the boundary establishes
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whether delegated administrators can create overly privileged identities
π§ Important
Section titled βπ§ ImportantβA permission boundary:
does not grant permissions.
It limits what identity policies can ultimately allow.
16 β Review Service Control Policies
Section titled β16 β Review Service Control PoliciesβIf AWS Organizations is used, review SCPs relevant to the account/OU.
Understand:
IAM Policyβ May Allow
SCPβ Defines Organizational Maximum
Explicit SCP Denyβ Blocks AccessThe SCS-C02 guide explicitly states that SCPs restrict permissions but do not grant permissions.
17 β Review Session Policies
Section titled β17 β Review Session PoliciesβWhere STS/federation workflows use session policies, determine whether additional restrictions are applied during temporary sessions.
This is especially useful when delegated access needs to be narrower than the roleβs full permissions.
18 β Review Cross-Account Access
Section titled β18 β Review Cross-Account AccessβInventory:
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roles trusted by other accounts
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resource policies granting external access
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external roles your account can assume
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third-party integrations
π Cross-Account Matrix
Section titled βπ Cross-Account Matrixβ| Source Account | Target Role/Resource | Access Type | Purpose | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|
π§ Core Rule
Section titled βπ§ Core RuleβNever solve cross-account access by simply sharing IAM credentials.
The SCS-C02 guide recommends controlled role assumption using STS and resource policies where appropriate.
19 β Review Third-Party Access
Section titled β19 β Review Third-Party AccessβFor vendors, auditors, or external services, review:
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trusted account
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role permissions
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conditions
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session duration
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external ID where relevant
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logging
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continued business need
20 β Review Federation
Section titled β20 β Review FederationβIf SAML/OIDC federation is used, assess:
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identity provider
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mapped roles
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permission sets
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MFA
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group-to-role mappings
21 β Review IAM Identity Center
Section titled β21 β Review IAM Identity CenterβWhere used, assess:
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user/group assignments
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permission sets
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account assignments
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administrator privileges
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MFA through the identity provider
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inactive assignments
The SCS-C02 study material identifies IAM Identity Center as a preferred multi-account workforce access solution.
22 β Review Administrator Access
Section titled β22 β Review Administrator AccessβIdentify identities with:
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AdministratorAccess -
Action: "*" -
broad IAM privileges
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broad Organizations permissions
For each privileged identity document:
Why is this level of access required?
π¨ Finding Example
Section titled βπ¨ Finding ExampleβFinding:Excessive Administrator Access
Severity:High
Observation:Multiple human identities retain permanent administrative permissions.
Risk:Credential compromise could result in full account compromise.
Recommendation:Reduce standing administrative access and use controlled temporary privileged roles with MFA and logging.23 β Review IAM Privilege Escalation Paths
Section titled β23 β Review IAM Privilege Escalation PathsβPay special attention to permission combinations.
Examples include:
iam:AttachUserPolicyiam:AttachRolePolicyiam:PutUserPolicyiam:PutRolePolicyiam:CreatePolicyVersioniam:SetDefaultPolicyVersioniam:PassRolests:AssumeRoleThese permissions are not automatically vulnerabilities.
Risk depends on combinations and resource scope.
24 β Review iam:PassRole
Section titled β24 β Review iam:PassRoleβFor every principal with iam:PassRole, determine:
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which roles can be passed
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which services can receive them
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how privileged those roles are
π₯ Example Escalation Pattern
Section titled βπ₯ Example Escalation PatternβDeveloper βec2:RunInstances +iam:PassRole βPrivileged EC2 Role βTemporary Credentials βHigher Privilegesπ§ Critical Question
Section titled βπ§ Critical QuestionβCan the principal pass a role more privileged than itself?
25 β Review Role Assumption Paths
Section titled β25 β Review Role Assumption PathsβFor sts:AssumeRole, assess:
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target roles
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trust relationships
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conditions
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privilege difference
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cross-account paths
Create an access-path diagram if needed.
User βRole A βRole B βSensitive Resource26 β Review IAM Access Analyzer
Section titled β26 β Review IAM Access AnalyzerβUse Access Analyzer to identify unintended access where supported.
The SCS-C02 guide specifically identifies Access Analyzer for detecting unintended access and overly permissive policies.
Review findings involving:
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external principals
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cross-account access
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public access
27 β Review IAM Policy Simulator
Section titled β27 β Review IAM Policy SimulatorβWhere useful, validate policy behavior.
Test relevant actions against:
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users
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roles
The SCS-C02 guide identifies Policy Simulator as an IAM troubleshooting tool.
π§ Professional Principle
Section titled βπ§ Professional PrincipleβDo not modify policy blindly.
Use:
Understand βSimulate βChange βValidate28 β Review CloudTrail IAM Events
Section titled β28 β Review CloudTrail IAM EventsβSearch for activity such as:
CreateUserCreateAccessKeyCreateRoleAttachRolePolicyPutRolePolicyAssumeRoleUpdateAssumeRolePolicyReview:
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principal
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source IP
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time
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changes
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unusual activity
29 β Review IAM Usage
Section titled β29 β Review IAM UsageβDetermine whether identities and permissions are actually used.
Look for:
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inactive users
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inactive keys
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unused roles
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excessive services permitted compared to actual use
π‘ Least Privilege Maturity
Section titled βπ‘ Least Privilege MaturityβLeast privilege is not a one-time configuration.
It is a continuous process:
Grant βObserve Usage βReduce βValidate βReview Again30 β Review Credentials in Workloads
Section titled β30 β Review Credentials in WorkloadsβAsk whether applications store:
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access keys
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secret keys
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credentials in environment variables
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credentials in code
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credentials in repositories
π¨ Red Flag
Section titled βπ¨ Red FlagβWorkload access should generally use role-based temporary credentials when supported.
31 β Review Break-Glass Access
Section titled β31 β Review Break-Glass AccessβIf emergency privileged access exists, review:
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when it can be used
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approval
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MFA
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monitoring
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logging
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credential protection
π§ Security Principle
Section titled βπ§ Security PrincipleβEmergency access should be:
available when needed
but:
difficult to misuse silently.
32 β Review Separation of Duties
Section titled β32 β Review Separation of DutiesβAssess whether one identity can:
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create identities
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grant itself permissions
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modify logs
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disable security controls
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delete evidence
A strong security model separates sensitive duties where practical.
33 β Review Security Service Administration
Section titled β33 β Review Security Service AdministrationβReview who can disable or modify:
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GuardDuty
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Security Hub
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CloudTrail
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AWS Config
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logging buckets
π¨ High-Risk Pattern
Section titled βπ¨ High-Risk PatternβAn identity that can both:
Perform Sensitive Activity+Disable Security Monitoringcreates increased risk.
34 β Create IAM Findings
Section titled β34 β Create IAM FindingsβUse a standard format.
Finding ID:
Title:
Severity:
Affected Identity:
Observation:
Evidence:
Risk:
Privilege Path:
Recommendation:
Validation:35 β Example Finding β Unused Access Key
Section titled β35 β Example Finding β Unused Access KeyβFinding ID:IAM-001
Title:Unused Active Access Key
Severity:Medium
Affected Identity:legacy-admin-user
Observation:An active access key has not been used for an extended period.
Risk:Unused long-term credentials increase attack surface and may remain unnoticed if compromised.
Recommendation:Validate business need and deactivate/delete the key if no longer required.36 β Example Finding β Excessive IAM Policy
Section titled β36 β Example Finding β Excessive IAM PolicyβFinding ID:IAM-002
Title:Developer Role Has Broad IAM Permissions
Severity:High
Observation:Developer role contains iam:* permissions.
Risk:The role may be capable of modifying identities and escalating privileges.
Recommendation:Replace broad IAM permissions with task-specific actions and restrict resources where supported.37 β Example Finding β Dangerous PassRole Scope
Section titled β37 β Example Finding β Dangerous PassRole ScopeβFinding ID:IAM-003
Title:Developer Can Pass Privileged IAM Roles
Severity:Critical / High depending on reachable role
Observation:Developer role has iam:PassRole against highly privileged roles and can create compatible compute resources.
Risk:The developer may be able to obtain higher privileges through a workload.
Recommendation:Restrict iam:PassRole to explicitly approved low-privilege roles and constrain related service actions.38 β Rate IAM Risk
Section titled β38 β Rate IAM RiskβUse:
Privilege+Exposure+Credential Type+Exploitability+Business Impact=Riskπ΄ Critical
Section titled βπ΄ CriticalβPotential direct account takeover or unrestricted privilege escalation.
π High
Section titled βπ HighβSignificant excessive privilege, dangerous trust, or privileged credential weakness.
π‘ Medium
Section titled βπ‘ MediumβMeaningful access-control weakness.
π΅ Low
Section titled βπ΅ LowβHardening, cleanup, or documentation issue.
39 β Prioritize Remediation
Section titled β39 β Prioritize RemediationβRecommended order:
Active Compromise Risk βPrivilege Escalation βPrivileged Authentication βCross-Account Trust βUnused Credentials βLeast Privilege Optimization40 β Create a Remediation Plan
Section titled β40 β Create a Remediation PlanβExample:
| Finding | Recommendation | Priority | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Broad admin role | Reduce privilege | Immediate | IAM Team |
| Missing MFA | Enforce MFA | Immediate | Identity Team |
| Old access key | Remove key | Short Term | Application Team |
| Federation gap | Implement Identity Center | Strategic | Platform Team |
41 β Validate IAM Remediation
Section titled β41 β Validate IAM RemediationβNever assume the change worked.
Validate:
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required access still works
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unauthorized access fails
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workloads still operate
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trust path is correct
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no unexpected privilege remains
π§ Best Validation Pattern
Section titled βπ§ Best Validation PatternβTest:
what should work
and:
what should not work.
42 β Produce an IAM Access Matrix
Section titled β42 β Produce an IAM Access MatrixβExample:
| Identity | Resource | Required Access | Actual Access | Gap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| App Role | S3 Bucket A | Read | Full S3 | Excessive |
| Analyst | Security Hub | Read | Read | None |
| Developer | EC2 | Manage Dev | Admin | Excessive |
43 β Produce a Privilege Map
Section titled β43 β Produce a Privilege MapβFor complex environments, visualize:
Developer Group βDeveloper Role βCan Pass βApplication Role βAccesses βProduction DataThis makes privilege paths easier to explain.
44 β Prepare the Executive Summary
Section titled β44 β Prepare the Executive SummaryβKeep IAM executive reporting simple.
Example:
The IAM security review identified excessive standing privilege, inconsistent MFA coverage, and unnecessary long-term access keys.
The highest-priority concern is the ability of selected developer identities to access or pass privileged roles.
Immediate remediation should focus on removing privilege-escalation paths, securing privileged authentication, and eliminating unnecessary credentials.45 β Prepare the Technical Report
Section titled β45 β Prepare the Technical ReportβRecommended sections:
1. Scope2. Identity Architecture3. Authentication Review4. IAM User Findings5. IAM Role Findings6. Policy Findings7. Cross-Account Access8. Privilege Escalation Analysis9. Risk Summary10. Remediation Planπ€ AWS IAM Security Review Interview Questions
Section titled βπ€ AWS IAM Security Review Interview QuestionsβPractise answering without notes.
IAM Fundamentals
Section titled βIAM Fundamentalsβ1. How would you perform an AWS IAM security assessment?
Section titled β1. How would you perform an AWS IAM security assessment?β2. Which IAM identities would you review first?
Section titled β2. Which IAM identities would you review first?β3. Why are IAM roles generally preferred for workloads?
Section titled β3. Why are IAM roles generally preferred for workloads?βAuthentication
Section titled βAuthenticationβ4. How would you assess MFA coverage?
Section titled β4. How would you assess MFA coverage?β5. What risks exist with long-term access keys?
Section titled β5. What risks exist with long-term access keys?β6. How would you handle unused credentials?
Section titled β6. How would you handle unused credentials?βPolicies
Section titled βPoliciesβ7. How do you review an IAM policy?
Section titled β7. How do you review an IAM policy?β8. When is Resource: "*" acceptable?
Section titled β8. When is Resource: "*" acceptable?β9. What is an explicit deny?
Section titled β9. What is an explicit deny?β10. Identity policy vs resource policy?
Section titled β10. Identity policy vs resource policy?β11. What is a role trust policy?
Section titled β11. What is a role trust policy?β12. Trust policy vs permission policy?
Section titled β12. Trust policy vs permission policy?β13. How would you review cross-account roles?
Section titled β13. How would you review cross-account roles?βAdvanced IAM
Section titled βAdvanced IAMβ14. What is a permission boundary?
Section titled β14. What is a permission boundary?β15. What is an SCP?
Section titled β15. What is an SCP?β16. Do SCPs grant permissions?
Section titled β16. Do SCPs grant permissions?β17. What is iam:PassRole?
Section titled β17. What is iam:PassRole?β18. Why can iam:PassRole create privilege-escalation risk?
Section titled β18. Why can iam:PassRole create privilege-escalation risk?β19. How would you identify unintended external access?
Section titled β19. How would you identify unintended external access?βTroubleshooting
Section titled βTroubleshootingβ20. How would you troubleshoot AccessDenied?
Section titled β20. How would you troubleshoot AccessDenied?βA structured answer should consider:
Principal βIdentity Policy βResource Policy βBoundary βSCP βSession Policy βConditions βExplicit Denyπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 1
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 1βA developer can launch EC2 instances and pass any IAM role in the account. What is the risk?
Discuss:
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role privilege
-
PassRole
-
workload credentials
-
potential escalation
π¨ Scenario Interview Question 2
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 2βA third-party vendor requires access to one S3 bucket in your AWS account. How would you design access?
Discuss:
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cross-account role or controlled resource access
-
least privilege
-
temporary credentials
-
trust conditions
-
monitoring
Do not recommend sharing AWS access keys.
π¨ Scenario Interview Question 3
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 3βAn IAM user has
AdministratorAccessbut has not logged in for six months. What would you do?
Discuss:
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validate ownership
-
determine business need
-
review access-key usage
-
disable/remove unnecessary access
-
avoid immediately deleting without validation
π¨ Scenario Interview Question 4
Section titled βπ¨ Scenario Interview Question 4βA user receives
AccessDeniedeven though an identity policy clearly allows the action. Why?
Possible areas to investigate:
-
SCP
-
permission boundary
-
resource policy
-
explicit deny
-
policy condition
-
KMS key policy
π§ Interview Answer Framework
Section titled βπ§ Interview Answer FrameworkβUse:
Identity βAuthentication βTrust βAuthorization βEffective Permission βBusiness Needπ¬ Interview Tip
Section titled βπ¬ Interview TipβAvoid:
βI would remove admin access.β
A stronger answer:
βI would first determine the userβs required job functions, review effective permissions and actual usage, identify which administrative actions are necessary, design a narrower role, validate the replacement access, and then remove the standing administrator permission.β
That demonstrates controlled remediation.
π Portfolio Deliverables
Section titled βπ Portfolio DeliverablesβCreate sanitized examples of:
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IAM inventory
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MFA review
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access-key review
-
role trust review
-
policy assessment
-
privilege-escalation diagram
-
findings
-
remediation plan
π Resume Examples
Section titled βπ Resume ExamplesβInstead of:
Experience with AWS IAM.
Use:
Performed a structured AWS IAM security review covering users, roles, policies, MFA, access keys, trust relationships, cross-account access, permission boundaries, and potential privilege-escalation paths.
Or:
Identified excessive IAM permissions and risky role-assumption paths in a lab environment, then implemented and validated least-privilege remediation.
β Runbook Readiness Check
Section titled ββ Runbook Readiness CheckβYou should be able to:
-
inventory IAM identities
-
review MFA
-
assess access keys
-
evaluate IAM policies
-
explain effective permissions
-
assess trust relationships
-
evaluate cross-account access
-
explain permission boundaries
-
explain SCPs
-
identify privilege-escalation paths
-
use Access Analyzer
-
troubleshoot authorization
-
create defensible IAM findings
The objective is not:
I reviewed every IAM policy.
The objective is:
I understand which identities can reach sensitive privileges, whether that access is justified, and how to reduce unnecessary exposure without breaking the business.
π Runbook Complete
Section titled βπ Runbook CompleteβYou now have a repeatable methodology for:
Identity Discovery βAuthentication Review βCredential Review βRole Trust Review βPermission Analysis βPrivilege Escalation Review βCross-Account Analysis βRisk Rating βRemediation βValidationThis methodology is directly relevant to:
-
IAM Engineers
-
Cloud Security Engineers
-
AWS Security Engineers
-
Security Consultants
-
Cloud Security Architects
π Whatβs Next?
Section titled βπ Whatβs Next?βIAM determines who can act within AWS.
The next runbook focuses on systematically reviewing where traffic can flow, which workloads are exposed, how segmentation is implemented, and whether AWS network controls follow least privilege.
β‘οΈ Next: AWS Network Security Review Runbook
In the next runbook, you will assess:
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VPC architecture
-
public and private subnets
-
route tables
-
Internet Gateways
-
NAT
-
Security Groups
-
Network ACLs
-
VPC endpoints
-
peering and Transit Gateway
-
public exposure
-
Flow Logs
-
hybrid connectivity
-
network findings
-
risk rating
-
remediation
-
network-security interview scenarios