Project 03 β Enterprise Network Security Project
Learning Path
βοΈ Phase 02 β AWS Cloud Security
π Enterprise Cloud Security Projects & Capstone Labs
π― Lesson Objective
Section titled βπ― Lesson ObjectiveβIn this project, you will work as CloudNova Technologiesβ Lead Cloud Security Engineer and design an enterprise AWS network-security architecture.
You will move beyond creating individual VPCs, subnets and security groups.
You will design a scalable multi-account network that supports:
- Multiple business units
- Development, testing and production environments
- Centralised network connectivity
- Centralised traffic inspection
- Controlled internet ingress
- Controlled internet egress
- Private access to AWS services
- Hybrid cloud connectivity
- Network segmentation
- DNS security
- Network telemetry
- Incident isolation
- Disaster recovery
- Zero Trust networking
- Enterprise governance
By the end of this lesson, you will be able to:
- Assess an existing enterprise AWS network.
- Design a multi-account network architecture.
- Define an enterprise IP-addressing strategy.
- Design VPCs and subnets across Availability Zones.
- Explain hub-and-spoke network architecture.
- Design AWS Transit Gateway connectivity.
- Design Transit Gateway route-table segmentation.
- Build centralised network inspection.
- Design AWS Network Firewall policies.
- Control internet ingress and egress.
- Design inspection VPCs and egress VPCs.
- Use gateway and interface VPC endpoints.
- Explain AWS PrivateLink.
- Design Route 53 Resolver inbound and outbound endpoints.
- Implement Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall.
- Design hybrid connectivity using Direct Connect and VPN.
- Apply security groups and network ACLs.
- Implement network logging and monitoring.
- Design network incident-response controls.
- Apply Zero Trust network principles.
- Produce professional enterprise network-security documentation.
π Lesson Information
Section titled βπ Lesson Informationβ| Area | Details |
|---|---|
| Project | CloudNova Enterprise Network Security |
| Project Type | Network Architecture, Security Engineering and Governance |
| Estimated Time | 16β20 Hours |
| Difficulty | Advanced |
| Delivery Mode | DIY or Instructor-Led |
| Primary Services | Amazon VPC, AWS Transit Gateway, AWS Network Firewall |
| Supporting Services | Route 53 Resolver, DNS Firewall, AWS PrivateLink, VPC Flow Logs, Direct Connect, Site-to-Site VPN |
| Security Services | GuardDuty, Security Hub, CloudWatch, CloudTrail, AWS Config |
| Main Deliverable | Enterprise Network Security Architecture |
| Environment | Dedicated training or sandbox AWS environment |
| Prerequisite | Lesson 02 β Enterprise Identity & Zero Trust Implementation Project |
π’ Business Scenario
Section titled βπ’ Business ScenarioβCloudNova Technologies has completed:
- Its enterprise AWS landing zone
- Its multi-account organisational structure
- Its IAM Identity Center architecture
- Its Role-Based Access Control model
- Its Attribute-Based Access Control model
- Its privileged-access process
- Its workload-identity standards
CloudNova now operates hundreds of AWS accounts across several business units.
Application teams have independently created VPCs in their AWS accounts.
The current network environment includes:
- Development VPCs
- Testing VPCs
- Production VPCs
- Data analytics VPCs
- Kubernetes VPCs
- Shared services VPCs
- Internet-facing applications
- Private internal applications
- Connections to corporate data centres
- Connections to third-party organisations
The internal security assessment has identified several problems:
- VPC CIDR ranges overlap.
- Development networks can communicate with production networks.
- Internet egress is not centrally controlled.
- Several workloads use public IP addresses unnecessarily.
- NAT gateways have been created independently in many accounts.
- Network inspection differs between application teams.
- Security groups allow unrestricted inbound access.
- Network ACLs are poorly documented.
- VPC Flow Logs are not enabled consistently.
- DNS queries are not centrally monitored.
- Applications can resolve known malicious domains.
- Direct Connect and VPN routes are not centrally governed.
- Network changes are performed without security review.
- Incident responders cannot isolate compromised VPCs quickly.
- Network diagrams are incomplete or outdated.
- No formal network-security ownership model exists.
CloudNova plans to support:
- More than 500 AWS accounts
- Thousands of VPCs
- Multiple AWS Regions
- Global customer-facing applications
- Hybrid connectivity
- Regulated workloads
- 24Γ7 security operations
- Disaster-recovery environments
The Chief Information Security Officer asks:
βHow can we connect hundreds of AWS accounts securely while preventing unrestricted communication, inspecting sensitive traffic and maintaining complete visibility?β
You have been assigned to lead the CloudNova Enterprise Network Security Project.
π§βπΌ Your Role
Section titled βπ§βπΌ Your RoleβYou are working as the:
Lead Cloud Security Engineer
Your responsibilities include:
- Assessing the current AWS network.
- Defining network-security requirements.
- Designing the enterprise IP-addressing strategy.
- Designing the VPC architecture.
- Establishing network segmentation.
- Designing Transit Gateway connectivity.
- Designing centralised inspection.
- Controlling internet ingress and egress.
- Securing DNS.
- Designing private service access.
- Designing hybrid connectivity.
- Defining network logging standards.
- Developing incident-isolation procedures.
- Establishing network governance.
- Presenting the architecture to technical and executive stakeholders.
1. Enterprise Network Security Strategy
Section titled β1. Enterprise Network Security StrategyβEnterprise network security must answer:
- Which systems are allowed to communicate?
- Which protocols and ports are required?
- Which traffic must be inspected?
- Which workloads require internet access?
- Which applications must remain private?
- Which networks can connect to production?
- How will on-premises networks connect to AWS?
- How will DNS requests be controlled?
- How will network activity be logged?
- How will compromised workloads be isolated?
- Who approves network changes?
- How will network rules be reviewed?
CloudNovaβs network-security strategy will be based on:
- Explicit connectivity
- Default isolation
- Least-privilege traffic flows
- Centralised routing governance
- Centralised inspection
- Private service access
- Restricted internet exposure
- Controlled DNS resolution
- Complete network telemetry
- Multi-account separation
- Multi-Region resilience
- Automated validation
- Continuous monitoring
2. Zero Trust Networking
Section titled β2. Zero Trust NetworkingβZero Trust networking assumes that network location alone does not establish trust.
A workload must not be trusted simply because it is:
- Inside an AWS VPC
- Inside a private subnet
- Connected through a corporate network
- Hosted in a production account
- Connected through Direct Connect
- Located behind a firewall
Every connection should be evaluated based on:
- Source identity
- Destination identity
- Application
- Protocol
- Port
- Environment
- Data classification
- Business requirement
- Device or workload posture
- Current risk
- Approved policy
Zero Trust Network Principles
Section titled βZero Trust Network PrinciplesβDefault Isolation
Section titled βDefault IsolationβNetworks and workloads should begin without unnecessary connectivity.
Explicit Traffic Authorisation
Section titled βExplicit Traffic AuthorisationβEvery permitted flow must have a documented business requirement.
Application-Level Trust
Section titled βApplication-Level TrustβUse workload identity, application authentication and encryption rather than relying only on IP addresses.
Minimise Public Exposure
Section titled βMinimise Public ExposureβPrivate applications should not receive public IP addresses.
Inspect High-Risk Traffic
Section titled βInspect High-Risk TrafficβTraffic crossing trust boundaries should be inspected where technically and operationally appropriate.
Log Important Network Activity
Section titled βLog Important Network ActivityβNetwork flows, DNS activity, firewall events and configuration changes must be recorded.
Assume Compromise
Section titled βAssume CompromiseβThe architecture must support rapid containment of compromised workloads and accounts.
3. Current-State Network Assessment
Section titled β3. Current-State Network AssessmentβBefore designing the target architecture, CloudNova must understand its existing environment.
The assessment should identify:
- AWS accounts
- AWS Regions
- VPCs
- CIDR ranges
- Subnets
- Route tables
- Internet gateways
- NAT gateways
- Transit gateways
- VPC peering connections
- VPN connections
- Direct Connect connections
- VPC endpoints
- Security groups
- Network ACLs
- Route 53 Resolver endpoints
- Private hosted zones
- Public IP addresses
- Network inspection systems
- Flow-log status
- Traffic dependencies
- Application owners
- Network owners
Current-State Assessment Questions
Section titled βCurrent-State Assessment Questionsβ- Are any CIDR ranges overlapping?
- Which VPCs communicate with each other?
- Which workloads require internet ingress?
- Which workloads require internet egress?
- Which systems communicate with on-premises networks?
- Are network paths documented?
- Is traffic inspection implemented?
- Are VPC Flow Logs enabled?
- Are DNS logs enabled?
- Are security groups reviewed?
- Are unused network connections present?
- Are any production resources directly reachable from development?
4. Enterprise Network Architecture
Section titled β4. Enterprise Network Architectureβ Internet
|
AWS Shield and WAF
|
Central Ingress Services
|
Ingress Inspection VPC
|
AWS Transit Gateway
+-----------------+------------------+ | | | v v v Production VPCs Non-Production VPCs Shared Services | | | +-----------------+------------------+ | v Inspection VPC | AWS Network Firewall | v Egress VPC | NAT Gateway | Internet
Corporate Data Centres | vAWS Direct Connect / Site-to-Site VPN | vAWS Transit Gateway5. Multi-Account Network Model
Section titled β5. Multi-Account Network ModelβCloudNova will separate networking responsibilities across AWS accounts.
Proposed Network Accounts
Section titled βProposed Network Accountsβ| Account | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Network Management | Transit Gateway, routing governance and shared connectivity |
| Network Inspection | AWS Network Firewall and traffic inspection |
| Network Egress | Centralised outbound internet access |
| Network Ingress | Shared inbound application entry points |
| DNS Services | Route 53 Resolver endpoints and DNS Firewall |
| Shared Services | Enterprise shared applications and directory services |
| Security Tooling | Network monitoring, analytics and incident response |
Depending on operational requirements, some functions may be combined.
Highly regulated environments may require stronger separation of duties between:
- Routing administration
- Firewall administration
- DNS administration
- Security monitoring
- Workload administration
6. Enterprise IP-Addressing Strategy
Section titled β6. Enterprise IP-Addressing StrategyβAn enterprise IP-addressing plan is required before creating VPCs.
Poor IP planning can cause:
- Overlapping CIDR ranges
- Routing conflicts
- Failed acquisitions
- Hybrid connectivity problems
- Transit Gateway limitations
- Difficult network troubleshooting
- Application migration delays
CloudNova will maintain a central IP Address Management process.
Example Address Allocation
Section titled βExample Address AllocationβCloudNova Enterprise Private Address Space
10.0.0.0/8
βββ 10.0.0.0/10 Europeβββ 10.64.0.0/10 Asia-Pacificβββ 10.128.0.0/10 North Americaβββ 10.192.0.0/10 Shared, Security and Future UseExample Regional Allocation
Section titled βExample Regional AllocationβEurope
10.0.0.0/10
βββ 10.0.0.0/12 eu-west-2βββ 10.16.0.0/12 eu-west-1βββ 10.32.0.0/12 eu-central-1βββ 10.48.0.0/12 ReservedExample Environment Allocation
Section titled βExample Environment Allocationβeu-west-2
10.0.0.0/12
βββ 10.0.0.0/14 Productionβββ 10.4.0.0/14 Non-Productionβββ 10.8.0.0/15 Shared Servicesβββ 10.10.0.0/16 Network Securityβββ 10.11.0.0/16 Data Platformsβββ 10.12.0.0/14 Reserved7. AWS VPC IP Address Manager
Section titled β7. AWS VPC IP Address ManagerβAWS VPC IP Address Manager can help CloudNova:
- Plan IP-address allocations.
- Monitor IP-address usage.
- Allocate CIDR ranges.
- Detect overlapping ranges.
- Track regional allocations.
- Govern multi-account addressing.
- Identify unused address space.
- Support IPv4 and IPv6 planning.
IPAM Governance Requirements
Section titled βIPAM Governance Requirementsβ- Central ownership
- Delegated administration
- Approved address pools
- Region-based allocation
- Environment-based allocation
- Automated allocation where possible
- Regular utilisation reviews
- Documented exceptions
- Integration with account provisioning
8. VPC Design Principles
Section titled β8. VPC Design PrinciplesβEach VPC should have:
- A documented owner
- A documented business purpose
- A non-overlapping CIDR
- Multiple Availability Zones where required
- Public, private and isolated subnet categories
- Explicit route tables
- Security-group standards
- Network ACL standards
- VPC Flow Logs
- DNS settings
- Endpoint strategy
- Connectivity requirements
- Data-classification information
- Incident-isolation procedures
9. Enterprise Subnet Design
Section titled β9. Enterprise Subnet DesignβCloudNova will design subnets according to function.
Public Subnets
Section titled βPublic SubnetsβPublic subnets may contain:
- Internet-facing load balancers
- NAT gateways
- Approved network appliances
- Bastion alternatives where formally required
Application servers and databases should not be placed in public subnets merely for convenience.
Private Application Subnets
Section titled βPrivate Application SubnetsβPrivate application subnets may contain:
- EC2 application servers
- ECS workloads
- EKS worker nodes
- Internal load balancers
- Lambda VPC integrations
- Application services
Isolated Data Subnets
Section titled βIsolated Data SubnetsβIsolated subnets may contain:
- Relational databases
- Data warehouses
- Sensitive storage services
- Internal data-processing systems
- Security appliances
Isolated subnets should not have direct routes to an internet gateway.
10. Multi-Availability Zone VPC Architecture
Section titled β10. Multi-Availability Zone VPC ArchitectureβVPC: 10.20.0.0/16
Availability Zone A
βββ Public Subnetβββ Private Application Subnetβββ Isolated Data Subnetβββ Transit Gateway Subnet
Availability Zone B
βββ Public Subnetβββ Private Application Subnetβββ Isolated Data Subnetβββ Transit Gateway Subnet
Availability Zone C
βββ Public Subnetβββ Private Application Subnetβββ Isolated Data Subnetβββ Transit Gateway Subnet11. Hub-and-Spoke Architecture
Section titled β11. Hub-and-Spoke ArchitectureβCloudNova will use a hub-and-spoke model for enterprise connectivity.
Transit Gateway | +----------------------+----------------------+ | | | v v v Production Spokes Non-Production Spokes Shared Services | | | v v v Application VPCs Development VPCs Platform VPCsBenefits include:
- Central routing
- Scalable VPC connectivity
- Simplified governance
- Network segmentation
- Centralised inspection
- Shared hybrid connectivity
- Reduced peering complexity
12. AWS Transit Gateway
Section titled β12. AWS Transit GatewayβAWS Transit Gateway acts as a central routing hub connecting:
- VPCs
- AWS accounts
- AWS Regions
- Site-to-Site VPN connections
- Direct Connect gateways
- Network appliances
Transit Gateway does not automatically create unrestricted trust.
Connectivity depends on:
- Attachments
- Route-table associations
- Route propagation
- VPC route tables
- Security groups
- Network ACLs
- Firewall policies
- Application controls
13. Transit Gateway Attachments
Section titled β13. Transit Gateway AttachmentsβCommon attachment types include:
- VPC attachments
- VPN attachments
- Transit Gateway peering attachments
- Direct Connect gateway associations
- Connect attachments
Every attachment should have:
- An owner
- A business purpose
- An environment classification
- An approved route-table association
- Approved propagation
- Monitoring
- Lifecycle documentation
14. Transit Gateway Route Tables
Section titled β14. Transit Gateway Route TablesβTransit Gateway route tables create network segmentation.
CloudNova will not use a single unrestricted route table for every network.
Proposed Route Tables
Section titled βProposed Route Tablesβ| Route Table | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Production | Routes approved production traffic |
| Non-Production | Routes development and testing traffic |
| Shared Services | Routes approved shared-service traffic |
| Inspection | Routes traffic through security inspection |
| Hybrid | Routes approved on-premises connectivity |
| Quarantine | Isolates compromised or suspended networks |
15. Transit Gateway Segmentation
Section titled β15. Transit Gateway SegmentationβDevelopment VPCs | vNon-Production TGW Route Table | +----> Shared Development Services | +----> Inspection VPC | X----> Production VPCs
Production VPCs | vProduction TGW Route Table | +----> Approved Shared Services | +----> Inspection VPC | X----> Development VPCsThe X represents a deliberately prohibited network path.
16. Transit Gateway Routing Workflow
Section titled β16. Transit Gateway Routing WorkflowβSource Workload
β
Source Subnet Route Table
β
Transit Gateway Attachment
β
Transit Gateway Route Table
β
Inspection Attachment Where Required
β
Destination Transit Gateway Attachment
β
Destination VPC Route Table
β
Security Group and Network ACL Evaluation
β
Destination Workload17. Appliance Mode
Section titled β17. Appliance ModeβWhen stateful network appliances inspect traffic through Transit Gateway, routing symmetry is important.
Appliance mode can help maintain consistent traffic through the same Availability Zone path for supported inspection architectures.
CloudNova must validate:
- Symmetric routing
- Return paths
- Availability Zone design
- Transit Gateway attachment settings
- Firewall endpoint routing
- Failover behaviour
18. Centralised Inspection Architecture
Section titled β18. Centralised Inspection ArchitectureβCloudNova will use a dedicated inspection VPC.
Spoke VPC
|
Transit Gateway
|
Inspection VPC Attachment
|
AWS Network Firewall Endpoints
|
Transit Gateway
|
Destination VPC or Egress VPCThe inspection VPC separates:
- Security enforcement
- Firewall administration
- Workload administration
- Routing management
- Security logging
19. AWS Network Firewall
Section titled β19. AWS Network FirewallβAWS Network Firewall provides managed network-traffic inspection for VPC environments.
CloudNova may use it to inspect:
- VPC-to-VPC traffic
- Outbound internet traffic
- Inbound internet traffic
- Hybrid traffic
- Traffic crossing security zones
Core Components
Section titled βCore Componentsβ| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Firewall | Associates the policy with protected VPC subnets |
| Firewall Policy | Defines stateless and stateful rule groups |
| Stateless Rule Group | Evaluates packet-level attributes |
| Stateful Rule Group | Maintains connection state and inspects sessions |
| Firewall Endpoint | Processes traffic within an Availability Zone |
| Logging Configuration | Sends alert and flow information to approved destinations |
20. Stateless and Stateful Inspection
Section titled β20. Stateless and Stateful InspectionβStateless Rules
Section titled βStateless RulesβStateless rules evaluate individual packets.
They may evaluate:
- Source address
- Destination address
- Source port
- Destination port
- Protocol
- TCP flags
Stateful Rules
Section titled βStateful RulesβStateful rules track network sessions and can support:
- Domain-based controls
- Protocol inspection
- Connection-state analysis
- Threat signatures
- Suricata-compatible rules
- Stateful allow or deny decisions
21. Firewall Policy Strategy
Section titled β21. Firewall Policy StrategyβCloudNova will use layered firewall policies.
Baseline Rules
Section titled βBaseline RulesβApplied to all inspected environments:
- Block known malicious traffic.
- Block prohibited protocols.
- Restrict administrative ports.
- Log rejected connections.
- Protect approved DNS paths.
- Detect suspicious outbound connections.
Environment Rules
Section titled βEnvironment RulesβDevelopment
Section titled βDevelopmentβ- Controlled broader testing access
- Approved software repositories
- Restricted production connectivity
- Enhanced logging
Production
Section titled βProductionβ- Strict destination allow lists
- Restricted administrative access
- Approved service dependencies only
- Mandatory encryption
- High-severity alerting
Regulated Workloads
Section titled βRegulated Workloadsβ- Explicit source and destination rules
- Strict data-flow controls
- Full logging
- Formal change approval
- More frequent rule review
22. Example Stateful Rules
Section titled β22. Example Stateful Rulesβpass tls 10.20.0.0/16 any -> any 443 ( tls.sni; dotprefix; content:".amazonaws.com"; endswith; sid:100001;)
drop tcp any any -> any 23 ( msg:"Block outbound Telnet"; sid:100002;)
alert tcp any any -> any 445 ( msg:"Monitor outbound SMB traffic"; sid:100003;)Example rules must be tested in an authorised non-production environment before deployment.
23. Firewall Rule Lifecycle
Section titled β23. Firewall Rule LifecycleβRule Requirement
β
Business Justification
β
Security Review
β
Rule Development
β
Policy Validation
β
Non-Production Testing
β
Change Approval
β
Production Deployment
β
Traffic Monitoring
β
Periodic Review
β
Retirement24. Centralised Internet Egress
Section titled β24. Centralised Internet EgressβCloudNova will centralise outbound internet access where appropriate.
Private Application VPC
|
Transit Gateway
|
Inspection VPC
|
AWS Network Firewall
|
Egress VPC
|
NAT Gateway
|
Internet Gateway
|
InternetBenefits include:
- Centralised policy enforcement
- Reduced public exposure
- Consistent logging
- Central allow and deny controls
- Simplified incident response
- Centralised threat detection
25. Distributed and Centralised Egress
Section titled β25. Distributed and Centralised EgressβCloudNova must evaluate both models.
Centralised Egress
Section titled βCentralised EgressβAdvantages:
- Central inspection
- Central policy management
- Consistent logging
- Easier governance
Considerations:
- Routing complexity
- Data-processing charges
- Transit Gateway costs
- Availability design
- Regional dependencies
- Potential shared-service impact
Distributed Egress
Section titled βDistributed EgressβAdvantages:
- Simpler local routing
- Reduced dependency on a central egress VPC
- Localised failure domains
Considerations:
- More NAT gateways
- Distributed policy management
- Inconsistent controls
- Increased operational overhead
CloudNova may use a hybrid model based on:
- Environment
- Data classification
- Region
- Application criticality
- Performance
- Cost
- Regulatory requirements
26. Controlled Internet Ingress
Section titled β26. Controlled Internet IngressβInternet-facing applications should use approved ingress services.
Internet
|
Amazon CloudFront
|
AWS WAF
|
Application Load Balancer
|
Private Application TargetsDepending on the application, CloudNova may also use:
- AWS Shield
- Global Accelerator
- API Gateway
- Network Load Balancer
- AWS Network Firewall
- Third-party inspection appliances
27. Ingress Security Requirements
Section titled β27. Ingress Security RequirementsβInternet-facing applications must have:
- An approved business requirement
- Documented ownership
- TLS encryption
- Valid certificates
- WAF protections where applicable
- DDoS protections
- Restricted security groups
- Application logging
- Load-balancer logging
- Vulnerability management
- Threat monitoring
- Incident-response procedures
28. Private Service Access
Section titled β28. Private Service AccessβWorkloads should access AWS services privately where practical.
CloudNova will use VPC endpoints to reduce unnecessary internet paths.
Gateway Endpoints
Section titled βGateway EndpointsβGateway endpoints support private routing to selected AWS services.
Common examples include:
- Amazon S3
- Amazon DynamoDB
Interface Endpoints
Section titled βInterface EndpointsβInterface endpoints use elastic network interfaces with private IP addresses.
They can provide private access to many AWS services and endpoint services.
29. AWS PrivateLink
Section titled β29. AWS PrivateLinkβAWS PrivateLink enables private connectivity between VPCs and services without requiring:
- Public IP addresses
- Internet gateways
- NAT gateways
- Public internet routing
- Direct VPC peering for the service connection
PrivateLink Architecture
Section titled βPrivateLink ArchitectureβConsumer VPC
|
Interface VPC Endpoint
|
AWS PrivateLink
|
Endpoint Service
|
Provider Network Load Balancer
|
Private Application Service30. VPC Endpoint Policies
Section titled β30. VPC Endpoint PoliciesβEndpoint policies can restrict which principals and resources may use a VPC endpoint.
Example objectives:
- Allow access only to approved S3 buckets.
- Restrict access to organisation-owned resources.
- Prevent access to personal AWS accounts.
- Restrict actions to read-only operations.
- Require approved IAM principals.
Example S3 Endpoint Policy
Section titled βExample S3 Endpoint Policyβ{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "AllowApprovedCloudNovaBuckets", "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": "*", "Action": [ "s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject" ], "Resource": [ "arn:aws:s3:::cloudnova-approved-data/*" ] } ]}31. DNS Architecture
Section titled β31. DNS ArchitectureβDNS is a critical enterprise security dependency.
CloudNovaβs DNS architecture must support:
- AWS resource resolution
- Private hosted zones
- On-premises domain resolution
- AWS-to-on-premises queries
- On-premises-to-AWS queries
- DNS query logging
- Malicious-domain blocking
- Centralised DNS governance
- Resilience
- Incident investigation
32. Route 53 Resolver
Section titled β32. Route 53 ResolverβRoute 53 Resolver supports DNS resolution for AWS resources.
CloudNova may use:
- Inbound Resolver endpoints
- Outbound Resolver endpoints
- Resolver rules
- Rule sharing
- Query logging
- DNS Firewall
33. Inbound Resolver Endpoints
Section titled β33. Inbound Resolver EndpointsβInbound endpoints allow on-premises DNS systems to resolve selected AWS private domains.
On-Premises Workload
|
Corporate DNS Server
|
Direct Connect or VPN
|
Route 53 Resolver Inbound Endpoint
|
Private Hosted Zone
|
AWS Private Resource34. Outbound Resolver Endpoints
Section titled β34. Outbound Resolver EndpointsβOutbound endpoints allow AWS resources to resolve selected on-premises domains.
AWS Workload
|
Route 53 Resolver
|
Outbound Resolver Endpoint
|
Direct Connect or VPN
|
Corporate DNS Server
|
On-Premises Resource35. Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall
Section titled β35. Route 53 Resolver DNS FirewallβDNS Firewall can filter outbound DNS queries made through Route 53 Resolver.
CloudNova may use DNS Firewall to:
- Block known malicious domains.
- Block command-and-control domains.
- Restrict prohibited categories.
- Allow approved enterprise domains.
- Monitor suspicious DNS activity.
- Protect against certain DNS-based threats.
- Support incident containment.
36. DNS Firewall Rule Strategy
Section titled β36. DNS Firewall Rule StrategyβPriority 100 β Enterprise Allow List
Section titled βPriority 100 β Enterprise Allow ListβAllow required corporate and critical service domains.
Priority 200 β Threat Intelligence Block List
Section titled βPriority 200 β Threat Intelligence Block ListβBlock known malicious or compromised domains.
Priority 300 β Restricted Categories
Section titled βPriority 300 β Restricted CategoriesβBlock prohibited domains based on enterprise policy.
Priority 400 β Monitoring Rules
Section titled βPriority 400 β Monitoring RulesβAlert on suspicious domains requiring investigation.
Priority 500 β Default Behaviour
Section titled βPriority 500 β Default BehaviourβApply the approved default action.
37. DNS Query Logging
Section titled β37. DNS Query LoggingβCloudNova should collect DNS query logs for:
- Threat hunting
- Malware investigations
- Command-and-control detection
- Data-exfiltration investigations
- Policy validation
- Application troubleshooting
- Incident response
DNS logs may be sent to approved destinations such as:
- CloudWatch Logs
- Amazon S3
- Kinesis Data Firehose
- Security Lake
- Enterprise SIEM
38. Security Groups
Section titled β38. Security GroupsβSecurity groups are stateful virtual firewalls associated with supported resources.
CloudNova standards require:
- Least-privilege inbound rules
- Least-privilege outbound rules
- Approved source references
- Security-group referencing where practical
- No unrestricted administrative access
- Documented ownership
- Regular review
- Removal of unused rules
- Automated compliance checks
Poor Rule
Section titled βPoor RuleβProtocol: TCPPort: 22Source: 0.0.0.0/0Improved Rule
Section titled βImproved RuleβProtocol: TCPPort: 22Source: Approved management security groupPurpose: Time-bound administrative accessPrefer managed access solutions that avoid direct SSH or RDP exposure where possible.
39. Security Group Referencing
Section titled β39. Security Group ReferencingβSecurity-group references can express application relationships.
Internet-Facing Load Balancer Security Group
|
Allows HTTPS to
|
Application Security Group
|
Allows Database Port to
|
Database Security GroupThis is more maintainable than relying entirely on changing IP addresses.
40. Network ACLs
Section titled β40. Network ACLsβNetwork ACLs provide stateless controls at the subnet boundary.
CloudNova may use network ACLs for:
- Broad subnet-level restrictions
- Known malicious CIDR blocking
- Additional boundary controls
- Incident containment
- Compliance requirements
Network ACLs must be designed carefully because:
- Rules are evaluated numerically.
- Allow and deny rules are supported.
- Return traffic must be permitted explicitly.
- Ephemeral ports must be considered.
- Incorrect rules can interrupt many resources.
41. Security Groups and Network ACLs
Section titled β41. Security Groups and Network ACLsβ| Control | Security Group | Network ACL |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Resource or network interface | Subnet |
| State | Stateful | Stateless |
| Rules | Allow only | Allow and deny |
| Evaluation | Combined allowed rules | Ordered rule numbers |
| Typical Use | Workload-level access | Subnet boundary control |
CloudNova will primarily use security groups for workload-level controls and use network ACLs where a documented subnet-level requirement exists.
42. Hybrid Connectivity
Section titled β42. Hybrid ConnectivityβCloudNova connects AWS to corporate data centres and offices.
Possible connectivity options include:
- AWS Direct Connect
- AWS Site-to-Site VPN
- AWS Client VPN
- Transit Gateway
- Direct Connect Gateway
- Third-party SD-WAN
- Partner connectivity
43. AWS Direct Connect
Section titled β43. AWS Direct ConnectβDirect Connect provides dedicated network connectivity between customer environments and AWS.
CloudNova must still implement:
- Authentication
- Encryption where required
- Route filtering
- Traffic inspection
- Network segmentation
- Redundant connectivity
- Monitoring
- Incident response
A dedicated connection does not automatically create trusted traffic.
44. Site-to-Site VPN
Section titled β44. Site-to-Site VPNβSite-to-Site VPN provides encrypted connectivity using IPsec tunnels.
CloudNova may use it for:
- Primary connectivity for smaller locations
- Backup connectivity for Direct Connect
- Rapid connectivity deployment
- Disaster-recovery access
- Partner connections
45. Hybrid Connectivity Architecture
Section titled β45. Hybrid Connectivity ArchitectureβCorporate Data Centre A | Direct Connect | vDirect Connect Gateway | vAWS Transit Gateway | +----> Inspection VPC | +----> Production VPCs | +----> Shared Services
Corporate Data Centre B | Site-to-Site VPN | vAWS Transit Gateway46. Hybrid Route Governance
Section titled β46. Hybrid Route GovernanceβCloudNova must control:
- Advertised on-premises routes
- AWS routes advertised on-premises
- Production network reachability
- Non-production network reachability
- Default routes
- Backup routes
- Route preference
- Overlapping networks
- Partner routes
- Route ownership
47. Inter-Region Connectivity
Section titled β47. Inter-Region ConnectivityβCloudNova may use Transit Gateway peering for approved inter-Region connectivity.
Inter-Region design must consider:
- Data residency
- Latency
- Bandwidth
- Cost
- Failure isolation
- Route management
- Encryption
- Compliance
- Disaster recovery
- Operational ownership
Not every VPC requires global connectivity.
48. Network Logging Architecture
Section titled β48. Network Logging ArchitectureβVPC Flow Logs |Network Firewall Logs |Route 53 Resolver Query Logs |Load Balancer Logs |CloudTrail Network Configuration Events | vCentral Log Archive | vAmazon Security Lake | vSIEM and SOC | vThreat Detection and Investigation49. VPC Flow Logs
Section titled β49. VPC Flow LogsβVPC Flow Logs record metadata about IP traffic associated with supported network interfaces and network boundaries.
They can support:
- Traffic analysis
- Security investigations
- Rejected-traffic analysis
- Troubleshooting
- Threat hunting
- Compliance
- Network baselining
VPC Flow Logs are not full packet captures.
50. Network Firewall Logging
Section titled β50. Network Firewall LoggingβCloudNova will configure:
- Alert logs
- Flow logs
- Central destinations
- Retention policies
- Access controls
- SIEM integration
- High-severity alerting
Firewall logging should support:
- Rule tuning
- Threat detection
- Incident investigation
- Policy validation
- Application troubleshooting
51. Traffic Mirroring
Section titled β51. Traffic MirroringβVPC Traffic Mirroring can copy supported network traffic to monitoring or security appliances.
Possible use cases include:
- Deep packet inspection
- Network forensics
- Intrusion detection
- Application troubleshooting
- Threat hunting
Traffic Mirroring must be carefully governed due to:
- Sensitive data exposure
- Storage requirements
- Processing costs
- Privacy implications
- Performance considerations
- Access-control requirements
52. Network Threat Model
Section titled β52. Network Threat Modelβ| Threat | Potential Impact | Primary Control |
|---|---|---|
| Unrestricted east-west traffic | Lateral movement | Transit Gateway segmentation |
| Publicly exposed administration | Account or workload compromise | Restricted security groups |
| Malicious outbound traffic | Command-and-control communication | Network Firewall and DNS Firewall |
| DNS tunnelling | Data exfiltration | DNS logging and advanced detection |
| Route manipulation | Traffic interception or outage | Restricted route administration |
| Overlapping CIDRs | Failed or incorrect routing | Central IPAM |
| Uninspected hybrid traffic | Threat movement from on-premises | Central inspection |
| Security-group drift | Unauthorised access | AWS Config and continuous review |
| Flow-log deletion | Loss of evidence | Central logging protection |
| Public S3 access paths | Data exposure | VPC endpoints and bucket policies |
| Compromised VPC | Enterprise lateral movement | Quarantine route table |
| Firewall bypass | Uninspected communication | Routing validation and monitoring |
| Misconfigured NACL | Application outage | Change control and testing |
| Unrestricted internet egress | Malware downloads and exfiltration | Centralised egress controls |
| Unapproved VPC peering | Governance bypass | SCPs and configuration monitoring |
53. Network Incident Isolation
Section titled β53. Network Incident IsolationβCloudNova must be able to isolate compromised workloads quickly.
Possible containment actions include:
- Replace the resource security group.
- Remove public IP addresses.
- Update subnet routes.
- Move a Transit Gateway attachment to a quarantine route table.
- Apply restrictive network ACLs.
- Block malicious domains.
- Add firewall deny rules.
- Disable compromised load-balancer listeners.
- Isolate a Kubernetes workload.
- Preserve flow and firewall logs.
54. Quarantine Architecture
Section titled β54. Quarantine ArchitectureβCompromised VPC
|
Transit Gateway Attachment
|
Quarantine Route Table
|
No Production Connectivity
|
Limited Access to:
- Incident Response Services- Forensic Storage- Security Tooling- Approved Patch Repositories55. Network Change Management
Section titled β55. Network Change ManagementβAll significant network changes require:
- Business justification
- Source and destination
- Protocol and port
- Environment
- Data classification
- Risk assessment
- Security review
- Test evidence
- Implementation plan
- Rollback plan
- Change window
- Post-change validation
- Rule expiry where temporary
56. Firewall Rule Review
Section titled β56. Firewall Rule ReviewβEvery firewall rule should have:
| Field | Example |
|---|---|
| Rule ID | NET-FW-00231 |
| Source | Payments production subnet |
| Destination | Fraud API endpoint |
| Protocol | TCP |
| Port | 443 |
| Business Purpose | Payment fraud validation |
| Owner | Payments Platform |
| Approver | Cloud Security |
| Expiry | Permanent with annual review |
| Logging | Enabled |
| Last Reviewed | 2026-07-01 |
57. Network Governance Model
Section titled β57. Network Governance Modelβ| Team | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Cloud Network Engineering | Routing, Transit Gateway and hybrid connectivity |
| Cloud Security Engineering | Firewall and network-security architecture |
| DNS Services Team | Resolver endpoints, zones and DNS controls |
| Application Teams | Application-level connectivity requirements |
| SOC | Monitoring and incident response |
| Cloud Platform Team | VPC automation and account integration |
| Internal Audit | Independent control validation |
| Change Advisory Board | High-risk production changes |
58. Network Security Metrics
Section titled β58. Network Security MetricsβCloudNova will monitor:
- Number of public resources
- Unrestricted security-group rules
- Unused security groups
- VPC Flow Log coverage
- DNS logging coverage
- Firewall policy coverage
- Rejected connection trends
- Malicious-domain blocks
- Unapproved routes
- Unapproved VPC peering
- Quarantine events
- Mean time to isolate
- Firewall-rule review completion
- Network-control exceptions
- Internet-egress volume
- Cross-environment traffic
59. Enterprise Network Implementation Phases
Section titled β59. Enterprise Network Implementation PhasesβPhase 1 β Discovery
Section titled βPhase 1 β Discoveryβ- Inventory VPCs.
- Inventory CIDRs.
- Identify network owners.
- Map traffic flows.
- Review hybrid connections.
- Identify public workloads.
- Review network logs.
- Identify high-risk rules.
- Identify overlapping CIDRs.
Phase 2 β Design
Section titled βPhase 2 β Designβ- Define IP-addressing strategy.
- Define VPC standards.
- Design Transit Gateway.
- Design route-table segmentation.
- Design inspection VPC.
- Design egress.
- Design ingress.
- Design DNS.
- Design hybrid connectivity.
- Define logging standards.
Phase 3 β Build
Section titled βPhase 3 β Buildβ- Deploy IPAM.
- Deploy Transit Gateway.
- Deploy route tables.
- Deploy inspection VPC.
- Deploy Network Firewall.
- Deploy egress VPC.
- Deploy Resolver endpoints.
- Deploy DNS Firewall.
- Configure VPC endpoints.
- Configure central logging.
Phase 4 β Validate
Section titled βPhase 4 β Validateβ- Test approved traffic flows.
- Test prohibited traffic flows.
- Validate inspection paths.
- Validate route symmetry.
- Validate DNS filtering.
- Validate endpoint access.
- Validate hybrid routing.
- Validate flow logs.
- Test incident isolation.
Phase 5 β Migrate
Section titled βPhase 5 β Migrateβ- Attach VPCs in controlled waves.
- Update route tables.
- Remove legacy peering.
- Migrate internet egress.
- Migrate DNS forwarding.
- Validate applications.
- Monitor for denied traffic.
- Roll back where required.
Phase 6 β Operate
Section titled βPhase 6 β Operateβ- Monitor network drift.
- Review firewall rules.
- Review routes.
- Review public exposure.
- Review DNS activity.
- Review connectivity exceptions.
- Test quarantine procedures.
- Report security metrics.
π Hands-on Project Labs
Section titled βπ Hands-on Project LabsβLab 01 β Conduct the Enterprise Network Assessment
Section titled βLab 01 β Conduct the Enterprise Network AssessmentβMission
Section titled βMissionβAssess CloudNovaβs current AWS network environment.
Student Actions
Section titled βStudent ActionsβCreate:
03-Enterprise-Network-Security/βββ 01-Assessment/ βββ Current-State-Network-Assessment.mdDocument:
- AWS accounts
- Regions
- VPCs
- CIDR ranges
- Subnets
- Route tables
- Internet gateways
- NAT gateways
- VPC peerings
- Transit gateways
- VPNs
- Direct Connect
- Security groups
- Network ACLs
- VPC endpoints
- Resolver endpoints
- Flow-log status
- Network owners
Evidence
Section titled βEvidenceβ- Network inventory
- Current-state architecture
- Overlapping CIDR report
- Public exposure report
- High-risk findings
- Remediation priorities
Lab 02 β Design the Enterprise IP-Addressing Plan
Section titled βLab 02 β Design the Enterprise IP-Addressing PlanβMission
Section titled βMissionβCreate a scalable IP-addressing strategy for CloudNova.
Requirements
Section titled βRequirementsβDesign allocations for:
- Three AWS Regions
- Production
- Development
- Testing
- Shared services
- Security
- Data platforms
- Kubernetes
- Disaster recovery
- Future acquisitions
Student Actions
Section titled βStudent ActionsβCreate:
03-Enterprise-Network-Security/βββ 02-IP-Addressing/ βββ IP-Addressing-Strategy.md βββ CIDR-Allocation-Register.mdEvidence
Section titled βEvidenceβ- CIDR hierarchy
- Allocation table
- Reserved address space
- Overlap-validation results
- IPAM architecture
Lab 03 β Design the Multi-VPC Architecture
Section titled βLab 03 β Design the Multi-VPC ArchitectureβMission
Section titled βMissionβDesign CloudNovaβs VPC and subnet standards.
Student Actions
Section titled βStudent ActionsβDefine:
- VPC size
- Availability Zone strategy
- Public subnets
- Private application subnets
- Isolated data subnets
- Transit Gateway subnets
- Firewall subnets
- Endpoint subnets
- Route-table standards
- Naming standards
- Tagging standards
Required Diagram
Section titled βRequired DiagramβApplication VPC
βββ Availability Zone Aβ βββ Public Subnetβ βββ Private Application Subnetβ βββ Isolated Data Subnetβ βββ Transit Gateway Subnetββββ Availability Zone Bβ βββ Public Subnetβ βββ Private Application Subnetβ βββ Isolated Data Subnetβ βββ Transit Gateway Subnetββββ Availability Zone C βββ Public Subnet βββ Private Application Subnet βββ Isolated Data Subnet βββ Transit Gateway SubnetLab 04 β Build the Transit Gateway Segmentation Model
Section titled βLab 04 β Build the Transit Gateway Segmentation ModelβMission
Section titled βMissionβDesign Transit Gateway connectivity and route-table segmentation.
Required Route Tables
Section titled βRequired Route Tablesβ- Production
- Non-Production
- Shared Services
- Inspection
- Hybrid
- Quarantine
Student Actions
Section titled βStudent ActionsβDocument:
- Attachments
- Route-table associations
- Route propagation
- Allowed connections
- Prohibited connections
- Inspection paths
- Failure behaviour
- Quarantine process
Verification Scenarios
Section titled βVerification Scenariosβ- Development cannot initiate traffic to production.
- Production can reach approved shared services.
- On-premises users can reach approved production applications.
- Internet-bound traffic passes through inspection.
- Compromised VPCs can be moved to quarantine.
Lab 05 β Design the Central Inspection VPC
Section titled βLab 05 β Design the Central Inspection VPCβMission
Section titled βMissionβDesign AWS Network Firewall deployment for CloudNova.
Student Actions
Section titled βStudent ActionsβDocument:
- Inspection VPC CIDR
- Availability Zones
- Firewall subnets
- Transit Gateway subnets
- Firewall endpoints
- Route tables
- Stateless rules
- Stateful rules
- Logging
- High availability
- Failure handling
- Rule-change process
Evidence
Section titled βEvidenceβ- Inspection architecture
- Firewall policy
- Sample rule groups
- Routing matrix
- Validation plan
Lab 06 β Build the Centralised Egress Architecture
Section titled βLab 06 β Build the Centralised Egress ArchitectureβMission
Section titled βMissionβDesign secure outbound internet access.
Student Actions
Section titled βStudent ActionsβCreate:
- Egress VPC architecture
- NAT gateway design
- Network Firewall path
- Approved destination strategy
- DNS controls
- Logging
- Resilience plan
- Cost considerations
- Failure scenarios
Required Traffic Path
Section titled βRequired Traffic PathβPrivate Workload
β
Transit Gateway
β
Inspection VPC
β
AWS Network Firewall
β
Egress VPC
β
NAT Gateway
β
InternetLab 07 β Implement Private AWS Service Access
Section titled βLab 07 β Implement Private AWS Service AccessβMission
Section titled βMissionβReduce unnecessary public internet paths using VPC endpoints.
Student Actions
Section titled βStudent ActionsβDesign endpoints for:
- Amazon S3
- Amazon DynamoDB
- AWS Systems Manager
- Amazon EC2 Messages
- Systems Manager Messages
- Amazon ECR
- CloudWatch Logs
- AWS KMS
- Secrets Manager
- AWS STS
Document:
- Endpoint type
- Endpoint subnet
- Security group
- Endpoint policy
- Private DNS
- Resource policy
- Logging
- Ownership
Lab 08 β Design Enterprise DNS Security
Section titled βLab 08 β Design Enterprise DNS SecurityβMission
Section titled βMissionβCreate CloudNovaβs hybrid DNS and DNS Firewall architecture.
Student Actions
Section titled βStudent ActionsβDesign:
- Inbound Resolver endpoints
- Outbound Resolver endpoints
- Resolver rules
- Rule sharing
- Private hosted zones
- DNS query logging
- DNS Firewall rule groups
- Malicious-domain response
- Incident investigation workflow
Required Diagram
Section titled βRequired DiagramβAWS Workloads
β
Route 53 Resolver
β
DNS Firewall
β
Outbound Resolver Endpoint
β
Corporate DNS
β
Approved Internal DomainsLab 09 β Build the Network Monitoring and Isolation Runbook
Section titled βLab 09 β Build the Network Monitoring and Isolation RunbookβMission
Section titled βMissionβCreate an operational runbook for detecting and isolating network threats.
Required Scenarios
Section titled βRequired Scenariosβ- Public administrative port detected
- Malware command-and-control traffic
- DNS tunnelling alert
- Unapproved VPC peering
- Compromised production EC2 instance
- Route-table manipulation
- Firewall bypass
- Unexpected outbound data transfer
Runbook Sections
Section titled βRunbook Sectionsβ- Detection source
- Initial validation
- Traffic analysis
- Business-owner contact
- Containment options
- Evidence preservation
- Recovery
- Post-incident review
Lab 10 β Conduct the Enterprise Network Architecture Review
Section titled βLab 10 β Conduct the Enterprise Network Architecture ReviewβMission
Section titled βMissionβPresent CloudNovaβs target network-security architecture to the Architecture Review Board.
Review Participants
Section titled βReview Participantsβ- Chief Information Security Officer
- Cloud Security Architect
- Network Architect
- Cloud Platform Lead
- SOC Manager
- Application Architect
- Data Architect
- Compliance Manager
- Disaster-Recovery Lead
- Finance Representative
Review Topics
Section titled βReview Topicsβ- IP addressing
- VPC design
- Transit Gateway
- Segmentation
- Inspection
- Internet ingress
- Internet egress
- DNS
- Hybrid connectivity
- Private endpoints
- Network monitoring
- Incident isolation
- Resilience
- Cost
- Migration risks
π» AWS Console Walkthrough
Section titled βπ» AWS Console WalkthroughβStudents should explore or configure:
- Amazon VPC
- VPC IP Address Manager
- Subnets
- Route tables
- Internet gateways
- NAT gateways
- Security groups
- Network ACLs
- VPC Flow Logs
- Transit Gateway
- Transit Gateway attachments
- Transit Gateway route tables
- AWS Network Firewall
- Firewall policies
- Rule groups
- Firewall logging
- VPC endpoints
- Endpoint policies
- Route 53 Resolver endpoints
- Resolver rules
- DNS Firewall
- Site-to-Site VPN
- Direct Connect architecture
- CloudWatch network logs
π» AWS CLI Exercises
Section titled βπ» AWS CLI ExercisesβRun these commands only in an authorised training or sandbox environment.
# Display the current AWS identityaws sts get-caller-identity
# List VPCsaws ec2 describe-vpcs
# List subnetsaws ec2 describe-subnets
# List route tablesaws ec2 describe-route-tables
# List internet gatewaysaws ec2 describe-internet-gateways
# List NAT gatewaysaws ec2 describe-nat-gateways
# List security groupsaws ec2 describe-security-groups
# List network ACLsaws ec2 describe-network-acls
# List VPC peering connectionsaws ec2 describe-vpc-peering-connections
# List VPC endpointsaws ec2 describe-vpc-endpoints
# List VPC Flow Logsaws ec2 describe-flow-logsTransit Gateway Commands
Section titled βTransit Gateway Commandsβ# List Transit Gatewaysaws ec2 describe-transit-gateways
# List Transit Gateway attachmentsaws ec2 describe-transit-gateway-attachments
# List Transit Gateway route tablesaws ec2 describe-transit-gateway-route-tables
# List VPC attachmentsaws ec2 describe-transit-gateway-vpc-attachments
# Search a Transit Gateway route tableaws ec2 search-transit-gateway-routes \ --transit-gateway-route-table-id tgw-rtb-EXAMPLE \ --filters Name=state,Values=activeNetwork Firewall Commands
Section titled βNetwork Firewall Commandsβ# List firewallsaws network-firewall list-firewalls
# Describe a firewallaws network-firewall describe-firewall \ --firewall-name CloudNova-Central-Inspection
# List firewall policiesaws network-firewall list-firewall-policies
# List rule groupsaws network-firewall list-rule-groups
# Describe firewall loggingaws network-firewall describe-logging-configuration \ --firewall-name CloudNova-Central-InspectionRoute 53 Resolver Commands
Section titled βRoute 53 Resolver Commandsβ# List Resolver endpointsaws route53resolver list-resolver-endpoints
# List Resolver rulesaws route53resolver list-resolver-rules
# List rule associationsaws route53resolver list-resolver-rule-associations
# List DNS Firewall rule groupsaws route53resolver list-firewall-rule-groups
# List DNS Firewall domain listsaws route53resolver list-firewall-domain-lists
# List Resolver query-log configurationsaws route53resolver list-resolver-query-log-configsVPC IPAM Commands
Section titled βVPC IPAM Commandsβ# List IPAM configurationsaws ec2 describe-ipams
# List IPAM poolsaws ec2 describe-ipam-pools
# List IPAM scopesaws ec2 describe-ipam-scopes
# View allocations in an IPAM poolaws ec2 get-ipam-pool-allocations \ --ipam-pool-id ipam-pool-EXAMPLEExample VPC Flow Log Creation
Section titled βExample VPC Flow Log Creationβaws ec2 create-flow-logs \ --resource-type VPC \ --resource-ids vpc-EXAMPLE \ --traffic-type ALL \ --log-destination-type cloud-watch-logs \ --log-group-name CloudNova-VPC-Flow-Logs \ --deliver-logs-permission-arn arn:aws:iam::111122223333:role/CloudNovaFlowLogsRoleExample Interface Endpoint Creation
Section titled βExample Interface Endpoint Creationβaws ec2 create-vpc-endpoint \ --vpc-id vpc-EXAMPLE \ --vpc-endpoint-type Interface \ --service-name com.amazonaws.eu-west-2.secretsmanager \ --subnet-ids subnet-EXAMPLE1 subnet-EXAMPLE2 \ --security-group-ids sg-EXAMPLE \ --private-dns-enabledβ Technical Verification Checklist
Section titled ββ Technical Verification ChecklistβNetwork Assessment
Section titled βNetwork Assessmentβ- All VPCs are inventoried.
- All CIDR ranges are documented.
- Overlapping CIDRs are identified.
- Public resources are identified.
- Existing network connections are documented.
- Network owners are recorded.
IP Addressing
Section titled βIP Addressingβ- Enterprise IP strategy exists.
- Regional pools are defined.
- Environment pools are defined.
- Reserved ranges are documented.
- IPAM ownership is assigned.
- Allocation workflow is documented.
VPC Architecture
Section titled βVPC Architectureβ- VPC standard is documented.
- Subnet categories are defined.
- Availability Zone requirements are defined.
- Route-table standards are defined.
- VPC naming and tagging are defined.
- Flow Logs are included.
Transit Gateway
Section titled βTransit Gatewayβ- Transit Gateway architecture is documented.
- Attachments have owners.
- Route tables are segmented.
- Production and development are isolated.
- Inspection routing is validated.
- Quarantine routing is designed.
Network Firewall
Section titled βNetwork Firewallβ- Inspection VPC is designed.
- Firewall endpoints exist in required Availability Zones.
- Stateful rules are documented.
- Stateless rules are documented.
- Firewall logging is enabled.
- Rule-change workflow exists.
- Failure behaviour is documented.
Internet Access
Section titled βInternet Accessβ- Internet ingress is documented.
- Internet egress is documented.
- Public IP usage is justified.
- NAT gateway strategy is defined.
- Approved outbound destinations are governed.
- DDoS and WAF requirements are documented.
Private Connectivity
Section titled βPrivate Connectivityβ- Required VPC endpoints are defined.
- Endpoint policies are reviewed.
- Private DNS is configured appropriately.
- S3 and DynamoDB gateway endpoints are assessed.
- PrivateLink requirements are documented.
- Inbound Resolver architecture is documented.
- Outbound Resolver architecture is documented.
- Resolver rules are governed.
- DNS Firewall is designed.
- DNS query logging is enabled.
- Malicious-domain response is documented.
Hybrid Connectivity
Section titled βHybrid Connectivityβ- Direct Connect architecture is documented.
- VPN backup is documented.
- Route advertisements are governed.
- Hybrid traffic inspection is defined.
- Resilience is documented.
- Monitoring is enabled.
Monitoring and Response
Section titled βMonitoring and Responseβ- VPC Flow Logs are centralised.
- Firewall logs are centralised.
- DNS logs are centralised.
- Network alerts are defined.
- Quarantine procedures are documented.
- Isolation exercises are tested.
π§ Troubleshooting Guide
Section titled βπ§ Troubleshooting GuideβIssue 1 β VPCs Cannot Communicate Through Transit Gateway
Section titled βIssue 1 β VPCs Cannot Communicate Through Transit GatewayβPossible causes:
- Missing Transit Gateway route
- Incorrect route-table association
- Route propagation not enabled
- Missing VPC route
- Security-group denial
- Network ACL denial
- Overlapping CIDR ranges
Resolution:
- Verify both attachments.
- Review Transit Gateway route tables.
- Review route propagation.
- Review source and destination VPC routes.
- Review security groups.
- Review network ACLs.
- Confirm CIDR uniqueness.
- Use VPC Reachability Analyzer.
Issue 2 β Traffic Bypasses the Network Firewall
Section titled βIssue 2 β Traffic Bypasses the Network FirewallβPossible causes:
- Direct route to the destination
- Incorrect Transit Gateway association
- Missing inspection route
- Alternative VPC peering path
- Public IP path
- Incorrect firewall subnet route table
Resolution:
- Review all available routes.
- Remove unauthorised direct connectivity.
- Validate Transit Gateway route tables.
- Review inspection VPC routing.
- Check internet-gateway and NAT paths.
- Review VPC peering.
- Test using Reachability Analyzer.
Issue 3 β Return Traffic Uses a Different Path
Section titled βIssue 3 β Return Traffic Uses a Different PathβPossible causes:
- Asymmetric routing
- Incorrect route propagation
- Multiple default routes
- Appliance mode not configured
- Availability Zone path mismatch
Resolution:
- Map forward and return routes.
- Review Transit Gateway attachment settings.
- Review appliance mode.
- Validate Availability Zone routing.
- Remove conflicting routes.
- Test each traffic direction separately.
Issue 4 β Interface Endpoint Is Not Reachable
Section titled βIssue 4 β Interface Endpoint Is Not ReachableβPossible causes:
- Private DNS disabled
- Endpoint security group blocks traffic
- Incorrect subnet selection
- DNS settings disabled in the VPC
- Endpoint policy denies access
- Resource policy denies access
Resolution:
- Confirm endpoint status.
- Confirm private DNS.
- Review endpoint security groups.
- Review VPC DNS settings.
- Review endpoint policy.
- Review target-resource policy.
- Test DNS resolution.
Issue 5 β DNS Queries Do Not Reach On-Premises DNS
Section titled βIssue 5 β DNS Queries Do Not Reach On-Premises DNSβPossible causes:
- Missing outbound endpoint
- Incorrect Resolver rule
- Rule not associated with the VPC
- Network route missing
- Security group blocking DNS
- On-premises DNS not permitting the endpoint addresses
Resolution:
- Verify the outbound endpoint.
- Review the forwarding rule.
- Confirm VPC association.
- Review hybrid routes.
- Permit TCP and UDP DNS as required.
- Review corporate DNS access controls.
- Review Resolver query logs.
Issue 6 β DNS Firewall Blocks a Required Domain
Section titled βIssue 6 β DNS Firewall Blocks a Required DomainβPossible causes:
- Domain included in a block list
- Rule priority conflict
- Overly broad wildcard
- Threat-intelligence false positive
- Missing approved-domain exception
Resolution:
- Review the query log.
- Identify the matching rule.
- Validate the business requirement.
- Add a controlled allow-list entry.
- Test in non-production.
- Document the exception.
- Review the domain regularly.
Issue 7 β VPC Flow Logs Are Missing
Section titled βIssue 7 β VPC Flow Logs Are MissingβPossible causes:
- Flow Logs not enabled
- Delivery role lacks permissions
- Log destination is incorrect
- KMS permissions are missing
- Region mismatch
- Log group or bucket policy issue
Resolution:
- Review Flow Log status.
- Verify the delivery role.
- Review the destination.
- Review KMS permissions.
- Review CloudWatch or S3 policies.
- Confirm the correct Region.
- Generate test traffic.
Issue 8 β Security Group Change Breaks Application Access
Section titled βIssue 8 β Security Group Change Breaks Application AccessβPossible causes:
- Required source removed
- Incorrect source security group
- Missing outbound rule
- Wrong port
- Load-balancer health-check traffic blocked
- Database dependency overlooked
Resolution:
- Review application flow documentation.
- Check load-balancer health checks.
- Review source and destination groups.
- Review VPC Flow Logs.
- Restore the approved previous rule.
- Validate the application.
- Update dependency documentation.
π’ Enterprise Best Practices
Section titled βπ’ Enterprise Best PracticesβCloudNova network-security standards:
- Use non-overlapping CIDR ranges.
- Maintain central IP-address governance.
- Use separate VPCs for major trust boundaries.
- Separate production and non-production.
- Use Transit Gateway route tables for segmentation.
- Avoid unrestricted VPC-to-VPC connectivity.
- Use a dedicated inspection VPC.
- Inspect traffic crossing sensitive boundaries.
- Validate routing symmetry.
- Use centralised egress where appropriate.
- Minimise public IP addresses.
- Use approved ingress services.
- Use AWS WAF for supported web applications.
- Use VPC endpoints for private AWS service access.
- Restrict endpoint policies.
- Use Route 53 Resolver for hybrid DNS.
- Apply DNS Firewall controls.
- Enable DNS query logging.
- Enable VPC Flow Logs.
- Enable Network Firewall alert and flow logs.
- Centralise network telemetry.
- Use security-group references where practical.
- Avoid unrestricted SSH and RDP.
- Review security groups regularly.
- Use network ACLs only with a defined requirement.
- Encrypt hybrid and application traffic where required.
- Maintain redundant hybrid connectivity.
- Test incident-isolation procedures.
- Use Infrastructure as Code.
- Validate network changes before production.
- Maintain current network diagrams.
- Assign owners to routes, rules and connections.
- Remove unused network paths.
- Review network exceptions regularly.
π« Common Mistakes
Section titled βπ« Common Mistakesβ- Allowing overlapping VPC CIDRs.
- Using one unrestricted Transit Gateway route table.
- Assuming Transit Gateway provides firewall inspection.
- Allowing development networks to reach production.
- Deploying Network Firewall without validating routes.
- Ignoring asymmetric routing.
- Creating direct VPC peering that bypasses inspection.
- Using public IP addresses for private workloads.
- Allowing unrestricted internet egress.
- Allowing SSH or RDP from the internet.
- Using default security groups for applications.
- Failing to review outbound security-group rules.
- Creating overly complex network ACLs.
- Forgetting ephemeral ports in network ACLs.
- Not enabling VPC Flow Logs.
- Treating Flow Logs as packet captures.
- Failing to log DNS queries.
- Allowing workloads to use unauthorised DNS servers.
- Using broad DNS Firewall wildcard rules without testing.
- Creating interface endpoints without endpoint policies.
- Assuming Direct Connect traffic is automatically trusted.
- Advertising unrestricted on-premises routes.
- Failing to design hybrid-connectivity redundancy.
- Making firewall changes directly in production.
- Leaving temporary firewall rules permanently active.
- Failing to document network owners.
- Not testing network-isolation procedures.
- Ignoring the cost impact of centralised traffic paths.
- Failing to consider data residency in inter-Region routing.
- Building a single shared network failure domain.
π¦ Required Project Deliverables
Section titled βπ¦ Required Project DeliverablesβStudents must create the following project files:
CloudNova-Enterprise-Security/
βββ 03-Enterprise-Network-Security/ βββ README.md βββ 01-Assessment/ β βββ Current-State-Network-Assessment.md β βββ Network-Inventory.md β βββ Public-Exposure-Assessment.md β βββ Network-Risk-Assessment.md βββ 02-IP-Addressing/ β βββ IP-Addressing-Strategy.md β βββ CIDR-Allocation-Register.md β βββ IPAM-Architecture.md β βββ Overlap-Assessment.md βββ 03-VPC-Architecture/ β βββ Enterprise-VPC-Standard.md β βββ Subnet-Design.md β βββ Route-Table-Standard.md β βββ VPC-Naming-and-Tagging.md βββ 04-Transit-Gateway/ β βββ Transit-Gateway-Architecture.md β βββ Attachment-Register.md β βββ Route-Table-Design.md β βββ Segmentation-Matrix.md β βββ Quarantine-Routing.md βββ 05-Network-Firewall/ β βββ Inspection-VPC-Design.md β βββ Firewall-Policy.md β βββ Stateless-Rule-Groups.md β βββ Stateful-Rule-Groups.md β βββ Firewall-Rule-Review.md βββ 06-Internet-Access/ β βββ Central-Egress-Architecture.md β βββ Internet-Ingress-Architecture.md β βββ Public-Exposure-Standard.md β βββ Approved-Destination-Register.md βββ 07-Private-Connectivity/ β βββ VPC-Endpoint-Strategy.md β βββ Endpoint-Policy-Standards.md β βββ PrivateLink-Architecture.md β βββ Endpoint-Register.md βββ 08-DNS/ β βββ Enterprise-DNS-Architecture.md β βββ Resolver-Endpoint-Design.md β βββ DNS-Firewall-Policy.md β βββ DNS-Logging-Strategy.md βββ 09-Hybrid-Connectivity/ β βββ Direct-Connect-Architecture.md β βββ VPN-Architecture.md β βββ Hybrid-Route-Policy.md β βββ Connectivity-Resilience.md βββ 10-Monitoring/ β βββ Network-Logging-Strategy.md β βββ VPC-Flow-Log-Standard.md β βββ Network-Alert-Catalogue.md β βββ Network-Security-Dashboard.md βββ 11-Incident-Response/ β βββ Network-Isolation-Runbook.md β βββ Quarantine-Procedure.md β βββ Malicious-DNS-Runbook.md β βββ Firewall-Incident-Runbook.md βββ 12-Governance/ β βββ Network-Change-Procedure.md β βββ Firewall-Rule-Request.md β βββ Network-Exception-Process.md β βββ Network-Ownership-Matrix.md βββ 13-Evidence/ β βββ Screenshots/ β βββ CLI-Outputs/ β βββ Connectivity-Tests/ β βββ Flow-Log-Evidence/ β βββ Verification-Checklist.md βββ 14-Reports/ βββ Network-Architecture-Review.md βββ Executive-Network-Strategy.md βββ Risk-Register.md βββ Lessons-Learned.mdπ§ͺ DIY Enterprise Challenge
Section titled βπ§ͺ DIY Enterprise ChallengeβCloudNova acquires a global retail company called RetailSphere.
RetailSphere currently operates:
- 60 AWS accounts
- 110 VPCs
- Eight AWS Regions
- Multiple overlapping CIDR ranges
- 75 VPC peering connections
- Two Transit Gateways
- Four Direct Connect connections
- Twelve Site-to-Site VPNs
- Internet egress from every workload account
- Public IP addresses on application servers
- No central Network Firewall
- Inconsistent VPC Flow Logs
- No DNS Firewall
- Shared production and development networks
- Unrestricted administrative security-group rules
- No network-isolation runbook
- Undocumented partner connections
Design a complete network transformation and migration plan.
Your submission must include:
- Current-state network assessment
- VPC and CIDR inventory
- Overlapping CIDR remediation strategy
- Target IP-addressing architecture
- VPC design standard
- Transit Gateway architecture
- Route-table segmentation model
- Inspection VPC architecture
- Network Firewall policy
- Centralised egress design
- Internet ingress design
- VPC endpoint strategy
- Hybrid DNS architecture
- DNS Firewall policy
- Direct Connect and VPN architecture
- VPC Flow Log strategy
- Security-group remediation plan
- Network incident-isolation runbook
- Migration sequence
- Rollback plan
- Operational-risk assessment
- Cost considerations
- Architecture review
- Executive summary
π Knowledge Check
Section titled βπ Knowledge CheckβQuestion 1
Section titled βQuestion 1βWhat is the primary objective of enterprise network segmentation?
Answer:
To limit unnecessary communication between systems, reduce the blast radius of compromise and enforce approved trust boundaries.
Question 2
Section titled βQuestion 2βWhy should CloudNova avoid overlapping CIDR ranges?
Answer:
Overlapping CIDRs create routing ambiguity and can prevent VPC, hybrid and Transit Gateway connectivity.
Question 3
Section titled βQuestion 3βWhat is the purpose of AWS Transit Gateway?
Answer:
It provides central routing connectivity between VPCs, AWS accounts, VPNs and supported hybrid or inter-Region connections.
Question 4
Section titled βQuestion 4βDoes Transit Gateway automatically inspect network traffic?
Answer:
No. Traffic inspection requires routing through a firewall or approved inspection appliance.
Question 5
Section titled βQuestion 5βWhy should Transit Gateway use multiple route tables?
Answer:
Multiple route tables allow CloudNova to segment production, non-production, shared services, hybrid and quarantine networks.
Question 6
Section titled βQuestion 6βWhat is the purpose of an inspection VPC?
Answer:
It centralises network-security controls and separates firewall administration from application workload administration.
Question 7
Section titled βQuestion 7βWhat is AWS Network Firewall used for?
Answer:
It provides managed stateless and stateful network-traffic filtering and inspection within VPC architectures.
Question 8
Section titled βQuestion 8βWhat is the difference between stateless and stateful firewall inspection?
Answer:
Stateless inspection evaluates individual packets, while stateful inspection tracks connections and evaluates traffic in the context of a session.
Question 9
Section titled βQuestion 9βWhy is symmetric routing important for stateful inspection?
Answer:
The firewall must see both directions of a connection to maintain and evaluate the session correctly.
Question 10
Section titled βQuestion 10βWhat is centralised internet egress?
Answer:
It routes outbound internet traffic from multiple VPCs through shared inspection and egress services.
Question 11
Section titled βQuestion 11βWhy should private workloads avoid public IP addresses?
Answer:
Removing unnecessary public exposure reduces the attack surface and supports private, controlled connectivity.
Question 12
Section titled βQuestion 12βWhat is the difference between a gateway endpoint and an interface endpoint?
Answer:
A gateway endpoint adds private routes for supported services, while an interface endpoint creates private network interfaces for access to supported services.
Question 13
Section titled βQuestion 13βWhat is AWS PrivateLink?
Answer:
It enables private connectivity between VPCs and services without requiring public IP addresses or public internet paths.
Question 14
Section titled βQuestion 14βWhy are VPC endpoint policies important?
Answer:
They can restrict which principals, actions and resources may be accessed through the endpoint.
Question 15
Section titled βQuestion 15βWhat is the purpose of a Route 53 Resolver inbound endpoint?
Answer:
It allows networks outside the VPC, such as on-premises networks, to resolve approved AWS private DNS names.
Question 16
Section titled βQuestion 16βWhat is the purpose of a Route 53 Resolver outbound endpoint?
Answer:
It allows AWS workloads to forward selected DNS queries to external DNS servers, such as corporate DNS.
Question 17
Section titled βQuestion 17βWhat does Route 53 Resolver DNS Firewall control?
Answer:
It filters outbound DNS queries that pass through Route 53 Resolver based on configured domain rules.
Question 18
Section titled βQuestion 18βWhy should DNS query logs be collected?
Answer:
They support threat detection, malware investigations, DNS-tunnelling detection, troubleshooting and compliance.
Question 19
Section titled βQuestion 19βWhat is the difference between a security group and a network ACL?
Answer:
A security group is stateful and applies to supported resources or network interfaces, while a network ACL is stateless and applies at the subnet boundary.
Question 20
Section titled βQuestion 20βWhy should administrative ports not be open to 0.0.0.0/0?
Answer:
It exposes management services to the entire internet and significantly increases the risk of compromise.
Question 21
Section titled βQuestion 21βWhat information do VPC Flow Logs provide?
Answer:
They provide metadata about network flows, including accepted and rejected traffic, but they do not provide complete packet contents.
Question 22
Section titled βQuestion 22βWhy is Direct Connect not automatically a trusted network path?
Answer:
Dedicated connectivity does not verify user or workload identity and does not replace segmentation, encryption, inspection or authorisation controls.
Question 23
Section titled βQuestion 23βWhat is a quarantine Transit Gateway route table?
Answer:
It is a restrictive route table used to isolate compromised or suspended VPCs while retaining limited access to approved security services.
Question 24
Section titled βQuestion 24βWhy must firewall rules have owners and review dates?
Answer:
Ownership and review dates prevent obsolete or temporary access from remaining active indefinitely.
Question 25
Section titled βQuestion 25βWhat is the final outcome of this project?
Answer:
A secure, segmented, observable and scalable enterprise AWS network architecture supporting multi-account workloads, private connectivity, central inspection, hybrid operations and rapid incident isolation.
π‘ Key Takeaways
Section titled βπ‘ Key TakeawaysβAfter completing this lesson, you should understand that enterprise network security is not limited to creating VPCs and security groups.
A mature enterprise network combines:
- Central IP-address governance
- Multi-account VPC architecture
- Transit Gateway connectivity
- Route-table segmentation
- Centralised traffic inspection
- AWS Network Firewall
- Controlled internet ingress
- Controlled internet egress
- Private AWS service access
- AWS PrivateLink
- Enterprise DNS
- DNS Firewall
- Hybrid connectivity
- Network telemetry
- Threat detection
- Incident isolation
- Continuous governance
A strong network architecture allows CloudNova to provide only the connectivity required by the business while preventing unnecessary communication, reducing public exposure and maintaining complete security visibility.
π Project Completion Criteria
Section titled βπ Project Completion CriteriaβYou have completed this project when:
- The current network environment has been assessed.
- The network inventory is complete.
- The IP-addressing strategy is documented.
- The VPC standard is complete.
- Transit Gateway architecture is designed.
- Route-table segmentation is validated.
- The inspection VPC is designed.
- The Network Firewall policy is documented.
- Internet ingress and egress are documented.
- VPC endpoint requirements are defined.
- PrivateLink architecture is documented.
- Enterprise DNS architecture is complete.
- DNS Firewall policy is defined.
- Hybrid connectivity is documented.
- VPC Flow Log standards are complete.
- Network incident-isolation procedures exist.
- Network governance is documented.
- Connectivity tests have been completed.
- The architecture review has been conducted.
- All evidence is stored in the project repository.
- The executive network-security strategy is ready for presentation.
π Next Lesson
Section titled βπ Next Lessonββ‘οΈ Lesson 04 β Enterprise Security Operations Platform Project
In the next lesson, you will design and implement CloudNovaβs central security monitoring and operations platform using:
- AWS CloudTrail
- Amazon CloudWatch
- AWS Config
- Amazon GuardDuty
- AWS Security Hub
- Amazon Detective
- Amazon Inspector
- Amazon EventBridge
- Amazon Security Lake
- Security automation
- SIEM integration
- Detection engineering
- Threat hunting
- Incident-management workflows